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Abstract
Nearly all serious accidents, in the past twenty years, in which software has
been involved can be traced to requirements flaws. Accidents related to
or involving safety-critical systems often lead to significant damage to life,
property, and environment in which the systems operate.
This thesis explores an extension to use case modelling that allows safety
concerns to be modelled early in the systems development process. This
motivation comes from interaction with systems and safety engineers who
routinely rely upon use case modelling during the early stages of defining
and analysing system behaviour.
The approach of embedded formal methods is adopted. That is, we use one
discipline of use case modelling to guide the development of a formal model.
This enables a greater precision and formal assurance when reasoning about
concerns identified by system and safety engineers as well as the subsequent
changes made at the level of use case modelling. The chosen formal method
is Event-B, which is refinement based and has consequently enabled the
approach to exploit a natural abstractions found within use case modelling.
This abstraction of the problem found within use cases help introduce their
behaviour into the Event-B model via step-wise refinement.
The central ideas underlying this thesis are implemented in, UC-B, a tool
support for modelling use cases on the Rodin platform (an eclipse-based
development environment for Event-B). UC-B allows the specification of
the use cases to be detailed with both informal and formal notation, and
supports the automatic generation of an Event-B model given a formally
specified use case. Several case studies of use cases with accident cases are
provided, with their formalisation in Event-B supported by UC-B tool. An
examination of the translation from use cases to Event-B model is discussed,
along with the subsequent verification provided by Event-B to the use case
model.
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Introduction
1.1 Motivation
With the significant rise in computational power, safety-critical systems are increas-
ingly software-intensive [72,104]. In the development of these systems, the requirements
document forms the starting point and are an attempt to establish what the system
should do. The conventional techniques for capturing requirements are typically infor-
mal [86], and do not lend itself to automatic analysis and checking. The implication of
defects and limitations in the requirements can be significant, as much of the remainder
of the development process is aimed at implementing the system described within the
requirements document [73,77]. Errors introduced in the development of safety-critical
systems are particularly costly, and can have significant impact on life, property, and
the environment in which these systems operate.
Software-Related Accidents
“Most software-related accidents have been system accidents that stem from
the operation of the software, not from its lack of operation and usually that
operation is exactly what the software engineers intended.”
– Nancy G. Leveson
Nearly all serious accidents in the past twenty years, in which software has been
involved, can be traced to flaws introduced in the requirements [57, 72, 81]. In the
loss of the Mars Polar Lander (MPL) [39], the software requirements did not include
information to ignore the sensor readings from the landing-legs during the descent
phase. The on-board software mistook a jolt, recorded by the sensor readings, during
the deployment of the landing-legs for “ground contact”, and shut down the descent
engines, causing the MPL to fall from a presumed height of 40 meters (130 feet) on to
1
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the surface of Mars. A post-mortem analysis determined that this scenario was most
likely the cause of the accident that resulted in the MPL to strike the surface of Mars
at a high velocity.
In the batch chemical reactor accident [64, 72], the computer was in charge of:
controlling the flow of catalyst into the reactor, and also the flow of water into a
condenser to cool off the reaction. The systems engineers were told that if a fault
occurred in the plant, they were to leave all controlled variables as they were, and to
sound an alarm. On one occasion, the computer received a signal indicating a low oil
level in a gearbox (a fault). The computer reacted as its requirements specified: it
sounded an alarm and left the controls as they were. By coincidence, a catalyst had
been added to the reactor, but the computer had just started to increase the cooling-
water flow to the reflux condenser; the flow was therefore kept at a low rate. This
resulted in the reactor to overheat that caused the relief valve being lifted and the
discharge of contents in the reactor into the atmosphere. This accident resulted from
the systems engineers not being made aware of the safety requirement where the water
valve was required to be opened before the catalyst valve, and therefore assumed the
ordering was irrelevant.
The problem may also stem from unhandled control system states and environmen-
tal conditions. An F-18 was lost as a result of the aircraft getting into an altitude that
the engineers had assumed was impossible and that the software was not programmed
to handle [44]. Requirements are typically where the most errors are introduced in the
development process and also the most expensive to fix [77,81]. Figure 1.1, illustrates
the software defects and their cost to fix ration with respect to development phases.
There is hard data to support this premise that the majority of the software errors
are often introduced in the requirements. Lutz [77] examined 387 software errors un-
covered during integration and system testing of the Voyager and Galileo spacecraft.
She concluded that a majority of software errors identified as potentially hazardous to
the system were produced by: (1) discrepancies between the documented requirements
specification and the requirements needed for the correct functioning of the system.
(2) misunderstanding about the interface with the rest of the system.
Formal Methods for Requirements Analysis
When the requirements are defined informally throughout the early stages in the de-
velopment, the process of verification relies heavily on engineering judgement at later
stages. In requirements engineering, UML use cases [55] are an informal notation for
modelling the required behaviour of a system with respect to its operational environ-
ment. They are widely used and highly accessible. Use cases provides a basis on
Chapter 1. Introduction 3
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(a) Distribution of software defects.
Phase Cost Ratio
Requirements 1
Design 3-6
Coding 10
Unit Testing 15-40
System Testing 30-70
Production 40-1000
(b) Distribution of cost to fix defect.
Figure 1.1: Software defects and their cost to fix ratio with respect to development phases
[81].| |
which initial system behaviours can be defined and analysed. The lack of formality in
specifying use cases means that the process of analysis is typically review-based, and
thus lacks the rigour that comes from formal methods, i.e. systematic identification of
ambiguities, inconsistencies and incompleteness.
Formal methods can be used at all stages in the development process, from re-
quirements analysis to system acceptance testing [66]. It can provide precision which
is key to eliminating errors in requirements, while abstraction is key to mastering re-
quirements complexity. Without a rigorous approach to understanding requirements
and constructing specifications, it can be very difficult to uncover such errors other
than through testing after a lot of development has already been undertaken. Figure
1.2 illustrates error discovery rates at different stage in the development process, with
and without the use of formal methods [66]. However, formal methods are not easily
accessible due to the gap that exists between the informal and formal specifications.
| |
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(a) Typical error discovery.
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(b) Error discovery with formal methods.
Figure 1.2: Error discovery rate at different stage in development [66].| |
This thesis presents an approach that adds rigour to use cases via the Event-B [1]
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formal method. Event-B provides verification methods that support the discovery
and elimination of inconsistencies in models. The formalism, Event-B, was selected
because it promotes a layered style of formal modelling, where a design is developed as
a series of abstract models – level by level concrete details are progressively introduced
via provably correct refinement steps. Sometimes referred to as posit-and-prove, this
style of modelling can increase the clarity of design decisions as well as simplifying
the complexity of the verification task. Abstraction and refinement are key methods
to manage system complexity for structuring formal modelling effort by supporting
separation of concern and layered reasoning. This thesis aims to help bridge the gap
between the informal (i.e. use cases) and the formal (i.e. Event-B) by leveraging the
structure that is imposed by UML use cases, thus reducing the skills and experiences
that the user will require in formal methods.
This thesis provides a novel approach in exploiting a natural abstraction found
in use cases to aid the formal modelling effort with refinement. An encoding that
exploits this mapping is presented in this thesis. That is, for a given use case it is
possible to automatically generate an Event-B development that models the behaviour
of the use case using step-wise refinement. The completion of the development relies
upon the user formalizing the details of their use case, e.g. constants, variables, pre-,
post-condition, invariants, assignments.
Integrating Safety Analysis with Requirements Analysis
In the development of safety-critical systems, apart from capturing and analysing the
functional requirements, safety analysis is performed to identify potential dangers,
i.e. undesired or unplanned behaviours, that may occur in the operation of the system
[73,104]. The identification of these undesired behaviours helped investigate statements
that form the safety requirements of the system. The safety requirements defines
what the system must and must not do in order to ensure safety, and place integrity
constraints on existing core functions. In addition, new functional requirements may
be needed to prevent or mitigate the effects of failures identified in the analysis.
Often the requirements and safety analysis processes are performed in an ad-hoc
manner [72]. This results in that the safety requirements and the new additional be-
haviours appear in the requirements document, without due acknowledgement from
their origins in safety. Most requirements engineering techniques focus on capturing
only the desired behaviours of the system. For instance, UML use cases [19] do not
provide any special mechanisms for representing undesired behaviours or safety con-
cerns identified by the safety analysis. UML use cases only consider positive scenarios,
also known as “sunny day” scenarios, where there are no failures considered in the
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interaction between the system and entities in the environment, to achieve the desired
functionality. This results in over-simplified assumptions about the problem domain
and a tendency to go prematurely into design considerations.
This thesis aims to bridge the gap between safety analysis and the UML use cases
via the notion of accident cases. UML use cases are extended to include a use case
type accident case that would allow the requirements analysis to consider undesired
or unplanned behaviour from the safety analysis. The purpose of this extension is to
allow the desired behaviour to be specified in context of the undesired behaviours that
may occur.
Lightweight Application of Formal Methods
“Industry will have no reason to adopt formal methods until the benefits of
formalization can be obtained immediately, with an analysis that does not
require further massive investment.”
– Daniel Jackson
Historically, formal methods have been viewed as a pure alternative to traditional
development methodologies, requiring massive investment in the development process,
for industry to adopt [6, 59]. Recently, there has been a new trend of lightweight
applications of formal methods, documented by Jones [59], Jackson, Wing [51] and
by Easterbrook [33]. A lightweight approaches exhibit, partiality with respect to lan-
guage, modelling, analysis and composition, and has focused area of application. These
lightweight approaches are targeted primarily on the early stages of development and
are focused towards defect detection through rigorous examination.
In order for the formalisation of use cases to be more accessible, the research fo-
cused on the development of a prototype plug-in UC-B for the Rodin [4] platform
(development environment for Event-B). The purpose of UC-B is to enable use cases
to be authored and managed in Rodin. The plug-in aims to maintain the familiarity
of detailing a textual use case specification with informal notation, while also allowing
a corresponding formal specification, written with Event-B’s mathematical language,
to co-exist side-by-side. The aim of this dual representation of the specification is to
bridge the gap between the informal and formal specification.
Furthermore, given a formally specified use case, the purpose of the tool is to
support the automatic generation of an Event-B model, using the natural abstraction
found in the structure of use cases. This is aimed to reduce much of the modelling
effort with Event-B, while allowing the use case modeller to focus on specifying the
requirements. The generated Event-B model is immediately subjected to provers and
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syntax checkers, provided by the Rodin platform, that allow defects to be identified.
As a consequence, inconsistencies and defects identified by formal verification tools can
be related back to the level of the use case specification.
The concept of an accident case, the formalisation of use cases in Event-B, and the
initial tool development has been published in [82]. The research reported in this thesis
was supported by an EPSRC Industrial Case grant EP/J501992, with BAE SYSTEMS1
as the industrial project partner.
1.1.1 Industry Context
The work presented in this thesis is an on-going effort to help with the industrial
adoption of formal methods at early stage during requirements analysis and of a more
specific effort to consider safety concerns. This research has benefited from an industrial
project partnership with BAE SYSTEMS, which has provided a practical perspective
on the current challenges faced by engineers during the early stages in system devel-
opment. It has helped shape the focus of this research towards tools and techniques
that are actively used by, and familiar to, industry practitioners. The following are
summations of what was learnt through this partnership.
There are many techniques for early stage analysis of requirements: goal-oriented
[107], problem-oriented [53], and use case based [55] requirements engineering tech-
niques. At the start of this research, the requirements analysis was performed using
Problem Frames, a problem-oriented requirements analysis technique, as a means to
capture and analyse system behaviour. This was due to popularity and interest of Prob-
lem Frames in the Event-B community, as part of the DEPLOY2 project, as means to
bridge the gap between informal and formal specification [95]. However, through the
industry partnership, UML use cases was understood to be actively used at early stages
in the systems development process for requirements analysis, and their notations to
be more familiar to practitioners, in comparison to Problem Frames.
In the communication with systems and safety engineers, approaches towards the
integration of the requirements and safety analysis processes were also found to be
of interest. The requirements and safety analysis processes are often known to be
performed in an ad-hoc manner. This results in safety requirements appearing in the
requirements documentation without due acknowledgement to their origins from safety
analysis. This guided the research towards an approach to consider safety in UML use
cases, via the notion of the accident case. This extension aims to provide a platform for
systems and safety engineers to communicate appropriate design recommendations via
1BAE SYSTEMS - http://www.baesystems.com/
2DEPLOY Project - http://www.deploy-project.eu
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additional functionality to help prevent accidents as part of the development process.
1.2 Thesis Contribution
In summary the main contributions of this thesis are:
Accident Cases for UML Use Cases
UML use cases is extended with a use case type accident case. The purpose of this
extension is to enable accidents identified in the safety analysis process to be considered
along-side the use cases of a system. The accidents represent undesired or unplanned
behaviour that are introduced as deviations from the expected core functions of the
system, which are defined by regular use cases. The notations and semantics for the
accident case are provided.
Formal Use Case Specifications
The textual use case specifications that are typically informal, are enhanced with Event-
B’s mathematical language that support the use cases to be detailed with precise
semantics. The aim of this enhancement is to allow the textual specification to have
both informal and formal descriptions of the use case specification that are allowed
to co-exist, side-by-side. The purpose of this dual representation is to provide a step
towards bridging the gap between informal and formal specifications. The abstract
syntax for the use case specification is provided.
Encoding Use Cases in Event-B
An encoding of the use case specification in Event-B is provided. This encoding exploits
a natural abstraction found in use cases to model its behaviour in an Event-B model via
step-wise refinement. Gluing invariants are identified to help ensure that the abstract
model is related to the concrete model. The encoding also provides the verification
support provided in the generated Event-B model for a use case with its relation to
defects in the use case specification. Translation rules from a generic use case to an
Event-B model is provided.
Tool Development
The development of a prototype tool, UC-B, for the Rodin platform is provided. The
tool aims to implement the above contributions. It enables the use cases to be authored
and managed in Rodin. The specification of the use cases is required to contain both
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formal and informal notation. Given a formally specified use case the tool supports
automatic generation of a corresponding Event-B model. The mechanisation of this
process decreases the formal modelling effort. The generated Event-B model is imme-
diately subjected to the automatic verification tools that Rodin provides which helps
identify defects in the use case specification.
Case Studies and Evaluation
A collection of case studies is used to describe concepts of the use case specification
and the encoding in Event-B. The case studies aim to cover the use case types: use
case, accident case, and extension use case. In addition, types of branching within the
scenario of a use case are discussed. The verification provided by the Event-B model
is discussed with relation to the use case specifications.
1.3 Thesis Roadmap and Outline
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Figure 1.3: Thesis Roadmap.| |
Figure 1.3 shows the roadmap of the thesis. It has been divided into nine distinct
parts. The arrows how dependency and are assumed to be “transitive”. The thesis is
organised as follows:
Chapter 2 contains relevant background information on requirements engineering, safety
engineering and formal methods.
Chapter 3 extends UML use cases with accident cases.
Chapter 4 describes a formal underpinning of the use cases via the use case model.
The use case model provides the structure for the use case specifications.
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Chapter 5 describes the encoding of the use case model in Event-B.
Chapter 6 provides the tool development for UC-B for the Rodin platform.
Chapter 7 describes the case studies and their evaluation.
Chapter 8 and finally, Chapter 8 outlines future directions and concludes.
Chapter2
Background
In this chapter, the necessary background on the field of requirements engineering,
safety engineering, and formal methods is provided in Sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, respec-
tively. In particular, the background provides the concepts, notations and semantics
for UML use cases and Event-B that form parts of the approach proposed in this thesis.
2.1 Requirements Engineering
“The single hardest part of building a software system is deciding precisely
what to build. No other part of the conceptual work is as difficult as estab-
lishing the requirements. No other part of the work so cripples the resulting
system if done wrong. No other part is more difficult to rectify later.”
– Frederick P. Brooks, Jr
Requirements analysis was part of the formation of Software Engineering (SE), which
was created as a result of the so-called “software-crises” [83] in the late 1960s. At
this stage requirements analysis was perceived to be as potentially high leverage but
neglected area of software development [41]. By the mid 1970s, a review by Bell and
Thayer [16] had produced plenty of empirical data, conforming that the “requirements
problem is a reality”. The growing recognition of the critical nature of requirements
in software engineering gradually established Requirements Engineering (RE) as an
important sub-field of Software Engineering (SE) [46].
Brooks [43] highlighted the role of requirements engineering in his seminal paper,
“No Silver Bullet: Essence and Accidents of Software Engineering”. The paper sug-
gested that the essential difficulties in requirements engineering are harder to solve
due to the inherent properties of modern software-intensive systems. Difficulties arose
10
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as a result of the software product being embedded in a cultural matrix of applica-
tions, users, laws, and other machine vehicles. These all change continually, and their
change inexorably forces change upon the software product. Although much progress
has been made since the 1960s, requirements deficiencies in many software develop-
ment projects are still a main contributing factor for project failures and occurrences
in software-related accidents [31, 73,77]. Sommerville and Sawyer [102] observe that a
large number of project cost overruns and late deliveries still exist because of poor re-
quirements engineering processes. The following provides the definition of requirements
engineering by Zave [117]:
Definition 2.1 (Requirements Engineering). Requirements engineering is the branch
of software engineering concerned with the real-world goals for, functions of, and con-
straints on software systems. It is also concerned with the relationship of these factors
to precise specifications of software behaviour, and to their evolution over time and
across software families.
In this section, an overview of the requirements engineering techniques Problem
Frames, Goal-Oriented Requirements Engineering (KAOS and i* approach) and UML
use cases are discussed. A running example of a water tank system is used to pro-
vide a viewpoint on how requirements are modelled by the requirements engineering
techniques.
A Running Example: A Water Tank System
A simple case study of a water tank system is used as a means to describe how its core
functionality can be captured and analysed by the different requirements engineering
(RE) techniques. This case study is partly inspired by [21]. The aim of the water
tank system is to maintain the water level between the high (H) and low (L) limits of
the water tank, via the use of a controller (referred to as the water tank system), as
seen in Figure 2.1. To achieve this intent, the controller interacts with two external
components, namely the sensor system and pump. The sensor system monitors the
water level in the tank with respect to the high threshold (HT) and low threshold (LT)
sensor readings. Based on these readings, the controller either activates or deactivates
the pump. When the pump is active, its motor is switched on, which subsequently
increases the water level in the tank. On the other hand when the pump is deactivated,
its motor is switched off which then allows the water level in the tank to gradually
decrease.
In addition, the controller interacts with a drain component that is introduced
as a safety control structure. In the event of a component failure, the controller may
activate or deactivate the drain, which subsequently opens or closes an exit valve. This
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exit valve is located at the base of the water tank, at the low limit (L). When the exit
valve is open, the water level is reduced to the low limit.
| |
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Figure 2.1: A description of the water tank system.| |
2.1.1 Problem Frames
The Problem Frames approach was introduced by Jackson [52] in 1995, and a fuller
and more systematic representation of problem frames can be found in his later book
“Problem Frames: Analysing and Structuring Software Development Problems” [53], in
2001. It provides a framework that allows a requirement to be viewed as a problem in
a real-world context for which a solution, i.e. a software specification, is sought. The
process of software development is then regarded as a problem-solving process that
eventually leads to a solution that satisfies the requirement in its context [53].
This approach makes a clear distinction between the solution (the machine being
built) and its problem (the requirement). The world between the machine and the
requirement are represented by domains. These concepts are represented graphically
in what is called a problem diagram [53]. Figure 2.2, provides a problem diagram for
the water tank system, where the water tank system (controller) is represented as the
machine to be built (rectangle with double lines) and a requirement to maintain the
water level below the high (H) limit, is captured as a problem (dashed oval). The world
between the machine and the requirement, i.e. sensor system, pump and water tank
are introduced as domains that have annotated interfaces between each other and the
machine. The annotated connections between domains indicate shared phenomena,
including events, operations and state information. The requirement is introduced as
a constraint on the water tank (domain) via the dashed arrow-headed line. Often, the
requirements provided by the stakeholder specify constrains on the environment rather
than on the machine.
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As part of the problem-solving process, Jackson [53], provides an outline for the
following techniques:
Problem Patterns The complexity of a problem is reduced to fit elementary prob-
lem frames [53]. Jackson introduces the Work Pieces, Required Behaviour and
Information Display, problem classes. For instance, Figure 2.2, is a required
behaviour frame where the machine, i.e. the water tank system, is required to
impose a particular behaviour on a controlled domain, the water tank. These ele-
mentary frames give rise to frame concerns that are associated with the different
forms.
Frame Concerns This can be regarded as loosely analogous to the operational prin-
ciple of a device class in normal design, i.e. how the characteristic parts of
the device fulfil their special function in combining an overall operation which
achieves the devices purpose. By addressing the frame concern [53] for each
problem frame, the solution is likely to be acceptable.
Problem Progression This is part of the problem-solving process. The requirements
are transformed to a specification via the problem progression technique. This
technique results in sequence of problem frame descriptions that start with the
full description (including the original requirement) and ends with a description
containing only the machine and its specification.
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Figure 2.2: Problem diagram for the water tank system.| |
Formal Analysis with Problem Frames
Seater and Jackson [97] have presented a technique for obtaining a specification from
a requirement through a series of incremental steps. This technique is similar to the
progression technique presented by Jackson. However, as the requirement is moved
towards the machine, a trail of “breadcrumbs” is left behind. These breadcrumbs are
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partial domain descriptions representing assumptions about the behaviours of those
domains. Each step is justified by a mechanically checkable implication, ensuring that,
if the machine obeys the derived specification and the domain assumptions are valid.
The technique is formalized in Alloy [50].
Nelson et al. [85] presents an approach where the descriptions of the problem do-
mains, machine and requirements are written in the Alloy language. The approach
enables automated formal analysis to reason about problem frame concerns. Their
analysis provides an evaluation of results and counterexamples provided by a model
finder that is aimed to help remove inconsistencies as well as composition errors.
Gmehlich et al. [45] provide a report on an industry experience in the use of Problem
Frames to represent and trace informal requirements to a formal Event-B model. The
article presents an experiment carried out at Bosch to develop a model of a cruise
control system.
Representation of Failures in Problem Frames
As the causes of failures are typically rooted in the complex structures of software
systems and their world contexts, the problem frames framework have been used to
investigate areas in the system structures where failures are likely to occur [76,105].
In [105], Tun et al. describes the use of problem frames as a means to investigate the
role of software systems in the power blackout that affected parts of the United States
and Canada on 14 August 2003. Their work identified safety-related concerns that
were related to problem-patterns in problem frames. These concerns, reminder con-
cern, system precedence concern, outdated information concern, failure concern, raise
a number of specific issues that must be addressed if the solution is to be acceptable.
Lin et al [76] introduces abuse frames in problem frames to analyse security problem
in order to determine security threats and vulnerabilities. They consider threats to a
problem frame from the point of view of an attacker. Abuse frames can provide a
means for bounding the scope of and reasoning about security problems in order to
analyse security threats and identify vulnerabilities.
Limitations with Problem Frames
Problem frames provides an advantage by requiring all descriptions to be grounded in
the real world, that is, be as faithful as possible to reality. The problem owners, i.e.
stakeholders with requirements, usually do not have expertise in the computing machine
but have experiences or expertise in the application domains. Problem frames allows
the basis of communication with domain experts and users to be in a language that they
can understand [93]. However, the notations for problem frames with comparison to
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other requirements engineering techniques are less familiar to practitioners. In addition,
there exists a gap between problem frames to other commonly used design languages
such as UML. This introduces challenges in the use of problem frames in the systems
development process.
2.1.2 Goal-Oriented Requirements Engineering
There are two approaches for Goal-Oriented Requirements Engineering (GORE), namely,
the KAOS approach (Keep All Objects Satisfied) [109] and the i* appraoch [116]. Goal-
oriented approaches have gained popularity in requirements engineering as they are
useful in providing guidance in acquiring requirements, and relating requirements to
organisational and business context. They also play a role in identifying and dealing
with conflicts and driving design [115].
In goal-oriented approaches, requirements are expressed as goals, which may range
from high-level goals (e.g., strategic concerns within an organisation) down to low-
level operational goals (e.g., technical constraints on the software agent or particular
concerns on the environment agent). Therefore, goal refinement can be seen as a form
of requirement transformation. The definition of a goal is given by van Lamsweerde in
[107], as: “an objective the system under consideration should achieve. Goal formation
thus refers to intended properties to be ensured, they are optative statements as opposed
to indicative ones, and bounded by the subject matter”.
Software specifications are then derived from the subset of operational goals which
are assigned as responsibilities to agents. These agents may for example represent
humans, devices, or software.
The KAOS Approach
The KAOS [106] method is comprised of five core models: goal model, object model,
agent model, behaviour model, and operation mode. These are used for modelling
and structuring requirements. This background will only address the the goal model,
which is the starting points for KAOS where goals are identified. The goal model has
a two-level structure: the outer graphical semantic layer and the inner formal layer.
The outer layer shows semi-formal relationships among goals. The inner layer formally
defines goals and their relationships. The formal layer of KAOS is based on Linear
Temporal Logic (LTL) [90].
The goal model of KAOS is in the shape of a tree. For instance, the goal model for
the water tank system can be seen in Figure 2.3, where each goal can be viewed as high-
level requirements. The tree consists of a refinement graph expressing how higher-level
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goals are refined into lower-level ones and, conversely, how lower-level goals contribute
to higher-level goals. A parallelogram denotes a goal. In the refinement graph, a node
represents a goal which is either an achieve goal or a maintain goal. The maintain
goals prescribe behaviours where some target properties must be permanently satisfied
in every future state. The achieve goals prescribe system behaviours where some target
properties must be eventually satisfied in the future.
An AND-refinement is used to link and relate parent goal to a set of sub-goals. A
parent goal must be satisfied when all of its sub-goals are satisfied. The relationship
between a parent goal and the set of its sub-goals is called goal refinement. The KAOS
approach uses logic to support reasoning about goal refinement with some patterns
and tool support, such as GRAIL [28]
| |
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Figure 2.3: A goal model for the water tank system.| |
Obstacles
The goals, requirements and assumptions about agent behaviour are often too ideal,
where some of them are likely not to be satisfied from time to time in the running system
due to unexpected agent behaviour [106, 108]. The concept of obstacle is introduced
in [108]. Obstacles are a dual notion to goals; while goals capture desired conditions,
obstacles capture undesirable (but nevertheless possible) ones. An obstacle obstructs
some goal, that is, when the obstacle becomes true then the goal may not be achieved.
The obstacles have been introduced to counter the lack of anticipation of exceptional
behaviours that results in unrealistic, unachievable and/or incomplete requirements.
This is aimed to prevent poor performance or failures in the software developed from
those requirements that are considered both goals and obstacles.
Chapter 2. Background 17
The i* Approach
The i* framework has been developed for modelling and reasoning about organisational
contexts and their information systems. It has two major modelling components: the
Strategic Dependency (SD) model and the Strategic Rationale (SR) model. SD de-
scribes the dependency relationships among actors in an organisational environment;
SR describes stakeholder interests, concerns, and how they may be addressed by various
configurations of systems and environments [116]. The framework is used in contexts
where there are multiple parties with strategic interests that may be reinforcing or
conflicting each other.
The starting point of the i* approach is usually far away from the computing ma-
chine. Unlike KAOS, the primary focus of i* are soft goals [24], that is, the so-called
non-functional requirements. Since this approach focuses on soft goals, some global
non-functional property requirements such as security, usability, performance or flexi-
bility can be expressed as goals for refinement.
2.1.3 UML Use Cases
lvar Jacobson [54] introduced the concept of use cases in the context of his work on
large telecommunication systems. The behaviour of such systems is complicated and
can be analysed at many levels. To manage the complexity, Jacobson had the idea of
describing the desired behaviour of a system by telling a story from the point of view
of a user [9]. Such a story called a scenario supported by subsidiary scenarios and
associated information, he called a use case.
The use case concept was quickly understood to be useful, and was adopted freely,
especially within object-oriented software engineering. Use cases now form one of
many techniques included in the Unified Modelling Language (UML) [19]. Use cases
is a widely used requirements analysis technique and is not restricted to only object-
oriented software engineering. It has also been used for hardware-software systems, as
indicated by Jacobson’s original work [54].
Concepts
In requirements engineering, UML use cases [19] have been used as a means to capture
the desired behaviour of systems, i.e., what systems are supposed to do. The key
concepts for UML use cases [19] are actors, use cases, and subject. A subject represents
a system under consideration to which the use case can be applied to. In the running
example, the water tank system is considered as the subject in UML use cases. Users
and any other systems that may interact with a subject are represented as actors,
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i.e. the Pump, Sensor System, Water Tank, and Drain. Each use case specifies some
behaviour that a subject can perform in collaboration with one or more actors. In the
water tank system, the desired behaviour to maintain the water level below the H limit
could be introduced as a use case, MaintainH. Each of these concepts are defined as
follows [19]:
Subject A subject of a use case could be a system or any other element that may have
behaviour.
Use Case Each use case specifies a unit of useful or desired functionality that the
subject provides to its users (i.e., a specific way of interacting with the subject).
This interaction must always be completed for the use case to be considered
“complete”.
Actor An actor models a type of role played by an entity that interacts with the
subjects of its associated use cases (e.g., by exchanging signals and data). Actors
may represent roles played by human users, external hardware, or other systems.
These behaviours, involving interactions between the actors and the subject, may
result in changes to the state of the subject and communications with its environment.
Relationship: Extends
An extend [19] is a relationship from an extending use case (in this thesis we refer to
this as an extension use case) to an extended use case (a regular use case or even an
extension use case) that specifies how and when the behaviour defined in the extending
extension use case can be inserted into the behaviour defined in the extended use
case. The extension takes place at one or more specific extension-points defined in the
extended use case.
Extend is intended to be used when there is some additional behaviour that should
be added, possibly conditionally, to the behaviour defined in one or more use cases.
For the water tank system, the functionality to drain the water level to the low limit in
the event of a component failure can be introduced as an extension use case, DrainToL,
that extends the functionality of the use case MaintainH.
The extended use case is defined independently of the extending use case, and
is meaningful independently of the extending use case [9]. On the other hand, the
extending use case typically defines behaviour that may not necessarily be meaningful
by itself.
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Use Case Diagram
The concepts of a use case are illustrated via a use case diagram [19]. For the water
tank system, its use case diagram can be seen in Figure 2.4a. The Water Tank System
is introduced as the subject, i.e. the system under consideration, denoted by the
rectangular box. The required behaviour for the subject which is to maintain the water
level in the tank below the high limit, is introduced as a use case, MaintainH. This is
represented as an oval ellipse. The external entities, the Pump, Water Tank, Sensor
System, and Drain, which interact with the subject to achieve the desired behaviour,
are introduced as actors. They are represented as a stick man icon. Each actor that
plays a role in the use case has a line to indicate an association.
An extension use case DraintToL is introduced to MaintainH via the extends rela-
tionship. An extends relationship between use cases in the use case diagram, is shown
by a dashed arrow with an open arrowhead pointing from the extending extension use
case towards the extended use case. The arrow is labelled with the keyword 〈extend〉.
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(b) Use case specification.
Figure 2.4: Use Cases: water tank system.| |
Use Case Specification
The behaviour of a use case can be further detailed in a use case specification [9, 27].
There is no UML standard for a use case specification, but there are proposed templates
for documenting use cases [9]. The template used in this thesis takes into account con-
straints, exceptions and scenarios, as seen in Figure 2.4b. In essence the specification
is composed of two main components, contract and scenarios. The contract specifies
the pre-condition, post-condition and invariant properties, as described below:
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Pre-condition The writer of the functional requirements and the implementation team
can rely upon the preconditions to be established prior to the initiation of the
use case, i.e. they are conditions that must be true before the use case executes.
Post-condition The post-condition is used to document conditions that must be true
after the execution of the use case.
Invariant An invariant condition specifies the conditions that are true throughout the
execution of the use case.
A scenario is defined as a sequence of interactions happening under certain con-
ditions, in order to achieve an external actor goal, and having a particular result
with respect to that goal (contract) [26]. Scenarios have been a focus in requirements
engineering research and practice because they can offer narratives to bridge the com-
munication gap among various stakeholders in a development project.
In the use case specification, the scenario is captured as a sequence of steps. It
specifies a trigger condition, which causes the use case to execute. The difference
between the trigger and the pre-condition is that, there is no promise that the trigger
will occur, only an indication that these conditions will start the execution of the use
case. The use case provides a main flow that captures the expected sequence of steps
in the interaction between the actor and subject to achieve the goal (contract) of the
use case. In the specification of MaintainH use case, the trigger condition to initiate its
main flow is for the water level to be above the high threshold limit. The main flow
captures a sequence of steps that describes the interactions of the actors and subject
to achieve the overall goal.
The difference between pre-condition and trigger is that a precondition is a promise,
contract or guarantee while the trigger is the initiator of a use case. The writer of the
functional requirements and the implementation team can rely upon the preconditions
to be established prior to the initiation of the use case. Trigger is what causes the use
case to start (there is no promise that this trigger happens).
2.2 Safety Engineering
Safety engineering is a discipline which assures that engineered systems provide accept-
able levels of safety [74, 104]. It is strongly related to systems engineering, industrial
engineering and the subset system safety engineering. Safety engineering assures that
a safety-critical system behaves as needed, even when components fail. A sufficient
definition for safety for the needs of this thesis, is as follows:
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Definition 2.2 (Safety [30]). An overall mission and program condition that provides
sufficient assurance that accidents will not result from the mission execution or program
implementation, or, if they occur, their consequences will be mitigated.
This section provides the background on the early stage analysis of safety, with
respect to the identification of accidents, the identification of system-level hazards
associated to an accident, along with hazard analysis techniques to determine the
cause of a hazard.
2.2.1 Accidents
Accidents or losses, are considered early in the development of safety-critical systems
[73]. Their identification is part of the safety analysis process and is the first step in
any safety effort. The definition of what constitutes an accident varies greatly among
industries and engineering disciplines. The one used in this thesis follows the definition
provided by Leveson [73], where an accident is defined as:
Definition 2.3 (Accident [73]). An undesired or unplanned event that results in a
loss, including loss of human life or human injury, property damage, environmental
pollution, mission loss, etc.
An accident does not necessarily involve loss of life, but it does result in some form
of loss that is unacceptable to the stakeholder. As an example, in the water tank
system a potential accident (labelled ExceedH) is as follows:
Water level exceeds high (H) limit in water tank (damage to water tank).
(ExceedH)
This accident does not involve loss of life (at least not directly), but there is po-
tential for the water tank to be damaged as a result of this accident. The criterion
for specifying accidents is that the losses are so important that they need to play a
central role in the design of the system. This accident represent a safety concern in the
operation of the water tank system. The focus of this thesis, is towards investigating
how accidents identified in the safety analysis process can be introduced as constraints
on system goals, i.e. the required behaviour, within the requirements analysis pro-
cess. This is aimed at enabling the safety analysis to guide and limit the effort of the
requirements analysis process.
Once the accidents have been identified, priorities and evaluation criteria may be as-
signed to the accidents to indicate conflicts between system goals (required behaviour)
and safety goals. However, identifying the priorities for accidents and their relation to
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conflicts with system goals are outside the scope of this research.
2.2.2 System Hazards
Once the accidents have been defined, a set of high-level system hazards can be iden-
tified as part of the safety analysis process. In this thesis, the definition of a hazard
follows that of System Safety [73], where they are defined as within the system being
designed and its relation with the environment. This definition of a hazard is as follows:
Definition 2.4 (Hazard [73]). A system state or set of conditions that, together with
a particular set of worst-case environmental conditions, will lead to an accident (loss).
The hazard may be defined in terms of conditions or actions. There have been many
arguments about whether hazards are conditions or actions, and this distinction is said
to be irrelevant as long as one of these choices are used consistently [73]. In system
safety, these hazards are defined as something that can lead or result in an accident.
Leveson [73] describes the cause of an accident as a combination of a hazardous action
performed together with a set a worst-case environmental conditions, as follows:
Hazard (Action) + Environmental Condition (State)⇒ Accident (Event)
What constitutes a hazard depends on where the boundaries of the system are
drawn. A system is an abstraction, and the boundaries of the system can be drawn
anywhere the person defining the system wants. Where the boundaries of the sys-
tem are drawn will determine what actions are considered part of the hazard and the
conditions for the environment. For the water tank system, the designer has control
over the action to either increase or decrease the water level in the tank (albeit not
directly), via the interaction with the Pump component. Furthermore, it monitors the
water level at the high and low thresholds of the water tank via the readings from the
Sensor System. For the ExceedH accident, a hazardous action would be for the system
to increase the water level in the tank even after the water level has exceeded the high
threshold (HT) limit. The cause of the accident for ExceedH can be written as follows:
Water level in the tank increases + Water level above HT⇒ ExceedH
There are no tools for identifying hazards [104]. It takes domain expertise and
depends on the subjective evaluation by those constructing the system. Moreover,
there are no right or wrong set of hazards, only a set that the system stakeholders
agree is important to avoid [73].
These system hazards that have been identified in the safety analysis, are accom-
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panied with safety requirements and constraints necessary to prevent the hazard from
occurring. These constraints are often used to guide and limit the system design. For
the water tank system, the safety constraint for the identified hazardous action to in-
crease the water level, is constrained by the safety requirements for the water level to
always be maintained between the low and high limits of the water tank. That is, the
system action to increase the water level in the tank must be shown to be within the
constraint of this safety requirement.
It is not sufficient to only identify hazards and safety requirements (constraints),
it is also necessary to identify how these hazardous control action may be performed
that violate the safety constraints. These hazards at the system level can be related to
component failures via hazard analysis techniques.
2.2.3 Hazard Analysis
Hazard analysis can be performed to identify the cause of a hazard [73]. In this thesis,
the focus is placed on scenario-based modelling of hazards [30]. These establishes
a linkage between hazards and adverse consequences (accidents) of interest. This is
illustrated in Figure 2.5, where a scenario begins with the identification of an initiating
event for each hazard along with the necessary enabling events that result in undesired
consequences. The enabling events often involve the failure of or lack of protective
barriers or safety subsystems (controls). The resulting accident scenario is the sequence
of events that is comprised of the initiating event and enabling events that lead to the
adverse consequences.
Analysing hazards in relation to the enabling conditions, supports activities that
involve:
• Prevention of adverse accident scenarios ones with undesired consequences, e.g.
the water level exceeding the high limit (damage to water tank).
• The promotion of favourable scenarios that may mitigate or limit the severity of
such consequences.
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and System-Theoretic Pro-
cess Analysis (STPA) are hazard analysis techniques that can be used for identifying
scenarios for accidents [73, 74,104]. These techniques are often used to provide a link-
age between hazardous control action and the accident. However, FTA and STPA is
generally not recommended for scenario-based modelling of hazards, as seen in Figure
2.5, where an accident scenario involves a chronological sequence of events [30]. ETA
is more suitable scenario-based modelling of hazards as it is inductive and determines
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Figure 2.5: Scenario-based hazard modelling framework [30].| |
an event sequences and its resulting consequences. The following provides an overview
of each these hazard analysis techniques applied to the hazard (water level increased
while above high threshold) identified for the water tank system.
Fault Tree Analysis
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [38, 74, 104] is a top down, deductive failure analysis in
which an undesired state of a system is analysed using Boolean logic to combine a
series of lower-level events. An event known as the top event, is first defined for which
causes are to be resolved. For the water tank system, the increase of water level above
the high limit of the tank is taken as the undesired top event in the fault tree, as seen
in Figure 2.6.
This event is resolved into its immediate and necessary sufficient causal events using
Boolean logic. This stepwise resolution of events into immediate causal events proceeds
until basic events (often component failures) are identified. Starting with the undesired
(top) event the possible causes of that event are identified at the next lower level. If
each of those contributors could produce the top event alone an OR gate is used; if all
the contributors must act to result in the top event an AND gate is used. The fault tree
explicitly shows all the different relationships that are necessary to result in the top
event. The fault tree analysis allows for exhaustive identification in causes of a failure,
identify weaknesses in a system, assess a proposed design for its reliability or safety,
and more. There are several advantages to FTA: exhaustively identify the causes of a
failure, identify weaknesses in a system, assess a proposed design for its reliability or
safety, and quantify the failure probability and contributors.
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Figure 2.6: Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) of water tank system.| |
Event Tree Analysis
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) [37, 74, 104] is an inductive, or forward logic, technique
which examines all possible responses to the initiating event, then progressing left to
right, identifying the consequences that can result following an initiating event. The
potential hazardous trigger event is known as the initiating event. The branch points
on the tree structure usually represent the success or failure of different systems and
subsystems which can respond to the initiating event.
Figure 2.7 shows a very simple event tree structure for the water tank system. The
initiating event is the increase of the water level over the high threshold limit. The
branch points then consider the success and failure of the components in the system,
namely, the sensor system, water tank system, pump and finally the water tank. The
outcomes determined by the end point of each event tree branch identifies a different
consequence following the initiating event.
System-Theoretic Process Analysis
System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) [73] is a relatively new hazard analysis
technique that is based on the STAMP causality model. STPA was developed to in-
clude new causal factors identified in STAMP that are not handled by older techniques.
Chapter 2. Background 26
| |
Water increasesd 
above HT
Sensor HT 
switched On
Sensor HT 
switched Off
Pump is activated
Pump is 
deactivated
Motor switched Off
Motor switched On
Water TankSensor System Water Tank System PumpInitiating Event
Water level decreases
Water level increases
Outcome
Success Outcome
Failure Outcome A
Failure Outcome B
Failure Outcome C
Success
Failure
Success
Failure
Sucess
Failure
Initiating Event
Water level increases
Water level increasesPump is activated
Motor switched On
Motor switched On
Figure 2.7: Event tree analysis for water tank system.| |
The STAMP accident model takes into account complex human interactions, software
behaviour, design errors and flawed requirements. STPA can be used to identify ac-
cident scenarios that describe how a hazardous control action could happen. These
accident scenarios are aimed to encompass the entire accident process, not just the
electromechanical components. To gather information about how the hazard could
occur, the parts of the control loop based on the STAMP causality mode is examined
to determine if they could cause or contribute to it.
Figure 2.8 shows the results of the causal analysis of a hazard for the water tank
system in a graphical form. The hazard in Figure 2.8, is the increase in water level while
the water level is above the high threshold. Looking first at the controller itself, the
hazard could occur if the requirement is not passed to the developers of the controller,
the requirement is not implemented correctly, or the process model incorrectly shows
the water level is below the high threshold when that is not true. Working around the
loop, the causal factors for each of the loop components are similarly identified using
the general causal factors shown in Figure 2.8.
These causes include: that the command is sent but not received by the actuator;
the actuator delays in implementing the command; the commands are received or
executed in the wrong order; the increase of the water level above the high threshold
(HT) is not detected by the sensor system; there is an unacceptable delay in detecting
it; the sensor fails or provides spurious feedback; and the feedback about the state of
the water level is not received by the controller.
Once the causal analysis is completed, each of the causes that cannot be shown to
be physically impossible must be checked to determine whether they are adequately
handled in the design, or design features are added to control them if the design is being
developed with support from the analysis. This allows the engineers to design controls
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Figure 2.8: Causal factors to be considered to create scenarios for STPA [73].| |
and mitigation measures if they do not already exist, or evaluate existing measures if
the analysis is performed on an existing designs.
2.3 Formal Methods
“A formal method is a set of tools and notations (with a formal semantics)
used to specify unambiguously the requirements of a computer system that
supports the proof of properties of that specification and proofs of correctness
of an eventual implementation with respect to that specification.”
– Michael G. Hinchey and Jonathan P. Bowen
The failure of software systems to perform as expected can produce high losses for
companies. In safety critical systems this can even result in loss of human lives. Past
experiences have shown evidence of the need for high-quality software. For example,
the Ariane 5 launcher flight [17] self-destructed after 40 seconds of its launch due to
an overflow error when trying to convert 64-bits of data into 16-bits. An investment
of over 850 million dollars was lost as a result of this accident. Another case was
the Therac-25 [75], a computer-controlled radiation therapy system that overdosed six
people resulting in the death of two. The new design of the Therac-25, the successor of
the Therac-20, contained errors which caused a failure in the interlocking system and
lead to the overdoses.
Formal methods are mathematical rigorous techniques used for the development
and verification of software and hardware systems. They complement traditional de-
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velopment techniques, increasing confidence about the correctness and reliability of
systems. The use of formal methods offers a solution, as it may be used at all stages
in the development process from requirements analysis to system acceptance testing.
One of the main benefits of using formal methods as a step in the development process
of a system is minimising failure risks and costs in the testing phase.
2.3.1 Formal Specification
Formal specifications are mathematical descriptions of systems whose semantics are
well defined and that can be subject to formal analysis, i.e. it is possible to reason
about their correctness. Abstraction is a key aspect in formal specifications. It is a
modelling process that focuses on describing the intrinsic requirements of systems while
hiding away implementation details. In other words, a formal specification describes
what the system does rather than how it does it. Different types of systems can be
described through formal specification; for instance, process algebras like CSP [48] and
CCS [80] are used to model concurrent systems and to reason about them via the use
of algebraic laws; the Z [113], VDM [61], B [3] and Event-B [1] formalisms are used to
specify state-based aspects of systems.
However, the development of high quality and correct models has been identified
as a difficult task. In the formal methods survey presented in [114], formal speci-
fication was estimated to be the phase with the higher increase in the development
time, while in [101] it was reported that choosing the right set of abstractions was the
main barrier when writing formal models. As described in [62], techniques such as
decomposition and refinement have been developed in order to aid formal modelling.
Decomposition allows the verification of a system through the individual verification of
its sub-components while refinement enables the gradual verification of systems through
the use of incremental steps. The focus of this thesis is on refinement.
2.3.2 Refinement
Refinement is a technique used to model systems at different levels of abstraction. Its
main purpose is to handle the complexity of large systems through the gradual intro-
duction of steps that are verified by proof. Starting from an abstract representation of
a system, details are added incrementally in the search for a more concrete representa-
tion which is closer to implementation. Roever and Engelhardt [29] provide an analogy
for refinement as looking through a microscope. The microscope does not change any-
thing, only that some previously invisible parts of the reality are now revealed by the
microscope.
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Refinement allows us to tackle system complexity. Additionally, refinement can
be achieved via two main approaches. Firstly, the rule based approach, which uses
predefined rules whose correctness has been previously verified. The most notable ex-
ample is the technique proposed by Carroll Morgan [99] where a set of basic refinement
transformation rules are introduced. Secondly, the posit-and-prove approach, which
allows users to explore their own refinements but a formal proof is then required in
order to determine the correctness of the steps. Formalisms such as VDM [76], B [3]
and Event-B [1] implement this style of refinement. The techniques developed in this
thesis are tailored for the posit-and-prove approach. The techniques developed in this
thesis are focused on the refinement-based formalism, Event-B. A brief description is
given next about some relevant formalisms that are based on refinement.
VDM
VDM (Vienna Development Method) [61] is one of the longest-established formal meth-
ods for the development of computer-based systems, introduced by a research group
in the IBM laboratory in Vienna in the 1970s. It has grown to include a group of
techniques and tools based on a formal specification language - the VDM Specification
Language (VDM-SL) [60]. Use of VDM starts with a very abstract model and is devel-
oped into an implementation. Each step involves data reification [63], then operation
decomposition. Data reification develops the abstract data types into more concrete
data structures, while operation decomposition develops the (abstract) implicit speci-
fication of operations and functions into algorithms that can be directly implemented
in a computer language of choice.
VDM has been extended to VDM++ [32], which supports the modelling of object-
oriented and concurrent systems. VDM has been widely used in the industry; one
of its most recognised applications is the development of compilers, in particular the
first European Ada compiler [23]. Overture [69] is a tool that support developing and
analysing VDM models.
Z
In 1977, Abrial proposed Z [113] with the help of Schuman and Meyer, it was developed
at Oxford University. The Z notation is based on mathematical constructs used in set
theory and first order predicate logic. The state of a system in a Z specification is
represented by global variables; predicates are used to express the types of variables
as well as invariants, and operations are structured through schemas. Refinement is
possible in Z via ZRC [22]. Z has also been extended to allow the specification of
complex systems by introducing object-oriented constructs and notions such as classes,
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inheritance and polymorphism [67]. Tool support is also available for the development
of Z specifications; this includes test case generation tools, model checking, animation
and type-checkers, among others.
B-Method
The B-Method (also known as classical B), was originally developed by Abrial [3] in
the mid 1980s. The B-Method is a model-based method for formal development of
computer software systems. A B specification is composed of variables, which describe
the state of the system, invariants, which describe properties of the variables that must
always hold, and a set of operations, which define changes in the state. B specifications
are built by means of refinement of abstract machines. An abstract machine specifies
the basic requirements of the system and is subsequently refined all the way to im-
plementation via refined machines, which refine an abstract or a refined machine; and
an implementation machine, which represents the last model from which code can be
automatically generated. The verification of B developments is achieved through the
generation of proof obligations, which are used to check the correctness of the model
against the invariants and the consistency between different levels of refinement.
Compared to Z, B is more focused on refinement rather than just formal specifi-
cation. In particular, there is better tool support such as Atelier-B [70]. These tools
support two main proof activities: (1) consistency checking, shows that invariants are
preserved by machine operations, and (2) refinement checking, which proves the valid-
ity of each refined machine. The B method has been successfully applied to industrial
projects, one of the most successful applications is its use in the development of Line
14 of the Paris metro [2].
Event-B
Event-B [3] is a formalism used for the modelling of discrete event systems. An Event-
B development is structured into models and contexts. A context describes the static
part of a system, i.e. constants and their axioms, while a model describes the dynamic
part; i.e. variables, invariants and events. Event-B promotes refinement- based formal
modelling, where each step of a development is underpinned by formal reasoning. That
is, each refinement step generates proof obligations that must be discharged in order
to prove the correctness of the step.
Event-B is an evolution of the B-method [3], and it builds upon the Action System
formalism [13]. It has a same structure as an action system which describes the be-
haviour of a reactive system in terms of the guarded actions that can take place during
its execution. Event-B is different from B-Method in some aspects. The B-Method is
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organized in a way that is suitable for the development of non-concurrent programs,
whereas Event-B is geared towards the development of systems including reactive and
concurrent systems. A detailed description of Event-B is provided in Section 2.4.
2.4 Event-B
2.4.1 Structure and Notation
Event-B is a formalism that is used for the modelling of discrete event systems [1].
As seen in Figure 2.9, an Event-B development is composed of a collection of context
and machine components. The context component models the static aspects of a
system while the machine models the dynamic aspects. Contexts provide a means to
state static properties of an Event-B model, whereas machines provide behavioural
properties of an Event-B model. Items of machines and contexts are called modelling
elements, and are presented in this section. There are various relationships between
contexts and machines. A context can be extended by other contexts and seen by
machines. A machine can be refined by other machines and can see contexts as its
static part.
| |
Event-B Project p0
 
Machine m0
  …
Machine m1
  …
sees
Context c0
  …
Context c1
  …
extendsrefines
sees
……
Machine mn
  …
Context cn
  …
sees
refines refines
Figure 2.9: Event-B project component structure and relationships.| |
Context
The modelling elements of a context are from four types: sets, constants, axioms,
and theorems. It is illustrated in Figure 2.10a. Axioms are predicates that describe
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the properties of sets, constants and theorems. A context can extend more than one
context, and can also be seen by several machines in a direct or indirect way. By
indirect, we mean that a context may be referenced by a machine whose abstract
machines sees that context. Theorems list the various theorems which have to be
proved within the context.
| |
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Figure 2.10: Structure of Context and Machine components.| |
Machine
A machine consists of variables, invariants, events, theorems and variants, illustrated
in Figure 2.10b. Variables v define the state of a model. Invariants, I(v), constrain
variables, and are supposed to hold whenever variables are changed by an event. In
Event-B the state of a model is changed by means of an event execution. An event, in its
simplest form, is composed of a name, a list of named predicates, the guards, collectively
denoted by G(v), and a generalized substitution denoted by S(v). All events are atomic
and can be executed only when their guards hold. When the guards of several events
hold at the same time, then only one of those events is chosen non-deterministically to
be executed. An event E with guards G(v) and generalized substitution S(v) can be
given the syntactic form:
E =̂ when G(v) then S(v) end
As seen Figure 2.11, there are three kinds of generalized substitutions for expressing
the transition associated with an event: (1) the deterministic substitution, (2) the
empty substitution, and (3) the non-deterministic substitution.
In the deterministic and non-deterministic cases, x denotes a list of variables of v
which are all distinct. In the deterministic case, E(v) denotes a number of set-theoretic
expressions corresponding to each of the variables in x. In the non-deterministic cases,
there are two constructs by the means of the operator : | and :∈. The first one is to be
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Kind Generalised Substitution
Deterministic x := E(v)
Empty skip
Non-deterministic x : | P (x′, x, y)
Non-deterministic x :∈ S(v)
Figure 2.11: Kinds of generalised substitutions.| |
read, x becomes such that the before-after predicate P (x′, x, y) holds, where x denotes
some distinct variables of v, y denotes those variables of v that are distinct from x, and
x′ denotes the values of the variables x after the substitution is applied. The second
one is to be read as x becomes a member of the set S(v).
2.4.2 Refinement in Event-B
In an Event-B development, rather than having a single large model, it is encouraged
to construct the system in a series of successive layers, starting with an abstract rep-
resentation of the system. The abstract model should provide a simple view of the
system, focusing on the main purpose and key features of what the system achieves.
The details of how the purpose is achieved are added gradually via step-wise refinement.
This process is called refinement. Each step creates a more concrete model, which is
a refinement of the previous one and must be verified through the use of proof. The
semantic of some refinement proof obligations are described in Section 2.4.3.
Types of Refinement
Refinement is the process of enriching or modifying the abstract model in order to
introduce new functionality or add details of current functionality. Refinement in
Event-B has different views or classifications. From the Event-B notation point of
view, refinement of a machine can be classified into the following types:
1. Refining existing events:
(a) Add new guards and actions to the existing abstract event. In this case, the
resulting concrete event is labelled as extended. In an extended event, the
existing guards and actions can not be modified.
(b) Modifying guards and actions of the existing abstract event: in this case the
resulting concrete event is labelled as not extended. Adding new guards and
actions are allowed too.
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In both these types, the guards of the concrete event must be proved to be
stronger than its abstraction.
2. Adding new events: The new event refines an event in the abstraction which
does nothing (skip).
3. Adding new variables and invariants:
• New Variables : introducing new variables usually results in 2 or 1 types of
refinement. Sometimes abstract variables can be replaced by new concrete
variables. In this case the refinement can result in (1.b). Sometimes variable
replacement results in redundant variables.
• Gluing Invariants : a gluing invariant relate the states of the abstract vari-
able to the concrete variables. The invariant of the concrete model including
gluing invariants should be preserved by the concrete events.
Each abstract event should be refined by at least one concrete event. One abstract
event can be refined by more than one concrete event. This is called event splitting.
Furthermore, one concrete event can refine more than one abstract event. This is called
event merging. Another view of classifying refinement is as follows:
• Vertical Refinement known also as data refinement, makes reference to the re-
finement of data types, i.e. the transition from abstract data types to concrete
data structures. The rationale for the transition is usually specified through glu-
ing invariants as in the Event-B formalism, or retrieve functions as in VDM.
The consistency of the transformation is verified by proving that the concrete
operations preserve that rationale.
• Horizontal Refinement refers to refinement steps in which new requirements
or more detailed functionality are introduced into the model. The correctness
of each step is verified by proving that the behaviour at the concrete level is
consistent with the behaviour at the abstract level.
2.4.3 Proof Obligations
Event-B developments are verified through the use of Proof Obligations (POs). A PO
is a sequent of the form:
H ` G
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where H represents the set of hypotheses and G represents the goal to be proved. There
are different proof obligations which are generated by the Event-B tool Rodin [4] during
the development of a system using Event-B. The Rodin tool is discussed in Section 2.4.4.
In Figure 2.12, an overview of the types of proof obligations is provided.
As an example, considering Figure 2.13, a machine m1 refines machine m0. Both
machines see the context c0. m1 contains two events, evt3 as a new event and evt2
that is introduced as a refining event. This machine contains some gluing invariants
glue inv. The following describes some of the proof obligations generated for this
Event-B model:
| |
Proof Obligation Label Description
Well-definedness x/WD
x is the name of axiom, theorem, invariant,
guard, or action.
Invariant Preservation evt/inv/INV
evt is the event name, inv is the invariant
name
Feasibility of a non-deterministic
event action
evt/act/FIS
evt is the event name, act is the action
name
Guard Strengthening evt/grd/GRD
evt is the concrete event name, grd is
the abstract guard name
Action Simulation evt/act/SIM
evt is the concrete event name, act is
the abstract action name
Natural number for a numeric
varaint
evt/NAT evt is the new event name.
Decreasing of Variant evt/VAR evt is the new event name.
Figure 2.12: Proof Obligations: Name, label and description.| |
Well-definedness (WD) Ensures that a axiom, theorem, invariant, guard, action,
variant is indeed well defined. For instance, to compute cardinality of a set,
card(S), it has to be proved that the set S is finite.
Invariant Preservation (INV) Ensures that each invariant is preserved by each event.
For instance in Figure 2.13, one of generated proof obligation in the abstract
machine m0 is evt1/inv m0/INV. This ensures that inv m0 is preserved by the
state transition of event, evt1.
Feasibility (FIS) Ensures that each non-deterministic action is feasible. In Figure
2.13, for event evt1 in machine m0, the proof obligation evt1/act evt1/FIS is
generated. It means there should exist values for variables v m0 such that the
assignment act evt1 is feasible.
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Guard Strengthening (GRD) Ensures that each abstract guard is no stronger than
the concrete ones in the refining event. As a result, when a concrete event is
enabled, the corresponding abstract event is also enabled. For instance, in the
model evt2/grd evt1/GRD ensures that abstract guard grd evt1 is weaker than
the guards of the concrete event evt2.
Simulation (SIM) Ensures that each action in a concrete event simulates the cor-
responding abstract action. When a concrete event executes, the correspond-
ing abstract event is not contradicted. In Figure 2.13, the simulation proof is
evt2/act evt1/SIM.
Numeric Variant (NAT) Ensures that under the guards of each convergent event, a
proposed numeric variant is indeed a natural number. The PO evt3/NAT is the
proof obligation generated for the machine m1 in Figure 2.13.
Decreasing of Variant (VAR) Ensures that each convergent event decreases the pro-
posed numeric variant. As a consequence, the new event does not take control
forever. evt3/VAR in Figure 2.13, ensures that event evt3 does not take control
forever.
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Figure 2.13: Event-B project component structure and relationships.| |
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2.4.4 Rodin
Rodin [4] is a platform implemented on top of the Eclipse environment for the devel-
opment and verification of Event-B specifications. Rodin allows a developer to reason
about a model by giving instant feedback about its correctness. This is achieved by au-
tomatically generating and discharging POs, which allows the integration of reasoning
as part of the modelling task during the development of Event-B models. Furthermore,
discharging POs may not always be automatic; depending on the model, user inter-
action may be needed to discharge a PO. The close interplay between modelling and
reasoning provided by the Rodin toolset facilitates the identification of problems when
a PO fails to verify. It is important to stress that Rodin is not used to run programs
but to reason about models at the design stage. The Rodin tool chain is composed of
three main components:
A Static checker (SC) That analyses a model developed in Event-B in order to find
syntax and type errors.
A Proof obligation generator (POG) That automatically generates the POs that must
be verified for a given Event-B model. The different type of POs associated with
Event-B were described in Section 2.4.3. The POG does not perform proofs, it
only carries out simple rewritings within a PO sequent.
A Proof obligation manager (POM) That handles the POs’ status as well as the
associated proof tree for each PO. It works automatically alongside the automatic
Rodin provers, or interactively with the user and external provers. As all POs
are represented as sequent in predicate calculus, different external provers for
predicate calculus can be used within Rodin.
Rodin provides similar functionalities to those provided by tools used for program-
ming, in which tasks are performed automatically in the background. This facilitates
and improves the modelling experience for Rodin users. Among the characteristics pro-
vided by Rodin are: (1) instant feedback when a change has been made to the model,
i.e. syntax errors, inconsistent types, etc.; (2) automatic generation and verification of
POs when a model is saved to the disk (no need of compilation processes); (3) error
traces; (4) management of a schema of colours for reserved words (which make the
models more readable); (5) templates for the creation of Event-B basic elements; i.e.
events, variables, etc.
As Rodin is built on the Eclipse platform, new functionalities can be provided
through the addition of plug-ins. This flexible architecture contributes to the improve-
ment and extensibility of the tool as well as to the formation of a bigger community
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working around Event-B. We mention some of the plug-ins available in Rodin which
illustrate different aspects of the tool-set that have been extended:
UML-B [100] Is a graphical front-end for the modelling of Event-B systems as UML-
like diagrams. Currently, it contains support for modelling and refinement of
systems with class and state machine diagrams.
ProB [71] provides animation and model checking capabilities for Event-B models.
ProR [58] provides requirement traceability between an Event-B model and the natural
language requirements associated to the model.
Currently the development of new plug-ins for the Rodin platform is growing. As
part of this research, the development of a plug-in, UC-B, in the Rodin platform is
provided in Chapter 6.
2.5 Summary & Discussion
This chapter has introduced the key concepts and the preliminary is for this thesis.
An overview of the popular requirements engineering techniques have been discussed
along with their comparison. The use case modelling is discussed with the water tank
example, which is used in later section to describe the formalisation of use cases. The
required background on safety engineering was provided, that described the early stage
analysis in the identification of accidents, its relation to hazard and hazard analysis
techniques. An overview of the different formal methods and their comparison to Event-
B is provided. The target formal method Event-B; the verification support provided
by Event-B to achieve reasoning of the behaviour specified by the use cases. The focus
in the background provides some of the limitations of use case modelling. The next
chapter shows how potentially bad behaviour is taken into consideration by extended
the use case model.
Chapter3
Accident Cases
“Safety is a system property, not a component property, and must be con-
trolled at the system level, not the component level.”
– Nancy G. Leveson
3.1 Introduction
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Figure 3.1: Thesis Roadmap for Chapter 3.| |
Figure 3.1 highlights which part of the roadmap this chapter implements. This
chapter introduces an extension to UML use cases that allow safety concerns to be
taken into account during requirements analysis. As discussed in Chapter 1, a majority
of software-related accidents occur due to requirements flaws [36, 77], particularly due
to incompleteness. Despite its importance, there is no consensus as to what precisely
constitutes completeness in a requirements specification, nor how to go about achieving
it. Many discussion [88,92,94], essentially state that the “requirements specification is
complete if some relevant aspect has not been left out”. The most appropriate definition
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in the context of this thesis is provided by Jaff [57]: “software requirements specification
are complete if they are sufficient to distinguish the desired behaviour from that of any
undesired program that might be designed”. The conclusions presented by Jaff [56] on
producing a complete requirements specification, is that it is large, tedious, and that it
may be unnecessary, as well. He states that it may be more feasible to perform safety
analysis to determine what actions of the software are critical and to use this analysis
to guide and limit the requirements specification.
Use cases have proven successful for the elicitation, communication and documenta-
tion of requirements. However, there are also problems with use case based approaches
to requirements engineering. Typical problems are over-simplified assumptions about
the problem domain and a tendency to go prematurely into design considerations [5,26].
As discussed in Chapter 2, a use case typically describes some function that the sys-
tem should be able to perform. Hence, use cases are good for working with functional
requirements, but not necessarily with those that are related to safety.
In the development of a safety-critical system, safety requirements are often stated
directly by the safety engineers, who rather have concerns about what should not
happen in the system. Use cases, by their nature, concentrate on what the system
should do, and have less to offer when describing the undesired behaviour. This system
behaviour that is undesired is still a behaviour, which could potentially be investigated
through use cases. This motivated the extension of use cases with the use case type
accident case.
The definition of the accident case is based on the concepts that belong to safety
analysis, namely: accidents, hazards and accident scenarios.
3.2 Accident Case
As discussed in Section 2.2.1, accidents or losses, are considered early in the develop-
ment of safety-critical systems [73]. Their identification is part of the safety analysis
process and is the first step in any safety effort. The definition of an accident is pro-
vided in Definition 2.3, where it is described as an event that results in some form of
loss that is unacceptable to the stakeholder. For example, in the water tank system a
potential accident (labelled ExceedH) was identified, as follows:
Water level exceeds the high (H) limit in water tank. (ExceedH)
The occurrence of this accident represents a potential for the water tank to be
damaged. This can be considered a loss to a stakeholder of the water tank system.
UML use cases is extended with the use case type, accident case, that allows an accident
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identified from the safety analysis to be introduced as an accident case along side the
existing (regular) use cases. The accident case is defined as follows:
Definition 3.1 (Accident Case). An accident case is a sequence of actions that a
system or other entity can perform that result in an accident or loss to some stakeholder
if the sequence is allowed to complete.
For instance, this identified accident is introduced as an accident case, ExceedH,
as seen in the use case diagram of the water tank system, Figure 3.2a. The accident
case is denoted by a shaded or grey ellipse, and is placed within the subject (system
under consideration). The name of the accident, or its label, is displayed within the
ellipse. The purpose of the accident case is to allow the requirement analysis to take
into consideration undesired behaviours identified from the safety analysis that may
affect core functionalities of the system. The undesired behaviour of an accident case
is introduced as a deviation from that of a (regular) use case. That is, during the
execution of a use case, the behaviour of the accident case can be introduced as an
alternate sequence of steps that represent undesired or unplanned behaviour. If the
sequence of steps in the accident case is allowed to complete, it will result in a state
that can be considered as some form of loss to the stakeholder. This deviation from
the accident case to the use case is denoted by the directed relationship 〈〈deviate〉〉 in
the use case diagram.
| |
Water Tank System 
(WTS)
MaintainHWaterTank Pump
Sensor
System
DrainToL
<<extend>>
Drain
Use Case
Extension Use Case
ExceedH
Accident Case
<<deviate>>
(a) Use case diagram with ExceedH.
Accident case: ExceedH (EH)
Scenario
Triggers: Water level above HT.
Flow:
EH1. ...
.
.
.
EHn. Water level increases in tank.
(b) Specification of ExceedH
Figure 3.2: Use case model for Water Tank System updated with accident case, ExceedH.| |
What is achieved by the accident case is expected to violate what is required to
be achieved by the use case it deviates. For example, in the water tank system the
complete execution ExceedH will result in the water level exceeding the high limit. This
violates what is required by the contract of the MaintainH use case, where the invariant
and post-condition that are required to maintain the water level below the high (H)
limit, are violated.
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So far, the accident case only describes what the accident is about without specifying
the details of how the accident may occur, i.e. its sequence of steps. The definition of
a hazard (Definition 2.4) is examined to determine the cause of an accident in Section
3.2.1. The semantic and notation for the accident case and deviate relationship is
discussed in Section 3.3.1 and 3.3.2.
3.2.1 Cause of an Accident
As discussed in Section 2.2.2, Leveson [72] describes the cause of an accident with
respect to a system-level hazard and worst-case environmental conditions as follows:
Hazard (Action) + Environmental Condition (State)⇒ Accident (Event)
In this thesis, a hazard is described as an action that, together with a particular
set of worst-case environmental conditions, results in an accident. What constitutes a
hazard depends on where the boundaries of the system are drawn. Use cases establish
the actors and system boundary (subject) in the use case diagram which determines
what the system has control over. If one expects the systems engineer or designer to
create systems that eliminate or control hazards, then those hazards must be in their
design space. For the water tank system, the designer has control over the action to
either increase or decrease the water level in the tank (albeit not directly). A hazardous
action would be for the water level to be increased in the tank even after the water level
has exceeded the high threshold (HT) limit. The cause of the accident for ExceedH can
be written as follows:
Water level in the tank increases + Water level above HT⇒ ExceedH
This hazardous control action and the environmental condition is introduced in the
textual specification of the accident case. The hazard is introduced as the final step
in the scenario of the accident case while the environmental condition is captured as
the trigger condition. The scenario of the accident case is allowed to execute when the
environmental condition is true. The execution of the final step in the scenario of the
accident case will result in a state that is considered to be an accident. For now, the
steps that lead to the final hazardous system action is not known. It is the role of the
safety engineer to apply hazard analysis in order to determine the accident scenarios
that may lead to the hazardous control action, in order to result in the accident. This
is discussed in Section 3.2.2
For the water tank system, the cause for ExceedH is introduced in the specification
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of the accident case, as seen in Figure 3.2b. The environmental condition where the
water level is above the high threshold is captured by the trigger condition, while the
final step EHn, captures the hazardous control action where the water level increases
in the tank. The steps from EH1 to EHn−1, that lead to the hazardous action can be
identified using scenario-based hazard analysis techniques.
3.2.2 Accident Scenarios
The role of hazard analysis is to identify the cause of a hazard [73]. As discussed in
2.2.3, scenario-based hazard analysis techniques [18] provide a means to establish a
linkage between hazards and adverse consequences (accidents) via scenarios. In the
scenario-based hazard modelling framework, an accident scenario is the sequence of
events that is comprised of the initiating event, and enabling events that lead to the
adverse consequences. Analysing hazards in relation to the above sequence of events,
support activities that involve the prevention of adverse accident scenarios, ones with
undesired consequences.
The background provides an overview of the hazard analysis techniques FTA, ETA
and STPA applied on the water tank system. However, it is out of the scope of this
thesis to employ the hazard analysis techniques for systematically deriving accident
scenarios in the use of the accident case. This is addressed as part of the future work
as discussed in Section 8. In the water tank system, a potential accident scenario that
may lead to a hazardous action of the water level increasing in the tank, is seen in
Figure 3.3. In this scenario, the initiating event is the water level rising above the high
threshold (HT). This results in the next two successful events, where the sensor system
deactivates the sensor HT, and the controller deactivates the pump. However, in the
next event, a failure in the pump component results in the motor remaining switched on,
which then subsequently increases the water level in the tank. The complete execution
of this scenario is expected to result in the accident ExceedH, where the water level
exceeds the high limit in the tank.
| |
ExceedHWater level above HT
Sensor System 
deactivates 
Sensor HT.
WTS
 deactivates 
Pump.
Pump failure, 
motor remains 
switched on.
Water level in 
tank increases.
Successful Successful Failure
Figure 3.3: An accident scenario for ExceedH.| |
The deviate relationship from an accident case to an use case, allows the textual
specification of the use case to provide a deviation-point, i.e. between the steps in the
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scenario of the use case, where the accident case can be introduced as an alternative
(undesired) route. This allows the accident scenario to only specify the steps that are
related to the failure of the system and not repeat the same steps that already exist
in the use case it deviates. For example, the specification of the use case MaintainH,
provides a deviation-point for the accident case ExceedH, between step MH 2 and step
MH 3, as seen in Figure 3.4a. The scenario of the accident case is updated with
the steps that describe the failure of the pump component, where the motor remains
switched on (EH 1) and the water level increases in the tank (EH 2). The deviation-
point, allows the execution of the use case scenario to deviate to that of the accident
case.
Figure 3.4b provides an informal description in the execution of MaintainH. It shows
the execution may deviate to the accident scenario after step MH 2. The execution
of the accident scenario for ExceedH will result in the water level exceeding the high
threshold, which would not achieve the post-condition and also violate the invariant of
the use case MaintainH. The accident case provides a platform for communication un-
desired behaviours and identify appropriate safety recommendations that could control
potential accidents at an early stage in the development process.
| |
Use case: MaintainH
Contract
Pre-conditions:
Water level above HT and below H.
Post-conditions:
Water level between L and HT.
Invariants:
Water level is always between L and H.
Scenario
Triggers:
Water level above HT.
Main flow :
MH 1. Sensor HT is activated.
MH 2. WTS deactivates pump.
〈〈deviation-point: ExceedH〉〉
MH 3. Pump deactivates motor.
MH 4. Water level in tank decreases.
Deviation:
Accident case: ExceedH
Deviation-point: MH 3
Accident case: ExceedH
Scenario
Triggers:
Water level above HT.
Main flow :
EH 1. Motor remains switched on.
EH 2. Water level increases in tank.
(a) MaintainH and ExceedH.
MH_1
MH_2
MH_3
MH_4
EH_1
EH_2
Pre-condition
Post-condition
Deviate
(b) Execution of MaintainH.
Figure 3.4: Specification for MaintainH and ExceedH.| |
3.2.3 Safety Guided Design
The accident case derived through safety analysis will place integrity constraints on
existing core system function defined by use cases that they deviate. New functional
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requirements may be introduced to prevent the effects of the accidents identified by
the safety analysis. The accident case allows the requirements analysis to consider
the desired behaviour of the system with respect to the potential undesired behaviour
suggested by the safety analysis. It is aimed to provide a platform for systems and
safety engineers to communicate appropriate design recommendations that may guide
the development of the system with safety as an early consideration.
Allowing UML use cases to analyse accident scenario support activities to prevent
adverse accident scenarios. This extension of the accident case, introduces the rela-
tionship 〈〈prevent〉〉. The prevent relationship allows new additional behaviour to be
introduced in to a deviated use case that that prevents the deviating accident case
from achieving its undesired outcome. The notations and semantics for the prevent
relationship is provided in Section 3.3.3.
| |
H
L
Drain Input Signal
SensorHT
Sensor HT, LT and Motor 
Readings
Water Tank
Water Level
SensorLT
Pump
Pump Input Signal
Controller
Sensor 
System
Water
Drain
Exit Valve
HT
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Motor Signal
Figure 3.5: Water Tank System updated with safety control structure.| |
Prevent
Prevent is a directed relationship from a use case to an accident case. It allows the
behaviour of the use case to be introduced as additional behaviour in the target accident
case. The behaviour introduced by the preventing use case is aimed to limit the severity
that results from the execution of the accident case. In the water tank system, in order
to strengthen the overall safety of the system against the accidents such as, ExceedH,
an additional safety control structure, a drain component, was introduced as a design
recommendation, as seen in Figure 3.6.
The water tank system may activate the drain if it detects a failure in the pump
component where its motor remains switched on (motor reading from the sensor sys-
tem) even after the pump has been deactivated. When the drain is activated, it opens
an exit valve that is located on the low limit (L) of the tank, which subsequently drains
the water level to the low limit. The combination of the water level being drained by
Chapter 3. Accident Cases 46
the exit value and the undesired increase in water level by the failure of the pump
component, is expected to mitigate the accident where the water level does not exceed
the high limit (H).
| |
Water Tank System (WTS)
MaintainHWater
Tank Pump
Sensor
System
ExceedH
<<deviate>>
DrainToL
<<extend>>
<<prevent>>
Drain
Figure 3.6: Use case development of water tank system with accident case.| |
In UML use cases, these types of additional or exceptional behaviour are often in-
troduced to the system via an extension use case, as discussed in Chapter 2. Extension
use cases can be used to describe how a system can respond to when things do not go
as expected. An extension use case, DrainToL, is introduced in the use case diagram of
the water tank system, as seen in Figure 3.4, that introduces the functionality of the
additional safety control structure, drain.
The drain has been introduced as an actor that is associated with the extension
use case, DrainToL. This extension use case introduces an extends relationship to the
use case MaintainH, and now a prevent relationship to the accident case ExceedH. The
prevent relationship requires the extension-point to be specified between the step in the
accident scenario, instead of the use case. The extension-point is specified between the
step EH 1 and step EH 2, in the scenario of the accident case ExceedH. The behaviour
of the extension use case is expected to prevent the severity of the accident case, i.e.
water level exceeding the high limit, whenever it deviates the use case MaintainH.
The specification for MaintainH, ExceedH, and DrainToL, are seen in Figure 3.7. The
specification for DrainToL describes the behaviour introduced by the drain competent
to reduce the water level to the low limit (L). Once the execution of the extension use
case is complete, the execution returns to the step, EH 2, of the accident scenario.
The behaviour of the extension use case DrainToL prevents the accident scenario from
exceeding the water level above the high limit, as the additional behaviour has reduced
the water level to the low limit.
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Use case: MaintainH (MH)
Contract
Pre-conditions:
Water level above HT and lesser than or
equal to H.
Post-conditions:
Water level between L and HT.
Invariants:
Water level is always between L and H.
Scenario
Triggers:
Water level above HT.
Main flow:
MH 1. Sensor System activates sensor HT.
MH 2. WTS deactivates pump.
〈〈deviation-point: ExceedH〉〉
MH 3. Pump deactivates motor.
MH 4. Water level in tank decreases.
Deviations:
Deviation: ExceedH
Deviation-point: MH 3
Extensions:
Extension: ExceedH
Status: Prevent
Extension-point: EH 2
Accident case: ExceedH (EH)
Scenario
Triggers:
Water level above HT.
Main flow:
EH 1. Motor remains activated.
〈〈extension-point: DrainToL〉〉
EH 2. Water level increases in tank.
Extension use case: DrainToL (DL)
Contract
Pre-conditions:
Pump has been deactivated and mo-
tor remains active.
Post-conditions:
Water level at L.
Scenario
Triggers:
Pump has been deactivated and mo-
tor remains active.
Main flow:
DL 1. WTS activates drain.
DL 2. Drain activates valve.
DL 3. Water level in tank is drained.
Figure 3.7: Updated specificatin for MaintainH, MonitorPump and ExceedH.| |
3.3 Notation and Semantics
This section specifies the notations and semantics for the accident case (Section 3.3.1)
and the relationships deviate (Section 3.3.2), and prevent (Section 3.3.3).
3.3.1 Accident Case
The accident case is a means of specifying undesired or unplanned usages of a system.
It is introduced as a deviation of a use case via the deviate relationship. The execution
of the accident case is dependent of the use case it deviates. Its behaviour may be
performed only during the execution of the deviated use case. The behaviour of the
deviated use case is defined independently of the deviating accident case, and is mean-
ingful independently. On the other hand, the deviating accident case typically defines
behaviour that is not necessarily meaningful by itself.
The specification of the accident case provides a set of actions performed by the
system under consideration, which yields an observable result that is, typically, some
form of loss to one or more actors or other stakeholders of the system if allowed to
complete, i.e. execution of the final action. The accident case may be prevented or
mitigated by a use case using the relationships prevent and mitigate, respectively. An
accident case may deviate one or more use cases and is defined within the subject
(system under consideration).
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Notation
An accident case is shown as an ellipse, either containing the name of the accident, as
seen in Figure 3.8. If a subject is displayed, the accident case ellipse is visually located
inside the system boundary rectangle. This does not necessarily mean that the subject
owns the contained accident case, but merely that the accident is applicable to the
system under consideration.
| |
Accident 
Case
(a) Accident case.
Subject
UseCase
AccidentCase
<<deviate>>
(b) Accident case deviates use case.
Figure 3.8: Notation for accident case and deviate relationship.| |
3.3.2 Deviate
The deviate relationship is a directed relationship where the source is the deviating
accident case and the target (or destination) is the deviated use case. This relationship
specifies how and when the undesired behaviour defined in the accident case can be
introduced as an alternate set of actions to the desired behaviour defined in the target
use case. The deviate relationship allows the target use case to specify one or more
deviation-points which specifies a location in the use case where the behaviour of the
accident case is introduced.
The execution of the use case may change to that of the accident case if the trigger
condition of the accident case is true at that point. The scenario of the accident case
leads to the end of the deviated use case. However, if the trigger condition for the
accident case is false then the deviation does not occur.
Notation
A deviate relationship between an accident case and use case is shown by a dashed
arrow with an open arrow head from the accident case providing the deviation to the
base use case. The arrow is labelled with the 〈〈deviate〉〉 keyword, as seen in Figure
3.8b.
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3.3.3 Prevent
Prevent is a directed relationship form a source use case to a target accident case,
where the behaviour of the use case augments the undesired behaviour of the accident
case by preventing the accident from taking place. Extension use cases are often used
to introduced the additional behaviour into the accident case. Figure 3.9, describes an
accident case AC that deviates a use case UC. The extension use case EC is introduced
that extends the functionality of the UC by preventing any occurrence of the accident
case from resulting in a loss to the stakeholder.
Notation
A prevent relationship between an accident case and use case is shown by a dashed
arrow with an open arrow head from the accident case providing the deviation to the
base use case. The arrow is labelled with the 〈〈prevent〉〉 keyword, as seen in Figure
3.9.
| |
Subject
UseCase
AccidentCase
<<deviate>>
Extension
UseCase<<prevent>>
<<extend>>
Figure 3.9: Prevent relationship.| |
3.4 Related Work
This section provides the related work on how undesired or unplanned behaviours
are considered by requirements engineering techniques. Ellison et al. [35] introduce
intruders and intrusion scenarios in their case study as part of a large-scale distributed
health care system. The intrusion scenario is similar to an accident scenario, but
they do not provide a diagrammatic notation, a specification, or guidelines for what
constitutes an intrusion scenario.
McDermott and Fox [78] introduce the term abuse case as a way of eliciting security
requirements; an abuse case defines an interaction between an actor and a system that
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results in harm to a resource associated with one of the actors, one of the stakeholders,
or the system itself. They capture the abuse cases and regular use cases in separate use
case diagrams. This differs from our approach where we provide relationships between
accident cases and regular use cases in the same use case diagram.
Sindre and Opdahl [99] introduce misuse case as a means to document conscious and
active opposition in the form of a goal that a hostile agent intends to achieve, but which
the organisation perceives as detrimental to some of its goals. Misuse cases introduces
the threatens relationships which is perhaps closest in meaning to the accident case
with deviate relationship. Both misuse case and abuse case have strong inclination to
security. The accident case, on the other hand, is focused towards safety concerns.
Allenby and Kelly [7] describe a method for eliciting and analysing safety require-
ments for aero-engine control systems, using what they call hazard-mitigating use cases.
In comparison to misuse case and abuse case, they do not suggest the use of negative
agents, associated with their use cases. The motivation of their method is similar to
the accident case. Their method is to tabulate the failures, their causes, types, and
effects, and then possible mitigations. However, since their hazard-mitigating use cases
describe potentially catastrophic failures and their effects, it seems reasonable to define
them explicitly from use cases, as in accident cases.
Apart from use case based requirements analysis, undesired or negative behaviours
have been considered for goal-oriented requirements engineering. Van Lamsweerde [109]
and his co-workers on the KAOS approach have proposed goal-obstacle analysis. Anton
and Potts [8] have used goals and obstacles to relate desired and undesired behaviour
under a goal-hierarchy. Our approach has investigated UML use cases as it widely
used in industry and its notations are familiar to practitioners, in comparison to these
requirements capture techniques.
3.5 Summary & Discussion
UML use cases has been extended with a new use case type: accident case, for the
explicit representation of safety concerns. As UML use cases are used during the early
stages of development for defining and analysing system behaviour, this extension
provides a platform to communicate accidents identified in the safety analysis with
regards to deviations from the desired system behaviour. The accident case allows the
requirements analysis to differentiate between the desired and undesired behaviour of
the system.
The deviate relationship has been introduced in the use case to indicate how the
accident case may deviate a use case. Analysing use cases in relation with deviations
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from accident case support activities that involve prevention of adverse accident scenar-
ios,ones with undesired consequences and the promotion of favourable scenarios that
limit the severity of such consequences. The relationship prevent was introduced to
allow use cases to control or limit the severity of an accident case they control. The
semantics and notation for this extension to the use case model has been provided.
Chapter4
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In this chapter, the specifications of use cases are enhanced to support a language
with precise semantics. Figure 4.1 highlights which part of the roadmap this chapter
implements. Use cases are a popular method for capturing behavioural requirements
of the software system. The informality of use cases is an advantage at the early
stages, however, informal requirements can be easily misinterpreted. It is difficult, if
not impossible, to check whether the behaviour captured by the use cases satisfies the
agreement of the stakeholders involved.
As discussed in Chapter 1, informal methods are limited to review-based analysis.
Since their notations are generally incapable of expressing behaviour, the results of the
analysis relies only on the properties of the artefact description, not the properties of the
artefact itself. Errors committed in the course of preparing the use case document may
have far reaching consequences [51]. Left undetected, these errors may later manifest
52
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in the design or implementation phases, where the cost of fixing the same errors are
more expensive.
As stated in the Section 2.1 (Background), as a primary artefact in the requirements
documentation, UML use cases [19] often appear in two complementary forms:
• A use case diagram that provides an easy-to-understand illustration of the subject,
actors and use cases. The use case diagrams have strictly formalized syntax.
• An informal document or plain text, often called a use case specification [9], used
to specify each use case with a contract (pre-conditions, post-conditions, and
invariants) and scenarios (interactions between actors and subject to achieve
the contract). There is no agreed formal syntax or semantics for the use case
specification.
The means for specifying the contents of a single use case is not agreed upon at
all. The UML definition [19] just states that “a use case can be described in plain
text, using operations, in activity diagrams, by a state-machine, or by other behaviour
description techniques...”. In this chapter, an enhancement of the use case specification
is provided that allows it to be written in a language with precise semantics and logic for
reasoning. Inference based on the formally specified use cases allows for the verification
of the desired properties in the use case. The gap between informal and formal methods
can be reduced by adopting a dual representation in the specification where informal
and formal notation is allowed to co-exist.
To implement this, a use case model for UML use cases is proposed. The use case
model provides the specifications for detailing the concepts of UML use cases, namely
the subject, actors and use cases. The specifications allows a dual representation of
its content, with both informal and formal notation. The formal notation is based on
Event-B’s mathematical language [1]. The use case model is not meant as a replacement
of the use case diagram that illustrates UML use cases. Instead, the use case model
allows each artefact introduced in the use case diagram to be specified with both
informal and formal notation.
The layout of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 gives an overview of the use
case model. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 describe how the subject, actors and use cases in the
use case model are represented in the use case model. The abstract syntax for the use
case model is provided in Section 4.5. Finally, the related work and summary on this
approach to formalising use cases is provided in Section 4.6 and 4.7.
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4.2 Use Case Model
The key concepts associated with UML use cases are actors, subject and use cases
(use cases refers to a use case type: use case, extension use case or accident case).
The subject is the system under consideration to which the use cases apply; the actors
model entities that are outside the system; and the use cases capture the interaction
between the actors and the subject (e.g., by exchanging signals and data), to achieve
some desired functionality. These concepts are illustrated in a use case diagram as seen
in Figure 4.2. A use case model is introduced, that allows the concepts of UML use
cases to be represented by specifications that have syntax and semantics.
| |
Use Case: UC
Roles: Actor, Subject
Subject
UC
EC
Contract
Scenario
Extensions
Extension Use Case: EC
Contract
Scenario
<<extends>>
Accident Case: AC
ScenarioAC
<<deviate>>
<<prevent>>
Use Case Model
Use Case Diagram
Actor
Agent: Actor
Carrier Sets
Constants
Variables
Agent: Subject
Carrier Sets
Constants
Variables
role
role
extension
deviation
Agent
Agent
Use Case
Extension Use Case
Accident Case
Deviations
Figure 4.2: UML use cases: use case diagram and use case model.| |
The actors and subject are represented as agents in the use case model. An agent
defines information or data relevant to the domain of the actor or subject that the agent
represents. These agents play a role in use cases, where the information that is defined
by the agent is used to detail the specification of the use cases. The specification of
the agent is described in Section 4.3 with the role relationship.
In the use case model, a use case and extension use case is represented by a speci-
fication that contains a contract and scenario. The accident case however is specified
with only a scenario. The relationships extends and deviates are introduced as an of
extensions and deviations in the use case specification. Specifications of the use case,
extension use case and accident case are described in Section 4.4.
Chapter 4. Formal Use Cases 55
4.3 Agent
The actors and subject are represented as agents in the use case model. An agent
models the data or information relevant to the domain of the actor or the subject it
represents. An agent is made up of five elements as seen in Figure 4.3.
Each element is described as follows:
Name The name of the actor or subject the agent represents.
Carrier sets S denotes a list of carrier sets such that S = {S1, ..., Sl}. Each carrier
set is represented by a name. The only requirement concerning such sets is that
they are to be non-empty.
Constants C denotes a set of constants such that C = {C1, ..., Cm}. The syntactic
form for declaring a constant Ci (where 1 ≤ i ≤ m) is Ci :: Tci(S,C). In this
case, Tci(S,C) is a predicate that denotes the type of the constant Ci.
Variables V denotes a set of constants such that V = {V1, ..., Vn}. The syntactic
form for declaring a constant Vi (where 1 ≤ i ≤ n) is Vi :: Tvi(S,C, V ).In this,
Tvi(S,C, V ) is a predicate that denotes the type of the variable Vi.
Initialisation For each variable Vi an initialisation v := Nv1(S,C) is provided. It
denotes an assignment. These initialisation could take either the form of a de-
terministic or non-deterministic assignment as seen in Figure 2.11.
| |
Name
Carrier Sets
Constants
Variables
Agent
(a) Structure.
Agent: A
Carrier Sets
S
Constants
C1 :: Tc1 (S,C), ..., Cm :: Tcm (S,C)
Variables
V1 :: Tv1 (S,C, V ), ..., Vn :: Tvn (S,C, V )
Initialisation
V1 :: v := Nv1 (S,C), ..., Vn :: v := Nvn (S,C)
(b) An agent, A.
Figure 4.3: Agent.| |
A predicate is expressed within the language of first order predicate calculus with
equality extended with set theory. It is the predicate language used by Event-B’s
mathematical language in [1]. The syntax for Event-B’s mathematical language is
provided in Appendix 1.
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Example
In the water tank system, the actors (Water Tank, Sensor System, Pump, Drain) and
the subject (Water Tank System) are introduced as agents in the use case model. This
can be seen in Figure 4.4.
| |
Agent: Water Tank
Constants
H :: H > HT
HT :: HT > LT
LT :: LT > L
L :: L = 0
DEC :: DEC ∈ (H−HT)..(HT− LT)
INC :: INC ∈ (LT− L)..(HT− LT)
DRN :: DRN = L
Variables
waterlevel :: waterlevel ∈ L...H
Initialisation
waterlevel :: waterlevel := H
Agent: Drain
Variables
valve :: valve ∈ BOOL
Initialisation
valve :: valve := FALSE
Agent: Sensor System
Variables
sensorHT :: sensorHT ∈ BOOL
Initialisation
sensorHT :: sensorHT := FALSE
Agent: Water Tank System
Variables
pump :: pump ∈ BOOL
drain :: drain ∈ BOOL
Initialisation
pump :: pump := TRUE
drain :: drain := FALSE
Agent: Pump
Variables
motor :: motor ∈ BOOL
Initialisation
motor :: motor := TRUE
Figure 4.4: Agents of the water tank system in the use case model.| |
The Water Tank agent defines the limits and thresholds of the tank (L,H,LT, and
HT) as constants, as they are not expected to be modified by the behaviour of the use
cases. Their types specify important assumptions on the domain of the water tank, e.g.
the high threshold if above the low threshold HT > LT. The water level in the tank is
denoted by the variable waterlevel as its values are expected to change. It is of type,
waterlevel ∈ L..H, where the water level is always expected to be between the L and
H limits of the water tank. This variable is initialised to the value H. The constants,
DEC and INC, denote a discrete representation in the decrease and increase of water
level in the tank, respectively.
The agents Sensor System, Pump, Water Tank System, and Drain, introduce the
variables, sensorHT, pump, motor, drain, valve. These variables are all of the type
BOOL, where TRUE indicates activated, and FALSE indicate deactivated. These sets,
constants and variables can be used to specify a use case in which the agent plays a
role in.
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4.3.1 Role
In the use case model, an agent is related to a use case via the role relationship.
This relationship plays an important part in allowing the specification of the use case
to be detailed formally. The relationship allows for the carrier sets, constants and
variables, defined by the agent, to be used to detail the specification of the use case.
This relationship is used in the following:
Subject An agent that represent the subject (as seen in Figure 4.5a) will have the role
relationship to the use case that belong to that subject (as seen in Figure 4.5b).
Actors The association between an actor and use case (indicated by a line in the use
case diagram), introduce the relationship role between the agent and use case
that corresponds to them in the use case model (as seen in Figure 4.5b).
2
| |
Subject
Actor
UC
(a) Use case diagram.
Agent: Actor
Carrier Sets
Constants
Variables
Agent: Subject
Carrier Sets
Constants
Variables
Use Case: UC
Roles: Actor, Subject
Contract
Scenario
role role
Agent Agent
Use Case
(b) Use case model.
Figure 4.5: Relationship role.| |
4.4 Use Cases
In the use case model, a use case is made of three elements (as seen in Figure 4.6): (1)
a name; (2) a contract; and (3) a scenario. The name of the use case the specification
describes. The contract is an agreement with the stakeholders of what must be achieved
by the use case. The scenario of the use case captures the interaction between the actor
and the subject that describe how the contract is achieved. The elements, contract
and scenario, are further discussed in the sub-sections below.
4.4.1 Contract
The structure of the contract is made of three elements (as seen in Figure 4.7): (1)
pre-conditions; (2) post-conditions; and (3) invariants. Assuming that an agent A with
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| |
Name
Contract
Scenario
Use Case
Figure 4.6: Contract.| |
carrier sets S, constants C, and variables V , plays a role in the use case UC, then its
contract can be specified as follows:
Pre-conditions A list of named predicates, collectively denoted by P (S,C, V ). These
predicates state the conditions that are required to be true before the use case
executes.
Post-conditions A list of named predicates, collectively denoted by Q(S,C, V ). These
predicates state the conditions that are required to be true after the use case
executes.
Invariants A list of named predicates, collectively denoted by I(S,C, V ). These pred-
icates state the conditions that are required to be true throughout the execution
of the use case.
The contract of the use case can be detailed formally using only the carrier sets S,
constants C, and variables V , of the agents that play a role in it. This requires a use
case to have atleast one agent that plays a role in it, in order for its specification to be
specified formally.
| |
Pre-conditions
Post-conditions
Invariants
Contract
Figure 4.7: Contract.| |
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4.4.2 Scenario
The structure for a scenario is made of two elements (as seen in Figure 4.8a): (1) a
main flow, and (2) a collection of alternate flows. The alternate flows are optional, but
there must be one main flow to describe the scenario of the use case. The structures
of the main flow and alternate flow are seen in Figure 4.8b and 4.8c, respectively.
The main flow represents a “sunny day” scenario where there are no exceptions or
failures in the interaction between the actors and the subject (agents) to achieve the
contract. The main flow is made of two elements: (1) triggers and (2) steps, as seen
in Figure 4.8b. The triggers are a list of named predicates, collectively denoted by
R(S,C, V ). These predicates state the conditions that must be true in order for the
main flow of the scenario to initiate execution. The steps element specify a sequence of
individual steps. The specification for the steps element is described in Section 4.4.3.
The alternate flows are optional. They introduce a sequence of steps that also
achieves the contract of use case, albeit, following different steps than those described
in the main flow of the use case. These alternate flows capture expected errors (e.g. an
ATM customer providing an incorrect PIN) in the interactions between the actors and
subject. The structure of the alternate flow specifies an alternate-point and rejoin-
point. The alternate-point specifies a step in the main flow of the use case, where
the execution of the use case may alternate (instead of that step) to the first step of
the alternate flow. The rejoin-point specifies a step in the main flow of the use case
where the execution of the alternate flow returns after its sequence of steps have been
executed.
| |
Main Flow
Alternate Flows
Scenario
(a) Scenario.
Main Flow
Triggers
Steps
(b) Main flow.
Alternate-point
Rejoin-point
Steps
Alternate Flow
(c) Alternate flow.
Figure 4.8: Structure of scenario, main flow and alternate flow.| |
4.4.3 Steps
The steps specify a sequence of steps, U1, ..., Un, where each step can be of either one
of the following kinds: (1) action, (2) conditional, or (3) loop. Traditionally, branching
in use cases are often shown by alternate flows. However, it is possible to specify
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if (conditional) and while (loop) within the flow of the use case to introduce what
is called simple branching [9]. The use of simple branching in a flow is desirable as
it can reduce the total number of alternate flows specified in the use case. In this
thesis, a use case flow is allowed to show branching in two ways: (1) simple branching
create branches within the flow, namely, conditionals and loops, (2) complex branching
specified by alternate flows written explicitly below the main flow.
Let Ui be a step such that Ui ∈ U1, ..., Un. Figure 4.9, describes the three different
kinds of step that can be applied to Ui with their syntactic form and semantics.
| |
Kind Syntactic Form Description
Action Ui. Nui(S,C, V )
Nui(S,C, V ) is a generalised substitution that
may take either form of a deterministic or non-
deterministic assignment, as seen in Figure 2.11. The
assignment may modify the state of variables V , on
the execution of the step Ui.
Conditional
Ui. if Cui(S,C, V ) then
Ui1 . ...
...
Uin . ...
Ui+1. ...
When the execution reaches a conditional step, Ui,
if the predicate, Uui(S,C, V ), is true, then the (sub)
steps, Ui1 ...Uin , that belong to Ui, are allowed to ex-
ecute. The execution then continues to step, Ui+1.
If the predicate, Cui(S,C, V ), was false, then exe-
cution skips the steps, Ui1 ...Ui n, and executes the
step, Ui+1.
Loop
Ui. while Cui(S,C, V ) do
Ui1 . ...
...
Uin . ...
Ui+1. ... ;
When the execution reaches a loop step, Ui, if the
predicate, Cui(S,C, V ), is true, then the (sub) steps,
Ui1 ...Uin , that belong to Ui, is allowed to execute.
The execution then returns back to the step, Ui.
If the predicate, Cui(S,C, V ), was false, the execu-
tion skips the steps, Ui1 ...Uin , and executes the step,
Ui+1.
Figure 4.9: Kinds of steps: action, conditional, and loop.| |
The simple branching conditional and loop are described as follows:
Conditional A conditional in the flow is introduced by a step with the prefix if . This
step does not capture an action, but specifies a predicate that is either true or
false. Under this step, is a collection of (sub-) steps that acts as the body to this
conditional. This is clearly indicated with careful indentation and numbering.
This removes the need for a closing statement, e.g. end if .
Loop Sometimes it is necessary to repeat an action several times within a flow of
events. This does not occur very often in use case modelling [9], but it is useful
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to provide a strategy to deal with it. The while keyword is used to model a
sequence of actions in the flow of events that is performed while some condition
is true. The syntactic form of a loop is similar to that of a conditional. However,
the sub-steps of the loop execute until the loop predicate is false.
Example
The informal specification for the MaintainH use case (Figure 3.7) of the water tank
system, is specified in the use case model as seen in Figure 4.10. The specification
supports a dual representation of the requirements where the use case is detailed with
both informal and formal notation. As the actors (Water Tank, Sensor System, Pump,
Water Tank System) are associated with MaintainH, their corresponding agents have the
relationship role with this use case (see Figure 4.4 for the agents). The contract of Main-
tainH is specified formally (Figure 4.10b) where the pre-condition, post-condition and
invariant are specified formally via the predicates labelled @MH Pre 1, @MH Post 1
and @MH Inv 1, respectively.
| |
Use case: MaintainH (MH)
Roles: Sensor System, Pump, Water Tank, Wa-
ter Tank System.
Contract
Pre-conditions:
@MH Pre 1: Water level is above high
threshold and lesser than or equal to the high
limit.
Post-conditions:
@MH Post 1: Water level is between the low
limit and high threshold.
Invariants:
@MH Inv 1: Water level is always between
low and high limit.
Scenario
Triggers:
@MH Trig 1: Water level above HT.
Main Flow :
MH 1. Sensor System activates sensor HT.
MH 2. Water tank system deactivates pump.
MH 3. Pump deactivates motor.
MH 4. Water level in tank decreases.
(a) Informal
Use case: MaintainH (MH)
Roles: Sensor System, Pump, Water Tank, Water
Tank System.
Contract
Pre-conditions:
@MH Pre 1: waterlevel > HT ∧ waterlevel ≤ H
Post-conditions:
@MH Post 1: waterlevel ≥ L ∧ waterlevel ≤ HT
Invariants:
@MH Inv 1: waterlevel ∈ L..H
Scenario
Triggers:
@MH Trig 1: waterlevel > HT
Main Flow :
MH 1. sensorHT := TRUE
MH 2. pump := FALSE
MH 3. motor := FALSE
MH 4. waterlevel := waterlevel −DEC
(b) Formal.
Figure 4.10: Informal and formal specification for use case MaintainH.| |
The constants and variables defined by the agents are used to formally specify the
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contract and scenario of MaintainH. The pre-condition, post-condition and invariant
are specified by predicates that clearly express the agreement of the stakeholders. The
scenario specifies a main flow which captures a trigger and a sequence of steps (MH 1
to MH 4). Each step is of the action kind, that captures assignments that modify the
variables of the agents that play a role in this use case. The execution of the main flow
is required to satisfy the contract of the use case.
4.4.4 Accident Case
The relationship deviate is used to describe how an accident case may deviate a use
case. The source of this relationship is the accident case and the target is the use
case. Figure 4.11a provides a use case diagram of an accident case that deviates a use
case via the deviate relationship. In the use case model, this is represented by the
specification of the use case and accident case, as seen in Figure 4.11b.
| |
Accident
Case
<<deviate>>
Use Case
(a) Use case diagram.
Name
Use Case
Contract
Scenario
Deviations Name
Scenario
Accident Case
deviation
(b) Use case model.
Figure 4.11: The deviate relationship between use case and accident case.| |
In the use case model, this deviate relationship introduces the deviations element
in the structure of the use case. This element allows the use case to have a collection
of deviation references to accident cases. The structure of the accident case is similar
to that of the use case. However, it does not have a contract, and only specifies a
name and a scenario, as seen in Figure 4.11b. The scenario of the accident case can be
detailed formally using the carrier sets, constants and variables of the agents that play
a role in the deviated use case.
The deviation element, as seen in Figure 4.12a, allows the use case to specify a
deviation-point. This deviation-point is a reference to a step in the scenario of the use
case (this includes steps in the main flow and alternate flows). This indicates that,
during execution, at this step the scenario provided by the accident case is allowed to
execute as a deviation from the scenario of the use case.
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| |
Deviation
Deviation-point
(a) Deviation.
Extension
Status
Rejoin-point
Extension-point
(b) Extension.
Figure 4.12: Elements: Deviation and Extension| |
Example
In the example of the water tank system, the ExceedH accident case deviates the use
case MaintainH. In the use case model, the element deviation is introduced in the
specification of MaintainH use case, as seen in Figure 4.13. This specifies a deviation-
point, step MH 3 of MaintainH, which allows the scenario of the ExceedH accident case
to be introduced as a deviation.
The specification of ExceedH only provides a scenario as it is an accident case. This
scenario is seen in Figure 4.13, and is specified with both informal and formal notations.
The deviation relation in the use case model allows the variables and constants defined
by the agents that play a role in the use case MaintainH, to be used to specify the
scenario of ExceedH.
| |
Use case: MaintainH (MH)
...
Deviations
Deviation: ExceedH
Deviation-point : MH 3
Extensions
Extension: DrainToL
Status: Prevent
Extension-point : EH 2
(a) MaintainH.
Accident case: ExceedH (EH)
Scenario
Triggers:
@EH Trig 1: Water level above HT.
Main Flow :
EH 1. Motor remains activated.
〈Extension-point: DrainToL〉
EH 2. Water level in tank increases.
(b) Informal
Accident case: ExceedH (EH)
Scenario
Triggers:
@EH Trig 1: wl > HT
Main Flow :
EH 1. motor := TRUE
〈Extension-point: DrainToL〉
EH 2. wl := wl + INC
(c) Formal.
Figure 4.13: Informal and formal specification for accident case ExceedH.| |
4.4.5 Extension Use Case
An extends relationship from an extension use case to a use case is illustrated by a
use case diagram in Figure 4.14a. The use case and extension use case are represented
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in the use case model as seen in Figure 4.14b. When an extension use case intents
to extend the behaviour of the use case, an element extensions is introduced in the
structure of the use case. This allows the use case to specify one or more extension,
which refers to the extension use case. This extension element represents the extends
relationship in the use case model. The structure of the extension use case is the same
as that of the use case. It specifies a name, a contract and a scenario.
| |
Extension 
Use Case
<<extend>>
Use Case
(a) Use case diagram.
Name
Use Case
Contract
Scenario
Extension Name
Contract
Extension Use Case
extension
Scenario
(b) Use case model.
Figure 4.14: The extend relationship between use case and extension use case.| |
The extension use case can be specified by the carrier sets, constants and variables,
used to specify the parent use case. New agents may also be introduced that play a role
in the extension use case. The extension element allows the use case to specify a status,
extension-point and rejoin-point. Each of these elements are described as follows:
Status A status can be of two kinds: ordinary or prevent. It denotes the type of
extension. By default, the status for an extension is ordinary. The status prevent
is discussed in the following subsection.
Extension-point When the status is ordinary, the extension-point specifies a step Se in
the scenario of the use case that the extension element belongs to. The behaviour
of the extension use case is inserted between steps Se and Se−1.
Rejoin-point When the status is ordinary, the rejoin-point specifies a step Sr in the
scenario of the use case that the extension element belongs to. It specifies the
step that is executed after the extension use case is complete. It is possible for
the rejoin-point not to be specified. In this case the execution of the use case
returns to the end of the use case.
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The Prevent Status
When the status of the extension is prevent, it indicates that the extension use case is
introduced as a means to prevent the behaviour of the accident case that deviates the
use case from completing. The prevent status requires the extension-point to specify
a step in the scenario of the accident case. The prevent relationship ensures that the
accident case is not allowed to complete, i.e. the final step of the accident case must
not be allowed to execute. When the status is prevent, rejoin-point must specify a step
in the scenario of the use case that the extension element belongs to. This ensures that
the behaviour of the extension use case is executed and returns to the scenario of the
main use case.
Example
The element extension is introduced in the specification of MaintainH as shown in
Figure 4.13a. It specifies the status and extension-point and refers to the extension use
case DrainToL. The extension-point specifies a step EH 2 in scenario of the ExceedH
accident case, as the status for the extension is prevent. This introduces the behaviour
of the extension use case between the steps EH 1 and EH 2. Since the rejoin-point is
not specified it returns to the end of the use case. This allows the execution to skip
the step EH 2, preventing the accident scenario from not completing.
| |
Extension Use Case: DrainToL (DL)
Roles: Drain.
Contract
Pre-conditions:
@DL Pre 1: Pump has been deactivated
and motor remains active.
Post-conditions:
@DL Post 1: Water level is at L.
Scenario
Triggers:
@DL Trig 1: Pump has been deacti-
vated and motor remains active.
Main Flow:
DL 1. WTS activates drain.
DL 2. Drain activates valve.
DL 3. Water level in tank is drained.
(a) Informal
Extension Use Case: DrainToL (DL)
Roles: Drain.
Contract
Pre-conditions:
@DL Pre 1: pump = FALSE ∧
motor = TRUE
Post-conditions:
@DL Post 1: waterlevel = L
Scenario
Trigger:
@DL Trig 1: pump = FALSE ∧
motor = TRUE
Main Flow:
DL 1. drain := TRUE
DL 2. valve := TRUE
DL 3. waterlevel := DRN
(b) Formal.
Figure 4.15: Informal and formal specification for extension use case DrainToLT.| |
The extension use case, DrainToL is specified with both formal and informal nota-
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tion, as seen in Figure 4.15. The extension use case is specified with the carrier sets,
constants and variables that were used to specify the MaintainH use case. The Drain
agent plays a role in this extension use case, allow the specification to use the variables
drain and valve and constant DRN , defined by the agent.
4.5 Abstract Syntax for Use Cases
This section provides the syntax in the structure of the use case specifications. Ex-
tended Backus-Naur Form (EBNF) [112], is used to describe the abstract syntax. This
syntax is used to describe translation rules in Chapter 5 to encode it in Event-B. The
meta-symbols for EBNF and their meaning are provided in Figure 4.16.
| |
Symbol Meaning Symbol Meaning
::= is defined as * zero or more
| or + one or more
<> non-terminal symbol ? zero or one
Figure 4.16: Meta-symbols for EBFN and their meanings.| |
Figure 4.17 describes the structure and syntax of the use case, extension use case
and accident case. The structure of these were informally described in Section 4.4. The
structure of the use case and extension use case are similar as they contain a name,
contract, scenario, extensions and deviations. The extension and deviation are optional
as there can be zero or more of them (∗). However, the accident case only specifies
a name and scenario. With regards to agents, the use case must specify atleast one
agent (+), while the extension use case and accident cases may specify zero or more (∗)
agents that play a role in them.
Figure 4.18 provides the structure and syntax used to define the agent, contract and
scenario. The agent may specify zero or more sets and constants, but they must specify
atleast one or more variable and initialisation. The contract of a use case or extension
use case specifies pre-conditions, post-conditions and invariants. The invariants are
optional but there must be atleast one or more pre-conditions and post-conditions.
Each of these refer to a collection, for example, pre-conditions is defined as collection
of pre-condition. The scenario specifies a main flow and optional alternate flows. The
main flow is composed of triggers and a collection of step∗. The 〈triggers〉 may specify
a collection of trigger.
Figure 4.19 provides the structure and syntax for the alternate flow, deviation, and
extension. The alternate flows contains an alternate-point, steps (similar to a main
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| |
〈usecase〉 =̂
Use Case: 〈name〉 (〈label〉)
Roles
〈agent〉+
Contract
〈contract〉
Scenario
〈scenario〉
Deviations
〈deviation〉∗
Extensions
〈extension〉∗
(a) Use Case.
〈accidentcase〉 =̂
Accident Case: 〈name〉 (〈label〉)
Roles
〈agent〉∗
Scenario
〈scenario〉
(b) Accident Case.
〈extensionusecase〉 =̂
Extension Use Case:
〈name〉 (〈label〉)
Roles
〈agent〉∗
Contract
〈contract〉
Scenario
〈scenario〉
Deviations
〈deviation〉∗
Extensions
〈extension〉∗
(c) Extension Use Case.
Figure 4.17: Structure of Use Case, Accident Case and Extension Use Case.| |
flow), and an optional rejoin-point. The relations extension and deviation refer to
extension use case and accident case via a name, respectively. The extension specifies
a status, extension-point, and rejoin-point. The status is either of the form ordinary,
mitigate or prevent. The deviation relation specifies the name of the accident case and
a deviation-point. The pre-condition, post-condition, invariant, trigger, and condition
capture a labelled predicate. The step, however, captures a labelled action.
As seen in Figure 4.18a the agents may specify sets, constants, variables and ini-
tialisations. The syntax for these are seen as follows. Each set, constant, variable and
initialisation specifies an identifier. The constant and variables also specify a predicate.
The initialisation specifies an action.
〈set〉 ::= 〈identifier〉
〈constant〉 ::= 〈identifier〉 ‘::’ 〈predicate〉
〈variable〉 ::= 〈identifier〉 ‘::’ 〈predicate〉
〈initialisation〉 ::= 〈identifier〉 ‘::’ 〈action〉
Each step may specify a label and action, or conditional or loop. The conditional
and loop introduce the if and while constructs. They capture a label, predicate and
steps.
〈step〉 ::= 〈label〉 ‘:’ 〈action〉 | 〈conditional〉 | 〈loop〉
〈conditional〉 ::= 〈label〉 ‘:’ ‘if’ {〈predicate〉} ‘then’ 〈step〉+
〈loop〉 ::= 〈label〉 ‘:’ ‘while’ {〈predicate〉} ‘do’ 〈step〉+
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| |
〈agent〉 =̂
Agent: 〈ident〉 (〈label〉)
Carrier Sets
〈set〉∗
Constants
〈constant〉∗
Variables
〈variable〉+
Initialisations
〈initialisation〉∗
(a) Agent.
〈contract〉 =̂
Pre-conditions:
〈pre-condition〉+
Post-conditions:
〈post-condition〉+
Invariants:
〈invariant〉∗
(b) Contract.
〈scenario〉 =̂
Triggers:
〈trigger〉+
Main Flow:
〈Steps〉+
Alternate Flows:
〈alternateflow〉∗
(c) Scenario.
Figure 4.18: Structure of Agent, Contract and Scenario.| |
| |
〈alternateflow〉 =̂
Alternate Flow:
〈Step〉+
Alternate-Point :
〈alternate-point〉
Rejoin-Point:
〈rejoin-point〉?
(a) Alternate Flow.
〈deviation〉 =̂
Deviation:
〈accidentcase〉
Deviation-point :
〈deviation-point〉
(b) Deviation.
〈extension〉 =̂
Extension:
〈extensionusecase〉
Status:
〈status〉
Extension-point :
〈deviation-point〉
Rejoin-point :
〈rejoin-point〉?
(c) Extension.
Figure 4.19: Structure of Alternate Flow, Deviation and Extension.| |
The syntax for the pre-condition, post-condition, invariant, trigger, condition and
step are as follows. They all, apart from step, specify a label and a predicate. The step
specifies a label and an action.
〈pre-condition〉 ::= 〈label〉 : 〈predicate〉
〈post-condition〉 ::= 〈label〉 : 〈predicate〉
〈invariant〉 ::= 〈label〉 : 〈predicate〉
〈trigger〉 ::= 〈label〉 : 〈predicate〉
The syntax for a predicate is specified in Appendix A. An action takes the syntactic
form as seen in Figure 2.11, that may contain a predicate or expression. The syntax
for an expression is provided in Appendix A.2. The predicate and expression language
provided is based on Event-B’s mathematical language [1].
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〈alternate-point〉 ::= 〈label〉
〈deviation-point〉 ::= 〈label〉
〈extension-point〉 ::= 〈label〉
〈rejoin-point〉 ::= 〈label〉
A label or identifier is a sequence of characters that enjoy some special property,
like referring to a letter or a digit.
4.6 Related Work
In this chapter, a formal use case model has been provided which allows the concepts
for UML use cases to be detailed in a formal specification. This use case model is not
meant as a replacement of the use case diagram but as an enhancement to it.
Hurlbut [49] provides a very thorough and detailed survey of selected issues con-
cerning formalising of use cases. Pohl and Haumer [91] propose contextual models for
representing and reasoning about scenario-based requirements. However, it has no for-
mal model and consequently there is a lack of reliable mechanism for formal reasoning
about the modelled system. In [98], Shen and Liu propose a rigorous review technique
for use case diagrams. The pre- and post-condition of an use case are formalised in a
HCL specification. In [15], Bartsch et al. describe an approach to check consistency
between use case scenarios and sequence diagrams. Barrett et al., [14] includes the
transition of use cases to finite state machines, however the formal model presented in
our work is more detailed and also shows the specific context of the formal verification.
In [118], Zhao and Duan shows the formal analysis of use cases using the Petri nets
[89] formalism. Overgaard and Palmkvist provide a formalisation of the relationships
used within UML use cases [87], but the authors do not show how to analyse the use
cases. OCL [110] is a text-based language that is part of the XML [20] standard and it is
used to constraint the behaviour of UML elements. Unfortunately, OCL specifications
cannot capture the interaction between actors. Therefore they are not as expressive as
contracts.
Back et al. [11] propose the enhancement of use case diagrams with formal docu-
ments (contracts) using the refinement calculus [12]. In [47], Wolfgang et al. propose
an approach for use cases to be specified in Abstract State Machine Language, and
test cases are generated. In comparison to these approaches, the work presented in
this section provides an enhancement UML use cases allowing its textual specifications
to be written in a language with precise semantics. In addition, the extension to UML
use cases via the accident case is taken into account in this formalisation of use cases.
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4.7 Summary & Discussion
This chapter has introduced a use case model that allows concepts of UML use cases,
namely, use cases (including accident case), actors and subject to be detailed in a formal
specification. The structure and semantics for the specification has been described with
relation to the use case diagram. The relationships, deviate and extends, have been
taken into account in the use case model that allows the creation of extension use cases
and accident cases, respectively. The formal language used is a derivation of Event-
B’s mathematical language. Using precise semantics to describe use cases is aimed at
removing ambiguity and inconsistencies in the requirements. The abstract syntax for
for the use cases is provided.
In the next chapter, an encoding of the use case model in Event-B is provided. The
aim of this encoding is to use to verification tools provided by Event-B to automate the
reasoning applied on the laws of the use case. The translation rules for this encoding
in Event-B is provided with the use of the abstract syntax for use cases provided in
this chapter.
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Figure 5.1: Thesis Roadmap for Chapter 5.| |
In this chapter, an encoding of the use cases in Event-B is provided. Figure 5.1 high-
lights which part of the roadmap this chapter implements. The purpose of this encoding
is three fold: (1) to exploit an abstraction found is use cases that allow its behaviour
to be encoded in the refinement-based formalism Event-B; (2) provide semantics for
use cases in Event-B, and (3) harness the verification support provided by Event-B
to prove that contracts are satisfied by scenarios, including those with prevented acci-
dent cases. As discussed in Section 2, Event-B supports a refinement-based approach,
where its model represents different abstraction levels of the system behaviour ; internal
consistency and between the abstraction levels are ensured by formal verification.
Use cases provide a goal hierarchy [25] by its contract and scenario that provide
an abstraction of the problem. A use case arises when a subject needs to interact with
actors to achieve an overall goal. This goal is specified by the contract of the use case
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as an agreement of what must be achieved. The scenario captures the interactions
between the subject and actors to achieve this goal. Each step in the scenario, can be
viewed as sub-goals, that act as steps taken towards achieving the overall goal. The
scenario of the use case details how the overall goal is broken down into sub-goals
represented by steps.
In addition, the scenario of the use case may have deviations and extensions that
further introduce additional behaviour to the use case via accident cases and extension
use cases. These additional behaviours can be considered as sub-goals introduced in the
scenario of a use case, which may result in further abstractions of the overall problem.
In this chapter, an argument is made for the use of this goal hierarchy (an abstraction
of the problem) to help model behaviour of the use cases as an Event-B model via
step-wise refinement. This is seen in Figure 5.2. Traversing through this hierarchy
answers the following questions:
• Moving down the hierarchy answers how to show how a certain use case can be
achieved.
• Moving up the hierarchy answers why and provides a rationale for why a certain
use case exists.
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Figure 5.2: An outline of behaviour from use case model encoded in Event-B.| |
This chapter provides an encoding of use cases as Event-B models based on the
natural abstraction found in the use cases structure and relationships. This encoding
also automatically extracts gluing invariants. These invariants provide the link between
the abstract and concrete representation that is needed to verify that each abstract
behaviour is a correct simulation of its concrete behaviour. Providing sufficient, but
provable, gluing invariants can be a significant task. The provision of gluing invariants
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to discharge the proof obligations (POs) associated with a refinement is a significant
step in providing verifiable models.
The encoding of use cases, accident cases and extension use cases in Event-B are
provided in Section 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4, respectively. Each section describes the encoding
along with the verification provided by Event-B. The encodings of alternate flows, loops
and conditional are provided in 5.5. Finally, the translation rules for the encoding use
case, extension use case and accident case is provided in Section 5.6.
5.2 Use Case
This section provides the encoding of a use case UC in Event-B. Figure 5.3b illustrates
a use case diagram for the use case UC with an actor A that is associated to it, and
their formal use case specifications. The actor A is represented as an agent in the use
case model that plays a role in UC. The carrier sets, constants and variables declared
by the agents are same as those provided in Section 4.3. These sets, constants and
variables are used to specify the contract and scenario of the use case UC. The contract
specifies the pre-conditions Puc(S,C, V ), post-conditions Quc(S,C, V ) and invariants
Iuc(S,C, V ) for the use case UC. Its scenario captures a main flow with steps U1, ..., Un
and triggers Ruc(S,C, V ). Each steps specifies an action that can modify the variable
V . The encoding of this use case in Event-B is provided in Section 5.2.1.
| |
UC
A
Agent: A
Carrier sets
S
Constants
Ci :: Tci (S,C)
Variables
v :: Tv(S,C, V )
Use case: UC
Contract
Pre-conditions: Puc(S,C, V )
Post-conditions: Quc(S,C, V )
Invariants: Iuc(S,C, V )
Scenario
Triggers:
Ruc(S,C, V )
Main Flow:
U1. Vi := EU1 (S,C, V )
.
.
.
Un. Vi := EUn (S,C, V )
(a) Use case model.
Event-B Project UC
 
Machine UC Contract
  …
Machine UC Scenario
  …
sees
Context UC Static
  …
Context UC Flow
  …
refines
sees
sees
(b) Event-B Project.
Figure 5.3: A use case UC.| |
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5.2.1 Encoding in Event-B
The encoding for the use case, UC, is provided in Figure 5.4, where the contract is
modelled by the abstract machine UC Contract. The content of the use case specification
that are encoded in the Event-B model are highlighted (in grey). This machine aims
to establish what is achieved by the use case. It is then refined by UC Scenario to
introduce the scenario of the use case. The refinement introduced by this encoding
aims to prove that the behaviour defined by the scenario achieves what is required by
the contract.
The encoding also produces the context UC Static and UC Flow. The UC Static
context models all the static aspects used to specify the use case, namely the carrier
sets S and constants C. The variables V that are used to specify the contract and
scenario, in Figure 5.3a, are treated as abstract Va and concrete Vc variables by the
encoding as seen in Figure 5.4. These variables are described as follows:
Abstract Variables The variables that occur in the pre-condition and post-condition
of the use case are denoted as abstract variables Va, such that Va is a subset of
V . These variables are introduced in the abstract machine UC Contract.
Concrete Variables The encoding denotes the variables that occur in the scenario
of the use case (triggers and steps) as concrete variables Vc, such that Vc is a
subset of V. These concrete variables are introduced in machine UC Scenario.
The variables Va that occur in the pre- and post-condition also appear in the
scenario. These concrete variables that correspond to Va are denoted as Vca .
The following subsection describe each of the components introduced by the encod-
ing in the Event-B model.
UC Static
This context models the static aspects of the use case. The sets S and constants C
that are defined by all the agent A (that plays a role in this UC), are introduced in this
context. The types Tc(S,C) for these constants defined by the agent are introduced
as axioms of the context. This context is seen by both machines UC Contract and UC
Scenario. This allows the machines to use the sets and constants.
UC Contract
This machine models the contract of the use case. The contract specifies what the
execution of the use case must achieve (post-conditions) given a promised or guaran-
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Machine UC Contract
sees UC Static
variables uc, Va
invariants
@uc type: uc ∈ BOOL
@v type: Tv(S,C, Va)
@uc inv: Iuc(S,C, Va)
events
Event Initialisation
when
@uc initt: uc := FALSE
@v init: Nv(S,C, Va)
Event UC
when
@uc grd: uc = FALSE
@uc pre: Puc(S,C, Va)
then
@uc post act: Va : | Quc(S,C, V ′a)
@uc act: uc := TRUE
Context UC Static
carrier sets
S
constants
C
axioms
@c type: Tc(S,C)
Context UC Flow
sets
FLOWuc
constants
UC Initial,UC Trigger, U1, ..., Un ,UC Final
axioms
@flowuc type: partition(FLOWuc,UC Initial,
UC Trigger, {U1}, ..., {Un} ,UC Final)
Machine UC Scenario
sees
UC Static, UC Flow
refines
UC Contract
variables
uc, Va , Vc , flowuc
invariants
@v type: Tv(S,C, Vc) @uc flow: flowuc ∈ FLOWuc
@uc glue variables: flowuc = UC Trigger ∨ (flowuc = UC Final ∧ uc = TRUE)⇒ Vai = Vcai
@uc glue flow: flowuc ∈ FLOWuc \ {UC Initial,UC Final} ⇒ uc = FALSE
@uc scenario pre: flowuc ∈ FLOWuc \ {UC Initial} ∧ uc = FALSE⇒ Puc(S,C, Va)
@uc scenario post: flowuc = UC Final⇒ Quc(S,C, Vc)
@uc scenario inv: Iuc(S,C, Vc)
events
Event Initialisation
when
then
@flow act: flowuc := UC Initial
@v init: Nv(S,C, Vc)
Event UC Initial
when
@uc pre grd: Puc(S,C, Va)
@uc grd: uc = FALSE
@flow grd: flowuc = UC Initial
then
@flow act: flowuc := UC Trigger
@v equal: Vcai
:= Vai
Event UC Final
refine
UC
when
@uc grd: uc := FALSE
@flow grd: flowuc = UC Final
then
@v equal: Vai := Vcai
@uc act: uc := TRUE
Event UC Trigger
when
@uc trig: Ruc(S,C, Vc)
@flow grd: flowuc = UC Trigger
then
@flow act: flowuc := U1
Event U1
when
@flow grd: flowuc = U1
then
@flow act: flowuc := U2
@step act: Vci := EU1 (S,C, Vc)
...
Event Un
when
@flow grd: flowuc = Un
then
@flow act: flowuc := UC Final
@step act: Vci := EUn (S,C, Vc)
Figure 5.4: Use case UC encoded in Event-B (highlighted Event-B.| |
teed set of pre-conditions. By modelling the pre- and post-conditions in this abstract
machine it is possible to establish what the use case achieves without specifying how.
The abstract variables, Va, that occur in the pre- and post-conditions of the use case
are introduced as variables of the abstract machine, as seen in Figure 5.4. The types
associated with the abstract variables are denoted by Tv(S,C, Va) in the encoding.
These are introduced as invariants (labelled @v Type) in this the machine. This
corresponds to typing invariants in Event-B. An event UC is introduced that represents
a state transition of the use case, i.e. an atomic execution of the use case. An auxiliary
boolean variable, uc, is introduced to indicate whether the use case has been executed.
This variable is used in the guards and actions of the event, i.e. the action uc := TRUE,
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is an indication that the use case has been executed, as seen in Figure 5.4. The encoding
models the pre-conditions and postconditions in the event UC as follows:
Pre-conditions The encoding represents the pre-condition as Puc(S,C, Va) that con-
tains the abstract variables Va. These predicates are modelled as the guards of
the event UC. Doing so ensures that the event may only be enabled when the
guaranteed or promised pre-conditions for the use case is true.
Post-conditions The encoding represents the post-condition as Quc(S,C, Va) that con-
tains the abstract variables Va. This predicate is transformed to produce the
non-deterministic assignment with before-after predicate, Va : | Quc(S,C, V ′a),
where the variables Va appears on the LHS of the such that operator, while all
occurrence of Va in the predicates Quc(S,C, Va) is primed V
′
a and introduced on
the RHS. This establishes a state transition where the post-condition is achieved
by the execution of this event.
The invariants Iuc(S,C, V ) in which only the abstract variables Va occur are in-
troduced as invariants Iuc(S,C, Va) in the abstract machine. The action of the event
UC, that achieves the post-conditions, is required to be within bound of the invariant
specified. This machine establishes an abstraction of the use case that describes what
is achieved by the use case, via the event UC, without specifying how.
UC Flow
This context establishes a type FLOWuc, which aims to model the states in the scenario
of the use case UC. A variable of this type can be used to simulate the execution of
the scenario in the concrete machine, UC Scenario. The type is created by adding the
name of FLOWuc in the sets section. It is an enumerated set where all the elements
are known and defined as follows:
UC Initial Variables of type, FLOWuc, are initialised to this value.
UC Trigger This value indicates a state in the scenario of the use case, where the
trigger condition may be checked to initiate the execution of the main flow.
U1,...,Un These values indicates the the steps in the flow where the execution of the
use case is in.
UC Final This value indicates that the execution of the final step in the use case
scenario has been executed. Note that it does not indicate that the use case is
complete.
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The partition operation is used to express this type and is introduced as an axiom
(labelled @uc label).
UC Scenario
This machine models the scenario of use case UC. The scenario captures behaviour
that describes how the use case achieves its contract. This machine refines the abstract
machine UC Contract. The scenario is modelled by a collection of events, as seen in
Figure 5.4.
The encoding introduces an auxiliary control flow variable flowuc. This variable is
of the type FLOWuc, which was modelled as a set by the UC Flow context. This variable
controls the event ordering that simulate the sequencing of events that correspond to
the scenario of the use case. The concrete variables Vc are introduced in this machine
along with the types associated with them Tv(S,C, Vc). The abstract variables uc and
Va remain in this machine alongside the concrete variables, Vc and flowuc. The gluing
invariants labelled @uc glue variables and @uc glue flow are introduced to relate the
abstract variables and concrete variables. The invariant @uc glue variables ensures
that all the abstract variables Vai that correspond to concrete variables Vcai (where
1 ≤ i ≤ x and x is the total number of corresponding variables), have the same values
before and after the scenario executes. This is achieved by the following invariant:
flowuc = UC Trigger ∨ (flowuc = UC Final ∧ uc = TRUE)⇒ (Vai = Vcai )
(uc glue variables)
The invariant @uc glue flow ensures that the use case can never be complete (in-
dicated by uc = FALSE) during the execution of its scenario. The following invariant
relates the states of the abstract and concrete variables uc and flowuc:
flowuc ∈ FLOWuc \ {UC Initial, UC Final} ⇒ uc = FALSE (uc glue flow)
The abstract event UC no longer exists in this machine. Instead, the following
events are automatically introduced by the encoding. The event UC Final refines the
abstract event UC, while the other events refine skip:
UC Initial This event models the initialises the scenario, where the pre-condition of
the use case must be guaranteed. This is achieved by modelling Puc(S,C, Va) as
the guard of the event. The event also ensures that the concrete variables Vca
that correspond to the abstract variables Va, have the same values via the action
labelled @v equal. The execution of this event leads to the event UC Trigger via
the auxiliary control flow variable.
Chapter 5. Encoding Use Cases in Event-B 78
UC Trigger This event models the triggers of the main flow Ruc(S,C, Vc), as its guard
(labelled @uc trig). The trigger captures the states that are required to be true
in order to initiate the execution of the main flow. The execution of this event
leads the flow of the use case to the event that represents the first step, U1.
U1 to Un Each step in the main flow is modelled as an event. The action associated
with each step are introduced as actions of the events (labelled @step act in each
event). The auxiliary control flow variable flowuc mediates the order in which the
events are executed to simulate the sequence as in the scenario. The execution
of the event Un leads to the event, UC Final.
UC Final This event represents the end of the use case. It refines the abstract event
UC. This requires the execution of this event to achieve the post-condition. The
concrete variables Vca are expected to have been modified by the events of the
main flow, U1 to Un, to achieve the post-condition. The action Vai := Vcai is
introduced that assigns the values of the concrete variables to the variables. This
event refines the abstract event UC, while the other events refine skip.
In order to ensure that the scenario satisfies the contract of the use case, the in-
variants @uc scenario pre, @uc scenario post and @uc scenario inv, are introduced
in this machine. The following invariant @uc scenario pre, ensures the pre-condition
Puc(S,C, Va) was guaranteed before the scenario executed:
flowuc ∈ FLOWuc \ {UC Initial} ∧ uc = FALSE⇒ Puc(S,C, Va)
(uc scenario pre)
The invariant @uc scenario post introduce a constraint where concrete variables
Vca that correspond to the abstract variables Va achieve the post-condition at the end of
the scenario. The scenario describe state transitions for the concrete variables Vc. The
post-condition is transformed to Quc(S,C, Vca), where all occurrence of the abstract
variable Va is replaced by the corresponding concrete variables Vca . This invariant
ensures that when the final event Sn executes, the post-condition is required to be
achieved for the concrete variables.
flowuc = UC Final⇒ Quc(S,C, Vca) (uc scenario post)
Finally, all the invariant of the use case that contain the concrete variables are
introduced as Iuc(S,C, Vc). This invariant ensures that the behaviour defined by the
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scenario maintains the invariants of the use case for the concrete variables.
Iuc(S,C, Vc) (uc scenario inv)
This machine establishes how the the contract of the use case is achieved. The
encoding uses the refinement to relate the behaviour specified by the scenario satisfies
the constraints of what is required to be achieved by the contract.
5.2.2 Verification
UC Contract
Figure 5.5 describes the proof obligations produced in the abstract machine and their
meaning to the contract of the use case. The main mathematical judgement applied
on the abstract machine UC Contract is to determine whether the invariants of the
use case (labelled @uc inv) are maintained by the execution of event UC. That is,
the post-condition that describes what is achieved by the use case is within bounds
with the invariant of the use case. This is formulated by the invariant preservation
proof obligation (INV). Proving UC/uc inv/INV, ensures that the before-after predi-
cate Quc(S,C, V
′
a) associated with the event UC maintains the invariant Iuc(S,C, Va).
The invariant preservation for Tva(s, c, va) applied on the event UC produces the proof
obligation UC/va type/INV.
| |
Proof Obligation Proof failure meaning towards Contract
UC/uc inv/INV The post-condition is not specified within bounds of the in-
variants of the use case.
UC/v type/INV The post-condition is not specified within bounds of the vari-
able type.
Figure 5.5: Defects identified by proof obligations in contracts.| |
UC Scenario
Figure 5.6 describes the main proof obligations produced in this machine and the mean-
ing of their failure to the scenario of the use case. In the concrete machine UC Scenario,
the abstract event UC is refined by the events that model the scenario of the use case.
The event UC Final refines the abstract event UC (the other events that represent the
scenario refine skip). Proof obligations associated with guard strengthening (GRD)
and action simulation (SIM) for the concrete event UC Final is produced to ensure that
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the concrete behaviour of the scenario satisfies the abstract behaviour of the contract.
This aims to prove two things: (1) the pre-condition must be guaranteed before the
execution of the use case scenario and (2) the post-condition must be achieved at the
end of the use case scenario. The invariants @uc scenario pre and @uc scenario post
help automatically prove the guard strengthening and action simulation proof obliga-
tion, as they ensure that the pre- and post-condition are provided before and after the
execution of the use case scenario.
The invariant, @uc scenario post, ensures that any event that leads to the end of
the use case, i.e. via the action flowuc := UC Final, must achieve the post-condition
of the use case for the concrete variables. In the main flow the final step Un leads to
the end of the use case. This produces the proof obligation Un/uc scenario post/INV
that requires the final step to achieve the post-condition.
The invariants labelled uc scenario inv ensures that all the steps in the scenario
maintains the invariants of the use case on the concrete variables vca . Let Ui be a step
in the scenario of the use case. The proof obligation Ui/uc scenario inv/INV for the
invariant preservation ensures the steps maintain the invariants.
| |
Proof Obligation Proof failure meaning towards Scenario
Un/uc scenario post/INV A step leading to the end of the use case does not achieve the
post-condition.
Ui/uc scenario inv/INV A step Ui in the scenario of the use case does not satisfy the
invariant of the use case.
Ui/v type/INV A step Ui in the scenario of the use case does not satisfy the type
of the variable.
Figure 5.6: Defects identified by proof obligations in scenario.| |
5.3 Accident Case
The accident case introduces undesired behaviour that is expected to violate the con-
tract of the use case it deviates. The use case UC from Figure 4.6, is updated with an
accident case AC that deviates it, as seen in Figure 5.7. The use case diagram and the
use case model are seen in Figure 5.7a and 5.7b, respectively.
The deviate relationship introduces the element deviation in the specification of the
use case. This deviation provides a reference to the accident case AC and specifies a
deviation-point at Ud where the scenario of the accident case can be introduced. The
deviation-point Ud is some step in the scenario of the use case between steps U1 to Un.
The accident case AC specifies a scenario that contains the steps A1 to An. Each step
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captures an action that modifies some variable Vi that belong to the variables V . The
carrier sets S, constants C and variables V , defined by the agent A and plays a role
in use case UC, are used to specify the scenario of the accident case. The encoding of
accident cases in Event-B is provided next.
| |
UC
AC
<<deviate>>A
(a) Use case diagram.
Use case: UC
.
.
.
Deviations
Deviation: AC
Deviation-Point: Ud
Accident Case: AC
Scenario
Triggers:
Rac(S,C, V )
Main Flow:
A1. Vi := EA1 (S,C, V )
.
.
.
An. Vi := EAn (S,C, V )
(b) Use case specification.
Figure 5.7: An accident case AC deviates UC.| |
5.3.1 Encoding in Event-B
The encoding introduces the scenario of the accident case in the Event-B model that
was produced for the use case UC it deviates (from Figure 5.4). The execution of the
accident case depends on the deviated use case. This updated Event-B model is seen
in Figure 5.8. The encoding introduces the scenario of the accident case alongside that
of the use case. The accident case scenario is introduced in the existing machine UC
Scenario. The context UC Flow is expanded with the steps of the accident case scenario.
The context UC Context models any new carrier sets and constants associated with
the accident scenario. The encoding treats the variables that occur in the accident
scenario as part of the concrete variables Vc from the encoding of the use case UC.
That is, some of these variables (Vca), used to specify the accident scenario, correspond
to the abstract variables Va specified in the contract of the use case UC.
UC Flow
The type FLOWuc is extended with the steps A1, ..., An of the accident scenario, as
seen in Figure 5.8. This allows the auxiliary control flow variable of type, FLOWuc, to
introduce the scenario of the accident case as a deviation from the use case scenario.
The steps are introduced as constants. The partition operation define these steps as
part of the type FLOWuc.
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UC Scenario
The steps in the accident scenario A1, ..., An and its triggers are introduced as events
in this machine. They exist along side the events that correspond to the scenario of
the use case UC. These events are as follows:
AC Trigger This event deviates the execution in the scenario from the use case to
that of the accident case. The triggers of the accident scenario are denoted as
Rac(S,C, Vc) by the encoding. These triggers, and the deviation-point flowuc =
Ud, are introduced as guards of this event. These guards ensure that the accident
scenario may only initiate when the deviation-point in the use case scenario is
reached and the trigger conditions are true. The action of this event deviates the
scenario of the use case to the first step in the accident scenario, i.e. flowuc := A1.
A1 to An Each step of the accident scenario is introduced as an event. The actions of
the step are modelled as actions of the event. The actions of the accident scenario
is required to introduce undesired behaviour that violate some property of the use
case it deviates. The execution of the event An that represents the final step of
the accident scenario, leads to the end of the use case, i.e. flowuc := UC Final.
When the final event An executes, the post-condition of the use case UC is required
to be achieved. The accident scenario is also required to maintain the invariant of
the use case throughout its execution. However, as the accident scenario captures
undesired behaviour, this is expected to violate the contract of the use case.
5.3.2 Verification
Introducing the accident scenario in the machine UC Scenario results in new proof
obligations generated in the Event-B model to ensure consistency. Figure 5.9 describes
some of these proof obligations that can be related to the scenario of the accident case.
The events that model the scenario of the accident case are subjected to the invariants
labelled @uc scenario post and @uc scenario inv, as seen in Figure 5.4. The invariant
@uc scenario post requires the final step An of the accident scenario to achieve the
post-condition of the use case. This is because the event An, which models this step,
leads to the end of the use case. The proof obligation of this final event is expected to
be fail, otherwise the accident scenario is not a correct deviation of the use case.
The invariants of the use case are required to be maintained by the steps of the
accident scenario. This is checked by the proof obligation An/uc scenario post/INV.
As the accident scenario is introduced as a deviation from the use case scenario, the
pre-condition of the use case can be shown to be guaranteed.
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Context UC Flow
sets
FLOWuc
constants
UC Initial,UC Trigger, U1, ..., Un, A1, ..., An ,UC Final
axioms
@flowuc type: partition(FLOWuc, {UC Initial}, {UC Trigger}, {U1}, ..., {Un}, {A1}, ..., {An} , {UC Final})
Machine UC Scenario
sees
UC Static, UC Flow
refines
UC Contract
variables
uc, Va , Vc , flowuc
...
events
...
Event AC Trigger
when
@ac trig: Rac(S,C, Vc)
@deviation point: flowuc = Ud
then
@flow act: flowuc := A1
Event A1
when
@flow grd: flowuc = A1
then
@flow act: flowuc := A2
@step act: Vci := EA1 (S,C, Vc)
...
Event An
when
@grd flow: flowuc = An
then
@act flow: flowuc := UC Final
@step act: Vci := EAn (S,C, Vc)
Figure 5.8: Deviation of accident case AC to use case UC encoded in Event-B.| |
5.4 Extension Use Case
An extension use case can introduce additional behaviour in the scenario of a use case.
In Figure 5.10, an extension use case EC is introduced as an extension to the use case
UC. The use case diagram illustrates this extension via the extend relationship as seen
in Figure 5.10b with the use case specifications. This extension refers to the extension
use case EC. It provides an extension-point Ue and a rejoin-point Ur. In this instance,
the status of the extension is ordinary. Hence, the extension-point and rejoin-point
are specified as some steps in the scenario of the use case (such as Ue ∈ U1, ..., Un and
Ur ∈ U1, ..., Un). The extension use case EC specifies a contract and a scenario, as seen
in Figure 5.10. The encoding of this extension use case EC in the Event-B is provided
next.
5.4.1 Encoding in Event-B
The extension use case is dependant of the use case it extends. This requires the
encoding of the use case UC to be already provided, as seen in Figure 5.4. The encoding
of the extension use case EC introduces the contract of the extension use case in the
Chapter 5. Encoding Use Cases in Event-B 84
| |
Proof Obligation Proof failure meaning towards accident scenario
An/uc scenario post/INV Final step of accident scenario does not achieve post-condition.
This PO is expected to fail unless the accident case is shown to
be prevented.
Ai/uc scenario inv/INV A step of the accident scenario where its action does not satisfy
the invariants of the use case.
Ai/v type/INV A step of the accident scenario where its action does not satisfy
the type defined by agent for a variable.
Figure 5.9: Defects related to an deviation identified by proof obligations.| |
machine UC Scenario as seen in Figure 5.11. The contract of EC is introduced between
the steps in scenario of use case UC where the extension-point is specified. The encoding
of the contract of EC models only what the extension use case may achieve, and does
not specify how. The scenario of the extension use case is introduced in a new machine
EC Scenario that refines the machine UC Scenario. This encoding determines a new set
of abstract Va and concrete Vc variables, as follows:
Abstract variables The existing variables of the UC Scenario machine (from Figure 5.4)
excluding the auxiliary variables uc and flowuc, are now treated as the abstract
variables Va. These abstract variables also include the variables that occur in the
pre-condition and post-condition in the contract of the extension use case EC.
Concrete variables The variables that occur in the scenario of the extension use case
are now treated as the concrete variables Vc.
All the static aspects of the use case and the extension use case have already been
modelled in the context UC Static. The flow of the extension use case is modelled by
the context EC Flow, which refines the context UC Flow. The new machine EC Scenario
sees the contexts UC Static and EC Flow.
UC Scenario
The encoding introduces the contract of EC between the events Ue (extension-point)
and Ue−1, in the scenario of UC. The encoding of the contract for the extension use case
produces two events, EC and EC FALSE. An auxiliary boolean variable ec is introduced
that helps insert these two events between the events Ue and Ue−1. That is, the contract
is introduced before the event that represents the specified extension-point Ue. The
events related to the encoding of the extension use case in the use case scenario are as
follows:
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| |
UC
EC
<<extend>>A
Use case: UC
.
.
.
Extension
Extension: EC
status: ordinary
extension-point: Ue
rejoin-point: Ur
Extension use case: EC
Contract
Pre-conditions: Pec(S,C, V )
Post-conditions: Qec(S,C, V )
Invariants: Iec(S,C, V )
Scenario
Triggers:
Rec(S,C, V )
Main Flow:
C1. Vi := EC1 (S,C, V )
.
.
.
Cn. Vi := ECn (S,C, V )
(a) Use case model.
Event-B Project UC
 
Machine UC Contract
  …
Machine UC Scenario
  …
sees
Context UC Static
  …
Context UC Flow
  …
refines
sees
Machine EC Scenario
  …
refines
Context EC Flow
  …
sees
sees
sees
extends
(b) Event-B Project.
Figure 5.10: An extension use case EC extends UC.| |
EC The event models the contract of EC. The pre-conditions Pec(S,C, Va) of EC was
modelled as the guards of this event. The post-condition is introduced as the
action. This is similar to the encoding of the contract of UC in the abstract
machine. However, an additional guard flowuc = Ue and action flowuc := Ur
are introduced to ensure that the event can be enabled only at the specified
extension-point Ue and the execution of the event returns the flow to some step
specified as the rejoin-point Ur.
EC FALSE This models a negation of the pre-condition of EC, ¬(Pec(S,C, Va)). If
the pre-condition of EC is not guaranteed then the post-condition of the extension
use case is not achieved. That is, the extension use case is not required to be
executed at the extension-point. The action of this event returns the flow to step
Ue.
Ue The event EC of the extension use case is required to be introduced before the
execution of this event. To do so, an additional guard ec = TRUE, is introduced
in the event Ue, as seen in Figure 5.11. This requires either the event EC or
EC FALSE to have been executed.
Ue−1 The event Ue−1 that is before Ue, has an additional action introduced ec :=
FALSE. This action ensures that either EC or EC FALSE will be enabled after
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| |
Machine UC Scenario
sees
UC Static, UC Flow
refines
UC Contract
variables
uc, flowuc, ec, Va
invariants
...
@ec type: ec ∈ BOOL
@ec inv: Iec(S,C, Va)
events
...
Event Ue−1
when
@flow grd: flowuc = Ue−1
then
@flow act: flowuc := Ue
@step act: EUe−1 (S,C, Va)
@ec act: ec := FALSE
Event Ue
when
@flow grd: flowuc = Ue
@ec grd: ec = TRUE
then
@step act: EUe (S,C, Va)
@flow act: flowuc := Ue+1
...
Event EC
when
@ec grd: ec = FALSE
@ec extpoint: flowuc = Ue
@ec pre: Pec(S,C, Va)
then
@ec post act: Va : | Qec(S,C, V ′a)
@ec rejpoint: flowuc := Ur
@ec act: ec := TRUE
Event EC FALSE
when
@ec grd: ec = FALSE
@ec extpoint: flowuc = Ue
@ec pre neg: ¬(Pec(S,C, Va))
then
@ec act: ec := TRUE
Figure 5.11: Contract of extension use case encoded in Event-B.| |
this step.
These events model the contract of the extension use case in the scenario of the
use case UC, via the use of the extension-point. The invariants in the contract of
the extension use case EC, in which the abstract variables Va occur, are introduced
as Iec(S,C, Va). The events EC and EC FALSE is required to maintain the invariants
introduced for the use case scenario.
EC Scenario
The encoding introduces the scenario of the extension use case EC in machine EC
Concrete, as seen in Figure 5.12. This encoding is similar to the encoding of the use
case scenario in the UC Scenario machine (Figure 5.4), with a few differences. The
following describes these similarities and differences:
Refines This machine refines UC Scenario in which the contract of the extension use
case was introduced.
Variables The variables from the abstract machine remain in this machine. The new
variables associated with the scenario of the extension use case, flowec and Vc
(concrete variables), are introduced in this machine. This is similar to the en-
coding of the use case scenario.
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| |
Context EC Flow
extends
UC Flow
sets
FLOWec
constants
EC Trigger, C1 , ..., Cn , EC Final
axioms
@type flowec: partition(FLOWec, {EC Trigger}, {C1}, ..., {Cn} , {EC Final})
Machine EC Scenario
sees
UC Static, EC Flow
refines
UC Scenario
variables
uc, ec,
Va , Vc ,
flowuc, flowec
invariants
@v type: Tv(S,C, Vc) @ec flow: flowec ∈ FLOWec
@ec glue variables: flowec = EC Trigger ∨ (flowec = EC Final ∧ (ec = TRUE ∧ flowuc = Ur ))⇒ Vai = Vcai
@ec glue flow: flowec ∈ FLOWec \ {EC Initial,EC Final} ⇒ ec = FALSE ∧ flowuc = Ue
@ec scenario pre: flowec ∈ FLOWec ∧ ec = FALSE ∧ flowuc = Ue ⇒ Pec(S,C, Va)
@ec scenario post: flowec = EC Final⇒ Qec(S,C, Vc)
@ec scenario inv: Iec(S,C, Vc)
events
Event Initialisation
when
then
@flow act: flowuc := UC Initial
@v init: Nv(S,C, Vc)
Event EC Initial
when
@ec pre: Pec(S,C, Va)
@ec grd: ec = FALSE ∧ flowuc = Ue
@flow grd: flowec = EC Initial
then
@flow act: flowec := EC Trigger
@equal v: Vca := Va
Event EC Final
refine
EC
when
@flow grd: flowec = EC Final
then
@equal v: Va := Vca
@ec act: ec := TRUE
@rej point: flowuc := Ur
Event EC Trigger
when
@ec trig: Rec(S,C, Vc)
@flow grd: flowec = EC Trigger
then
@flow act: flowec := C1
Event C1
when
@flow grd: flowec = C1
then
@flow act: flowec := C2
@step act: Vci := EC1 (S,C, Vc)
...
Event Cn
when
@flow grd: flowec = Cn
then
@flow act: flowec := EC Final
@step act: Vci := ECn (S,C, Vc)
...
Figure 5.12: Scenario of extension use case encoded in Event-B.| |
Invariants The invariants introduced for the scenario of the extension use case are
similar to those introduced for the use case scenario. The only difference is that
uc = TRUE corresponds to ec = TRUE ∧ flowuc = Ur, while uc = FALSE
corresponds to ec = FALSE ∧ flowuc = Ue. This is because the scenario of
the extension use case is introduced between the scenario of the use case. This
results in that the extension-point and rejoin-point are taken into account in the
invariants.
Abstract Events All the events of the abstract machine are introduced in this machine,
apart from the event name EC, which is refined by the events introduced in the
scenario of the extension use case.
EC Initial This event models the initialisation of the extension use case scenario. An
additional guard flowuc = Ue which ensures that the execution of the extension
use case’s scenario takes place at the extension point, is added.
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EC Final This event refines the abstract event EC. It has one additional action
flowuc := Ur, which ensures that after the extension use case’s scenario has
executed, the flow of UC rejoins at the step specified by the extension relation.
The encoding ensures that the abstract event EC that models the contract of the
extension use case, is refined by the events introduced by its scenario.
Prevent
If the status of the extension is prevent, then the extension use case is introduced as a
means to prevent an accident case from violating the contract of the deviated use case.
In Figure 5.10, the extension use case EC extends the use case UC, by preventing any
deviation to the accident case AC. This results the extension-point to specify some step
Ae in the accident scenario. The rejoin-point in the extension specifies some step in the
scenario of the use case or accident scenario. If the rejoin-point is not specified, then it
returns to the end of the use case. The extension use case must always execute during
the accident scenario. That is, the behaviour of the extension use case must prevent
the remaining steps of the accident scenario to complete execution. The following
invariant is introduced in the machine the contract of the extension is introduced, in
this instance UC Scenario if the prevent status is provided:
¬(ec = FALSE ∧ flowuc = Ae ∧ ¬(Pec(S,C, Va)) (ec prevent)
| |
UC
AC
<<deviate>>
EC
<<extend>>
<<prevent>>
A
(a) Use case diagram.
Use case: UC
.
.
.
Extension
extension use case: EC
extension-point: Ae
rejoin-point: Ur
status: prevent
Extension use case: EC
Contract
Pre-conditions: Pec(S,C, V )
Post-conditions: Qec(S,C, V )
Invariants: Iec(S,C, V )
Scenario
Main Flow:
Triggers: Rec(S,C, V )
C1. EC1 (S,C, V )
.
.
.
Cn. ECn (S,C, V )
(b) Use case specification.
Figure 5.13: Prevention of accident case with extension use case.| |
5.4.2 Verification
The EC event introduces the contract of the extension use case within the scenario of
the use case via the extension-point. Figure 5.14 describes what defects these proof
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obligations produced in this machine and the meaning of their failure to the exten-
sion introduced in the use case scenario relates to in the use case. What is achieved
by the contract of the extension use case must be shown to satisfy the invariants
(@EC/uc scenario inv/INV) of the use case and the types (@EC/v type/INV) of the
concrete variables. If the rejoin-point is not specified, then the execution leads to the
end of the use case. This requires the post-condition of the extension use case to achieve
the post-condition of the use case it extends (@EC/uc scenario post/INV).
| |
Proof Obligation Proof failure meaning towards EC
EC/ec scenario post/INV This PO is produced only if the rejoin-point of the extension leads
to the end of the use case, i.e. flowuc := UC Final. It indicates
a defect where the post-condition of the extension use case is not
established by its scenario.
EC/ec scenario inv/INV Indicates that what is achieved by the extension use case (post-
condition transformed to action) does not maintain the invariants
of the use case it extends.
EC/vc type/INV Indicates that what is achieved by the extension use case (post-
condition transformed to action) does not maintain the type of
the variable.
Figure 5.14: Defects related to an extension identified by proof obligations.| |
5.5 Encoding Branching in Event-B
As discussed in Chapter 4, branching in the scenario of use cases is supported by
simple and complex branching. Simple branching provides the use of conditional and
loop constructs within a flow. On the other hand, complex branching allows one or
more alternate flows that are explicitly stated below the main flow of a scenario. This
section provides the encoding of these styles of branching in the Event-B model.
Conditionals
Figure 5.15a describes a conditional if branching in the scenario of an use case model.
The step Ui specifies a conditional branching with the predicate CUi(S,C, V ). The
steps Ui1 to Uin act as sub-steps that belong to the step Ui. Each of these sub-steps
capture an action. The encoding of this conditional step Ui and its sub-steps in Event-B
is provided in Figure 5.15b.
The step Ui is modelled by two events if Ui and if Ui FALSE. The event if Ui
is enabled when the execution of the scenario reaches the step Ui and the predicate
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CUi(S,C, V ). The execution of this event leads to the sub-step Ui1 , and so on. The
execution of the final sub-step Uin leads to the step Ui+1. On the other hand, the
event if Ui FALSE is also enabled when the execution of the scenario reaches the step
Ui. However, it captures a negation of predicate ¬(CUi(S,C, V )) as its guard. This
allows the execution of the scenario to skip the sub-steps that belong to Ui, and lead
the execution to step Ui+1.
| |
Scenario
...
Ui. if CUi (S,C, V )
Ui1 . EUi1
(S,C, V )
...
Uin . EUin (S,C, V )
Ui+1. ...
...
(a) if branching.
...
Event if Ui
when
flow = Ui
CUi (S,C, V )
then
flow := Ui1
Event Ui1
when
flow = Ui1
then
EUi1
(S,C, V )
flow := Ui2
...
Event Uin
when
flow = Uin
then
EUin (S,C, V )
flow := Ui+1
Event if Ui FALSE
when
flow = Ui
¬( CUi (S,C, V ) )
then
flow := Ui+1
...
(b) Encoding in Event-B.
Figure 5.15: Encoding conditional branching in Event-B.| |
Loops
A simple branching provided by the loop construct allows a collection of steps to be
repeated several times in the execution of the scenario. Figure 5.16a illustrates a
loop construct for a step Ui. This step captures the predicate CUi(S,C, V ) and has
a collection of sub-steps Ui1 to Uin . The structure of the loop is similar to that of
the conditional seen in Figure 5.15a. However, the semantics of the constructs differ
in the sense that the sub-steps of Ui are repeatedly executed as long as the predicate
CUi(S,C, V ) is true when the execution reaches the step Ui. The encoding of the loop
construct in Event-B, as seen in Figure 5.16b, is similar to that of the conditional.
The only difference with respect to the encoding of the condition construct is that, the
execution of the final sub-step Uin returns to the step Ui.
The event if Ui FALSE is enabled when the execution of the scenario reaches the
step Ui. It captures a negation of predicate ¬(CUi(S,C, V )) as its guard. This allows
the execution of the scenario to break from the loop when the predicate is false, and
leads to the step Ui+1.
Alternate Flow
Each scenario in the use case model may contain one or more alternate flows. These
are alternative paths from the main flow in the scenario. This, unlike the flow of an
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| |
Scenario
...
Ui. while CUi (S,C, V )
Ui1 . EUi1
(S,C, V )
...
Uin . EUin (S,C, V )
...
(a) while branching.
...
Event while Ui
when
flow = Ui
CUi (S,C, V )
then
flow := Ui1
Event Ui1
when
flow = Ui1
then
EUi1
(S,C, V )
flow := Ui2
Event Uin
when
flow = Uin
then
EUin (S,C, V )
flow := Ui
Event
while Ui FALSE
when
flow = Ui
¬( CUi (S,C, V ) )
then
flow := Ui+1
...
(b) Encoding in Event-B.
Figure 5.16: Encoding loop branching in Event-B.| |
accident scenario, is allowed to complete and does not require a prevention. A scenario
always contains one main flow and any number of alternate flows. The key point of
the alternate flow is that they frequently do not return to the main flow. Unlike the
scenario of an accident, the alternate flow is expected to satisfy the contract of the use
case. These alternate flows are appended to the end of the structure of a scenario, after
the main flow. An alternate flow specifies an alternate-point that specifies a trigger in
the main flow. The formal specification for an alternate flow is seen in Figure 5.17a,
and its transformation to an Event-B model is seen in Figure 5.17b.
The alternate flow introduces the steps A1 to An, each capturing their own actions.
The alternate-point and rejoin-point are specified to some step in the use case the
alternate flow belongs to, Ua and Ur, respectively. The encoding of the alternate flow
in the Event-B model is seen in Figure 5.17b, where all the steps of the alternate flow
are introduced as events A1 to An. The guard of event A1 ensures the event is enabled
only at the specified alternate point, while the action of event An ensures the flow
rejoins to some point in the flow after the alternate flow has completed execution.
| |
Scenario
...
Alternate Flow
Alternate-point: Ua
Rejoin-point: Ur
A1. EA1 (S,C, V )
...
An. EAn (S,C, V )
(a) Alternate flow.
...
Event A1
when
flow = Ua
then
EA1 (S,C, V )
flow := A2
...
Event An
when
flow = An
then
EAn (S,C, V )
flow := Ur
...
(b) Encoding in Event-B.
Figure 5.17: Encoding alternate branching in Event-B.| |
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5.6 Translation Rules
This section provides the translation rules for encoding use cases in Event-B. The
syntax used to describe the semantics in the translation is seen in Figure 5.18. The top
row provides the semantic rule that has a rule number, indicated by Rule #. The rule
numbers are used to refer to the translation rule in the text. The rule is also of a certain
rule type, e.g. when in the text it is stated that RuleType is used, then it indicates
that the rule with the set of arguments of the specified rule is called. If several rules
of the same parameter are used, then both are used unless specified otherwise. The
arguments are references to the abstract syntax provided in Section 4.5. The second
row provide an unpacking of the argument, i.e. it provides what is defined by the
argument. The third row provides the Event-B elements that are produced using the
unpacked content of the use case.
| |
TRule #: RuleTypeJ〈Usecase〉K
〈Usecase〉
〈Event-B〉 | ReferenceJ〈arguments〉K
Figure 5.18: Syntactic form of translation rule.| |
Figure 5.19 provides an overview of the translation rules provided. The boxes
denote a translation rule of a specific type and list of arguments. In total there are ten
types of translation rules. Each of these translation rules are discussed in the following
sub sections. The directed arrows indicate the translation rules produced from a source
translation rule. The first translation rule in this tree ProjectJ〈usecase〉K.
5.6.1 Rule Type: Project
The rule type Project is given a use case and an Event-B project is produced.
Project: Use Case ↪→ Event-B Project
Figure 5.20 describes the translation rule TRule 1 of rule type Project that takes
the argument 〈usecase〉. The middle row shows an unpacking of this argument to reveal
that the use case contains a name, label, etc. The argument is unpacked only to show
what is required by the translation rule. The bottom row shows the Event-B elements
that are produced. This rule creates an Event-B project for the given use case, and
within it produces two machines components and two context components.
The function used by the translation rule to create the Event-B components are as
follows:
Chapter 5. Encoding Use Cases in Event-B 93
| |
1. Project ⟦<usecase>⟧
2. FlowType ⟦<label>, <scenario>, <deviations>⟧
5. Contract ⟦<name>, <label>, <agents>, <contract>⟧
3. Static ⟦<agents>⟧
4. Static ⟦<deviations>, <extensions>⟧6. Scenario ⟦<name>, <label>, <scenario>, <deviations>, <extensions>⟧
8. Extension ⟦<name>, <extensions>⟧
7. Flow ⟦<name>, <variables> <scenario>⟧
8. Flow ⟦<name>, <variables> <deviations>⟧
9. Flow ⟦<name>, <variables> <extensions>⟧
Figure 5.19: An overview of the translation rules.
| |
getName(〈name〉): Returns an 〈identifier〉 with the literal value of 〈name〉.
getNameContract(〈name〉): Returns an 〈identifier〉 with the literal value of 〈name〉 with
suffix “ Contract”.
getNameStatic(〈name〉): Returns an 〈identifier〉 with the literal value of 〈name〉 with
suffix “ Static”.
getNameFlow(〈name〉): Returns an 〈identifier〉 with the literal value of 〈name〉 with
suffix “ Flow”.
getNameScenario(〈name〉): Returns an 〈identifier〉 with the literal value of 〈name〉 with
suffix “ Scenario”.
createSees(〈identifiers〉): Creates sees element in the machine for each 〈identifier〉 in
〈identifiers〉.
createRefines(〈identifiers〉): Creates a refines element in the machine for each 〈identifier〉
in 〈identifiers〉.
createMachine(〈identifiers〉): Creates machine element in the machine for each
〈identifier〉 in 〈identifiers〉.
createContext(〈identifiers〉): Creates context element in the machine for each 〈identifier〉
in 〈identifiers〉.
createProject(〈identifier〉): Creates an Event-B project in the workspace of the UC-B
for each 〈identifier〉.
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| |
TRule 1: ProjectJ〈usecase〉K
〈usecase〉 =̂
Use Case: 〈name〉 (〈label〉)
Roles: 〈agents〉
Contract: 〈contract〉
Scenario: 〈scenario〉
Deviations: 〈deviations〉
Extensions: 〈extensions〉
Event-B Project createProject(getName(〈name〉)
Machine createMachine(getNameContract(〈name〉))
sees
createSees(getNameStatic(〈name〉))
ContractJ〈name〉, 〈label〉, 〈agents〉, 〈contract〉K
Context createContext(getNameFlow(〈name〉))
FlowJ〈name〉, 〈scenario〉, 〈deviations〉K
Context createContext(getNameStatic(〈name〉))
StaticJ〈agents〉K
StaticJ〈deviations〉, 〈extensions〉K
Machine createMachine(getNameScenario(〈name〉))
sees
createSees(getNameStatic(〈name〉))
createSees(getNameFlow(〈name〉))
refines
createRefines(getNameContract(〈name〉))
ScenarioJ〈name〉, 〈label〉, 〈agents〉, 〈contract〉, 〈scenario〉, 〈deviations〉, 〈extensions〉K
ExtensionJ〈usecase〉, 〈extensions〉]K
Figure 5.20: Translation rule TRule 1 of type Project.| |
This translation rule has only created a skeleton of an Event-B project. However,
within the components created are new translation rules that are applied. These new
translation rules describe how content of the use case are used to create the Event-B
elements. Each of these new translation rules are described in the following sections.
5.6.2 Rule Type: FlowType
The rule type FlowType models the scenario of the use case and any accident sce-
narios (deviations) in the context of Event-B that the rule belongs to.
FlowType: Scenario and Deviations ↪→ Flow Type in Context
The translation rule TRule 2, as seen in Figure 5.21, takes the label, scenario and
zero or more deviations as its arguments. It uses the following functions to produce
the elements within this context component:
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getNameFlowType(〈label〉): Returns an 〈identifier〉 with the literal value of 〈label〉 with
suffix “ FLOW”.
getNameFlowInitial(〈label〉): Returns an 〈identifier〉 with the literal value of 〈label〉
with suffix “ Initial”.
getNameFlowTrigger(〈name〉): Returns an 〈identifier〉 with the literal value of 〈label〉
with suffix “ Trigger”.
getNameFlowFinal(〈name〉): Returns an 〈identifier〉 with the literal value of 〈label〉
with suffix “ Final”.
getSteps(〈scenario〉, 〈deviations〉): The literal value of 〈label〉 in each step of the sce-
nario and deviations are returned as a list of 〈identifiers〉.
createPartitionFlowType(〈label〉, 〈scenario〉, 〈deviations〉): Creates a predicate that de-
notes the type of the flow using the partition operator.
createSet(〈identifiers〉): Creates a set in the context component for each 〈identifier〉 in
〈identifiers〉.
createConstant(〈identifiers〉): Creates a constant in the context component for each
〈identifier〉 in 〈identifiers〉.
createAxiom(〈predicates〉): For each 〈predicate〉 in 〈predicates〉 it creates the axiom in
the context component.
| |
TRule 2: FlowTypeJ〈label〉, 〈scenario〉, 〈deviations〉K
〈label〉 〈scenario〉 〈deviations〉
sets
createSet(getFlowType(〈label〉))
constants
createConstant(getNameFlowInital(〈label〉))
createConstant(getNameFlowTrigger(〈label〉))
createConstant(getSteps(〈scenario〉, 〈deviations〉))
createConstant(getNameFlowFinal(〈label〉))
axioms
createAxiom(createPartitionFlowType(〈label〉, 〈scenario〉, 〈deviations〉))
Figure 5.21: Translation rule TRule 2 of type Flow.| |
This translation rule creates a type based on the scenario of the use case and any
accident scenarios that are referenced the deviations associated with this use case.
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5.6.3 Rule Type: Static
The rule type Static generates all the static aspects, namely sets and constants,
defined by the agents that play a role in the use case are introduced in the context
component of the Event-B model. This also includes the accident cases and extension
use cases that are related to the use case via the extensions and deviation relationships.
Static: Agents ↪→ Sets and Constants in Context
The translation rule TRule 3, as seen in Figure 5.22, takes the one or more agents
as its argument. The middle row shows an unpacking of an agent that reveals the all
the sets and constants defined by the agent. The translation rule uses the following
functions to create the static aspects in the context components:
getSets(〈sets〉): For each 〈set〉 in 〈sets〉 it returns the identifier 〈set〉.〈identifier〉.
getConstants(〈constants〉): For each 〈constant〉 in 〈constant〉 it returns the identifier
〈constant〉.〈identifier〉.
getConstantsType(〈constants〉): For each 〈constant〉 in 〈constant〉 it returns the pred-
icate 〈constant〉.〈predicate〉.
| |
TRule 3: StaticJ〈agents〉K
〈agents〉 =̂
Agent: 〈name〉 (〈label〉)
Sets: 〈sets〉
Constants: 〈constants〉
...
sets
createSet(getSets(〈sets〉))
constants
createConstant(getConstants(〈constants〉))
axioms
createAxiom(getConstantsType(〈constants〉))
Figure 5.22: Translation rule TRule 3 of type Static.| |
The translation rule Trule 4 as seen in Figure 5.23 is also of the rule type Static.
This translation rule does not produce any Event-B elements. The argument of this rule
contains zero or more deviations and extensions. Its middle row reveals the agents that
may belong to these deviations and extensions. The rule applies the translation rules
StaticJ〈agents〉K for all the agents that belong to the accident case and extension
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use case that belong to the deviations and extensions, respectively. The extensions
may also contain further deviations and extensions. StaticJ〈deviations〉, 〈extensions〉K
translation rule is applied again for these deviations and extension that belong to the
extension use case.
| |
TRule 4: StaticJ〈deviations〉, 〈extensions〉K
〈deviations〉.〈deviation〉.〈accidentcase〉 =̂
Accident Case: 〈name〉 (〈label〉)
Roles: 〈agents〉
...
〈extensions〉.〈extension〉.〈extensionusecase〉 =̂
Extension Use Case: 〈name〉 (〈label〉)
Roles: 〈agents〉
...
Deviations: 〈deviations〉
Extension: 〈extensions〉
StaticJ〈agents〉K
StaticJ〈deviations〉, 〈extensions〉K
Figure 5.23: Translation rule TRule 4 of type Static.| |
5.6.4 Rule Type: Contract
The rule type Contract introduces the behaviour of what the use case achieves in
the machine component of Event-B.
Contract: Contract ↪→ Contract modelled in Machine
The translation rule TRule 5, as seen in Figure 5.24, takes the label, name, agents
and contract as the arguments. The middle row shows the content of the arguments
unpacked that are used by the translation rule. The translation rule creates two events,
one of this is the INITIALISATION event. The following functions are used by this rule
to create the elements within the machine components:
createAuxiliaryVariable(〈label〉): Creates an auxiliary boolean variable using the literal
value of 〈label〉 that contains an identifier, predicate (that denotes its type) and
initialisation. For example, a label UC would create a variable with identifier
UC, type UC ∈ BOOL, and initialisation UC := FALSE.
getAbstractVariables(〈agents〉, 〈pre-conditions〉, 〈post-conditions〉): Returns a collection
of variables in the agents that occur in the predicates of the 〈pre-conditions〉 and
〈post-conditions〉. These variables are treated as the abstract variables.
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getVariableType(〈variables〉): For each 〈variable〉 in 〈variables〉 this function returns
the predicate of the variable that denotes its type.
getAssociatedInvariants(〈variables〉, 〈invariants〉): This function returns the 〈predicates〉
for each of the 〈invariants〉 where the variables are found to occur.
getVariableInitialisation(〈variables〉): This function returns the 〈action〉 that denotes
the initialisation for each 〈variable〉 in 〈variables〉.
| |
TRule 5: ContractJ〈name〉, 〈label〉, 〈agents〉, 〈contract〉K
〈name〉
〈label〉
〈agents〉 =̂
...
Variables: 〈variables〉
Initialisation: 〈initialisations〉
〈contract〉 =̂
Pre-conditions: 〈pre-conditions〉
Post-conditions: 〈post-conditions〉
Invariants: 〈invariants〉
variables
createVariable(createAuxiliaryVariable(〈label〉) ≡ UC )
createVariable(getAbstractVariables(〈agents〉, 〈pre-conditions〉, 〈post-conditions〉) ≡ Va)
invariants
createInvariant(getVariableType(UC))
createInvariant(getVariableType(Va))
createInvariant(getAssociatedInvariants(Va, 〈invariants〉, 〈agents〉))
events
Event INITIALISATION
then
createAction(getVariableInitialisation(UC))
createAction(getVariableInitialisation(Va))
Event createEvent(getName(〈name〉))
when
createGuard(createFALSEGuard(〈label〉))
createGuard(getPreconditions(Va, 〈pre-conditions〉))
then
createAction(createTRUEAction(〈label〉))
createAction(getPostconditionsAction(Va, 〈post-conditions〉))
Figure 5.24: Translation rule TRule 5 of type Contract.| |
createFALSEGuard(〈label〉): Creates an action using the label, e.g. for a label UC an
action UC := FALSE is produced.
createTRUEAction(〈label〉): Creates an action in the event that assigns the value true
for the auxiliary variable, e.g. for a label UC an action UC := TRUE is produced.
getPreconditions(〈variables〉, 〈pre-conditions〉): Returns a list of predicates for all the
pre-conditions provided. If the variables provided have a corresponding abstract
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variable, these variables that occur in the pre-condition are updated with the
name of the refined variable.
getPostconditionstsAction(〈variables〉, 〈post-conditions〉): Creates a becomes such that
action with the post-conditions.
createVariable(〈identifier〉): For each 〈identifier〉 in 〈identifiers〉 it creates a variable in
the machine.
createInvariant(〈predicates〉): For each 〈predicate〉 in 〈predicates〉 it creates an invari-
ant in the machine.
createEvent(〈identifiers〉): For each 〈identifier〉 in 〈identifiers〉 it creates an event in the
machine.
createAction(〈actions〉): For each 〈action〉 in 〈actions〉 it creates a action in the event.
createGuard(〈predicates〉): For each 〈predicate〉 in 〈predicates〉 it creates a guard in
the event.
5.6.5 Rule Type: Scenario
The rule type Scenario models the behaviour of a scenario in the Event-B machine
component. The scenario may contain extensions and deviations that refer to other
extension use cases and accident cases. This is taken into account by the semantics.
Scenario: Scenario ↪→ Scenario modelled in Machine
The translation rule TRule 6, as seen in Figure 5.25, takes the name, label, agents,
contract, scenario, deviations and extensions as the argument. The middle row shows
the unpacking of these arguments that are used by the translation rule to produce the
Event-B elements. The following functions are used by this rule to create the elements
within the machine components:
getAbstractMachineVariables(): Returns a collection of variables that were introduced
in the abstract machine.
getConcreteVariables(〈variables〉, 〈agents〉, 〈scenario〉, 〈deviations〉, 〈extensions〉): A list
of variables that occur in the scenario, deviations and the pre-conditions and post-
conditions of any extension use cases is returned. These variables are treated as
the concrete variables. The first argument 〈variables〉 of this function denotes
a list of abstract variables. For any concrete variable that corresponds to the
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abstract variable has its identifier suffixed to indicate that it is a concrete rep-
resentation of the abstract variables. The concrete variable keeps note of the
variable that it refines.
createFlowVariable(〈label〉): Creates a auxiliary flow variable using the literal value of
〈label〉 that contains an identifier, predicate (that denotes its type) and initiali-
sation. For example, a label UC would create a variable with identifier UC flow,
type UC flow ∈ UC FLOW, and initialisation UC flow := UC Initial.
createGlueFlow(〈label〉): Creates an 〈predicate〉 that denotes the gluing invariant be-
tween the concrete control flow variable and the abstract auxiliary boolean vari-
able using the label provided.
createGlueVariables(〈label〉, 〈variables〉): Creates a 〈predicate〉 in the machine that de-
notes the gluing invariant between the abstract and concrete variables.
createScenarioPrecondition(〈label〉, 〈pre-condition〉): Creates a predicate that denotes
the invariant for the pre-condition to be established before the flow of the use
case may execute.
createScenarioPostcondition(〈label〉, 〈variables〉, 〈post-condition〉): Creates a predicate
in the machine that denotes the invariant that states the post-condition is estab-
lished once the flow has finished its execution.
createAbstractMachineEvents(〈name〉): Creates an extended event for each event from
the abstract machine apart from the event that has the same name as literal
value of 〈name〉.
createFlowInitialGuard(〈label〉): Creates a predicate in the event that states the initial
value the control flow auxiliary variable, e.g. for a label UC a guard UC flow =
UC Initial is produced.
createFlowFinalGuard(〈label〉): Creates a predicate in the event that states the final
value the control flow auxiliary variable, e.g. for a label UC a guard UC flow =
UC Final is produced.
createFlowTriggerAction(〈label〉): Creates an action in the event that assigns the trig-
ger value the control flow auxiliary variable, e.g. for a label UC an action
UC flow := UC Trigger is produced.
createRefinesEvent(〈name〉): Creates a refine element in the event with the literal value
of the argument 〈name〉 as the identifier.
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createConcreteEqualsAction(〈variables〉): The argument 〈variables〉 is list of concrete
variables. Some of the concrete variables have a corresponding abstract variable.
This function returns a collection of actions that assign the value of abstract
variable to the concrete variable.
createAbstractEqualsAction(〈variables〉): The argument 〈variables〉 is list of concrete
variables. Some of the concrete variables have a corresponding abstract variable.
This function returns a collection of actions that assign the value of concrete
variable to the abstract variable.
| |
TRule 6: ScenarioJ〈name〉, 〈label〉, 〈agents〉, 〈contract〉, 〈scenario〉, 〈deviations〉, 〈extensions〉K
〈name〉
〈label〉
〈agent〉∗=̂
.
..
Variables: 〈variables〉
Initialisation: 〈initialisations〉
〈contract〉 =̂
Pre-conditions: 〈pre-conditions〉
Post-conditions: 〈post-conditions〉
Invariants: 〈invariants〉
〈scenario〉
〈deviations〉
〈extensions〉
variables
createVariable(getAbstractMachineVariables() ≡ Va)
createVariable(getConcreteVariables(Va, 〈agents〉, 〈scenario〉, 〈deviations〉, 〈extensions〉) ≡ Vc)
createVariable(createFlowVariable(〈label〉 ≡ flow)
invariants
createInvariant(getVariableType(Vc))
createInvariant(getVariableType(flow))
createInvariant(createGlueFlow(〈label〉))
createInvariant(createGlueVariables(〈label〉, Vc))
createInvariant(createScenarioPre(〈label〉, 〈pre-conditions〉))
createInvariant(createScenarioPost(〈label〉, Vc, 〈post-conditions〉))
createInvariant(getAssociatedInvariants(Vc, 〈invariants〉))
events
createAbstractMachineEvents(〈name〉)
Event INITIALISATION extended
then
createAction(getInitialisation(flow))
createAction(getInitialisation(Vc))
Event createEvent(getNameFlowInitial(〈label〉))
when
createGuard(createFALSEGuard(〈label〉))
createGuard(createFlowInitialGuard(〈label〉))
createGuard(getPreconditions(Va, 〈pre-conditions〉))
then:
createAction(createFlowTriggerAction(〈label〉))
createAction(createConcreteEqualsActions(Vc))
Event createEvent(getNameFlowFinal(〈label〉))
refines
createRefinesEvent(getName(〈name〉))
when
createGuard(createFlowFinalGuard(〈label〉))
then
createAction(createTRUEAction(〈label〉))
createAction(createAbstractEqualsActions(Vc))
FlowJ〈label〉, 〈scenario〉K FlowJ〈label〉, 〈deviation〉K FlowJ〈label〉, 〈extensions〉K
Figure 5.25: Translation rule TRule 6 of type Scenario.| |
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5.6.6 Rule Type: Flow
The rule type Flow models a sequence of steps in a use case as a sequence of events
in the machine component of Event-B.
Flow: Sequence of Steps ↪→ Events in Machine
The translation rule TRule 7, as seen in Figure 5.26, takes the label, variables, and
scenario as the argument. The middle row provides an unpacking of these arguments
that are used by the translation rule to produce the Event-B elements. The following
| |
TRule 7: FlowJ〈label〉, 〈variables〉, 〈scenario〉K
〈label〉 〈variables〉
〈scenario〉 =̂
Triggers:
〈triggers〉
Main Flow:
〈steps〉
Alternate Flows:
〈alternateflows〉
events
Event createEvent(getNameFlowTrigger(〈label〉))
when:
createGuard(createFlowTriggerGuard(〈label〉))
createGuard(getTriggers(〈variables〉, 〈triggers〉))
then:
createAction(createFlowFirstStepAction(〈label〉, 〈steps〉)
createEvent(createStepEvents(〈label〉, 〈variables〉, 〈steps〉))
Figure 5.26: Translation rule TRule 7 of type Flow.| |
functions are used in the translation rule to create the events that model the scenario.
createFlowTriggerGuard(〈label〉): Creates a predicate in the event that states the trig-
ger value the control flow auxiliary variable, e.g. for a label UC a guard UC flow =
UC Trigger is produced.
getTriggers(〈variables〉, 〈triggers〉): For each predicate 〈trigger〉.〈predicate〉 in 〈triggers〉
is returned as a collection of predicates 〈predicate〉.
createFlowFirstStepActtion(〈label〉, 〈steps〉): Creates an action that assigns the value
of the first step 〈steps〉 to the control flow auxiliary variable, e.g. for a label UC
and the first step S an action UC flow := S is produced.
createStepEvents(〈label〉, 〈variables〉, 〈steps〉): Creates an event for each step 〈step〉 in
〈steps〉 in the machine.
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createDeviationPointGuard(〈label〉, 〈deviation-point〉): Creates a guard in the event
that states the control flow variable has the value of the deviation-point, e.g. for
a label UC and deviation-point Sd a guard UC flow := Sd is produced.
createExtensionPointGuard(〈label〉, 〈deviation-point〉): Creates a guard in the event
that states the control flow variable has the value of the extension-point, e.g. for
a label UC and extension-point Se a guard UC flow := Se is produced.
The translation rule TRule 8, as seen in Figure 5.27, takes the label, variables, and
deviations as the argument. The middle row provides an unpacking of these arguments.
The deviation refers to an accident case that contains a scenario, with triggers and a
main flow.
| |
TRule 8: FlowJ〈label〉, 〈variables〉, 〈deviations〉K
〈label〉 〈variables〉
〈deviations〉.〈deviation〉.〈accidentcase〉.〈scenario〉 =̂
Triggers:
〈triggers〉
Main Flow:
〈steps〉
events
Event getFlowTrigger(〈deviations〉.〈deviation〉.〈accidentcase〉.〈label〉)
when
createGuard(createDeviationPointGuard(〈deviation-point〉))
createGuard(getTriggers(〈variables〉, 〈triggers〉))
then
createAction(createFlowFirstStepAction(〈label〉, 〈steps〉)
createEvent(createStepEvents(〈label〉, 〈variables〉, 〈steps〉))
Figure 5.27: Translation rule TRule 8 of type Flow.| |
The translation rule TRule 9, as seen in Figure 5.28, takes the label, extension and
variables as the argument. The middle row provides an unpacking of these arguments.
The extension refers to an extension use case. It specifies an extension-point and rejoin-
point. Only the contract of the extension use case is provided, as the scenario is not
required by this translation rule.
5.6.7 Rule Type: Extension
The rule type Extension introduces the extensions as refinement in the Event-B
model. The scenarios of the extension use cases are introduced in the Event-B model
by this rule type.
Extension: Extensions ↪→ Extension Scenario in Event-B
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| |
TRule 9 Flow: FlowJ〈label〉, 〈variables〉, 〈extensions〉K
〈label〉 〈variables〉
〈extensions〉.〈extension〉=̂
Extension: 〈extensionusecase〉
Status: 〈status〉
Extension-point : 〈extension-point〉
Rejoin-point : 〈rejoin-point〉
〈extensionusecase〉.〈contract〉 =̂
Pre-conditions: 〈pre-conditions〉
Post-conditions: 〈post-conditions〉
Invariants: 〈invariants〉
〈extensionusecase〉.〈label〉
variables
createVariable(createAuxiliaryVariable(〈extensionusecase〉.〈label〉) ≡ UC)
invariants
createInvariant(getVariableType(UC))
createInvariant(createPrevent(status))
events
Event INITIALISATION extended
then
createAction(getInitialisation(UC))
Event createEvent(getName(〈extensionusecase〉.〈label〉))
when
createGuard(createFALSEGuard(〈extensionusecase〉.〈label〉))
createGuard(createFlowStepGuard(〈extension-point〉))
createGuard(getPreconditions(〈variables〉, 〈pre-conditions〉))
then
createAction(createTRUEAction(〈extensionusecase〉.〈label〉))
createAction(createFlowStepAction(〈rejoin-point〉))
createAction(getPostconditionsAction(〈variables〉, 〈post-conditions〉))
Event createEvent(getNameFalse(〈extensionusecase〉.〈label〉))
when:
createGuard(createFALSEGuard(〈extensionusecase〉.〈label〉))
createGuard(createFlowStepGuard(〈extension-point〉))
createGuard(negatePredicate(getPreconditions(〈variable〉, 〈pre-conditions〉)))
then:
createAction(createTRUEAction(〈extensionusecase〉.〈label〉))
Figure 5.28: Translation rule TRule 9 of type Flow.| |
The translation rule TRule 10, as seen in Figure 5.29, takes the label and exten-
sions as the argument. The middle row provides an unpacking of these arguments. The
translation rules produces a machine and context component. The sees and refines re-
lationships are created for the machine to relate it to context and machine components.
It uses translation rules of types Scenario, Flow and Extension, with the argu-
ments of the extension use case. This results in the scenario of the extension use case
being introduced in the Event-B project. If the extension use case contains extensions,
this results in further refinement in the Event-B model.
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| |
TRule 10 Project: ExtensionJ〈usecase〉, 〈extensions〉K
〈extensions〉.〈extension〉.〈extensionusecase〉 =̂
Extension Use Case: 〈name〉 (〈label〉)
Roles: 〈agents〉
Contract: 〈contract〉
Scenario: 〈scenario〉
Deviations: 〈deviations〉
Extensions: 〈extensions〉
Event-B Project createProject(getName(〈name〉))
Context createContext(getNameFlow(〈name〉) )
FlowJ〈name〉, 〈scenario〉, 〈deviations〉K
Machine createMachine(getNameScenario(〈name〉))
sees
createSees(getNameStatic(〈usecase〉.〈name〉))
createSees(getNameFlow(〈name〉))
refines
createRefines(getNameScenario(〈usecase〉.〈name〉))
ScenarioJ〈name〉, 〈label〉, 〈agents〉, 〈contract〉, 〈scenario〉, 〈deviations〉, 〈extensions〉K
ExtensionJ〈usecase〉, 〈extensions〉K
Figure 5.29: Translation rule TRule 10 of type Extension.| |
5.7 Related Work
Several groups have investigated a rigorous approach to capturing UML use cases [65,
96,111]. In comparison, the novelty of our approach comes from the use of refinement to
introduce key abstractions that are captured naturally by the structure of the use case
specification and its relationship to other use cases. In [96], Soussa and Russo provide
a mapping from the flow of a use case to operations in B. They rely upon the flow to
be written in accordance to a transaction pattern between the actor and the system as
follows: (1) an actors request action; (2) a system data validation action; (3) a system
expletive action; and finally (4) a system response action. We consider this pattern
would require the designer to focus more on the solution rather than understanding the
problem domain, which steps away from some of the benefits and simplicity of using
UML use cases. In [111], Whittle presents a precise notation for specifying use cases
based on three levels of abstraction: use case charts, scenario charts and interaction
diagrams. The motivation for this approach is similar to ours which also considers the
use of negative scenarios. However, we have focused on adding rigour to the textual
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specification of use cases which is commonly used in industry. In [65], Klimek and
Szwed refer to the formal analysis of the use case diagrams. They propose a formal
model of use cases that provide two methods of formal analysis and verification: the
first one based on a state exploration represents a model checking approach, and the
second one refers to the symbolic reasoning using formal methods of temporal logic.
In comparison to this formalisation of use cases, the approach presented in this thesis
takes into consideration the formalisation of undesired behaviour via the accident case
and its relationship to regular use cases.
Control flow between events in Event-B is typically modelled implicitly via variables
and event guards. While this fits well with Event-B refinement, it can make models
involving sequencing of events more difficult to specify and understand than if control
flow was explicitly specified. Atomicity Decomposition (AD) diagram introduced by
Fathabadi. et al [40], provide a graphical notation that is capable of representing
relationships between abstract and concrete events explicitly. Using the AD approach
has another advantage which is that we can represent event ordering explicitly. The
AD diagrams are based on JSD diagrams from Jackson. The Event-B models produced
from the AD diagrams use auxiliary variables to help mediate the execution of events.
In the approach of encoding UML use cases in Event-B, an auxiliary control flow
variable is introduced to help ensure the execution of events in the Event-B model
correspond to the ordering of steps in the use case scenario.
5.8 Summary & Discussion
This chapter has provided the encoding of use cases as an Event-B model. This has
also taken into account deviations from accident case and extensions from extension use
cases in the encoding into Event-B. The encoding has utilised an abstraction found in
the structure and relationships of a use case. In order to relate the abstract and concrete
layers, gluing invariants were identified that establish the relationship between the
layers. In addition, invariants for the scenario were identified that helps establish that
the scenarios satisfy the pre-condition, post-condition and invariants of the contract.
The encoding of simple and complex branching in the scenario of use case to Event-B
has been provided. Verification of the generated Event-B models have been discussed
with emphasis on specific proof obligations that provide identification of defects to the
use case specification. An overview of the translation rules have been provided. These
are used in Chapter 6, which implements the UC-B tool that automatically produces
Event-B models from formally specified use cases use cases.
Chapter6
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| |
Verification of Case 
Studies in Event-B
IX                                    7Case Studies
Use Case Model
VIII                                  7
Accident Case 
in UML Use Cases
I                                       3 Formal Use Case 
Model
Abstract Syntax
 Use Cases
II                                     4 III                                 4.6
Encoding Use Case 
Model in Event-B
IV                                    5 Verification of Use 
Cases in Event-B
Translation Rules
Use Cases to Event-B
 V                                     5 VI                                 5.6
UC-B Tool 
Development
VII                                   6
Figure 6.1: Thesis roadmap for Chapter 6.| |
One of the contributions in this thesis is the development of a prototype plug-in
UC-B for the Rodin platform [4]. The aim of UC-B is to enable practitioners to adopt a
light-weight approach in the use of formal methods during requirements analysis via use
case modelling. The development of this plug-in make use of the extensibility features
provided by Rodin as a result of its eclipse-based installation. This enables the use
of Event-B’s mathematical language to specify use cases formally, as well support for
the automatic generation of Event-B from a source use case. The implementation of
this tool is based on the structure of the use case model and the translation rules to
Event-B, provided in Chapter 4 and 5. Figure 6.1 highlights which part of the roadmap
this chapter implements.
Historically, formal methods have been viewed as a pure alternative to traditional
development methodologies, demanding a revolutionary change in industry to adopt
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them [6,59]. This approach has been documented to not be realistic because: (1) often
only parts of the systems would benefit formal methods and (2) the skill level required
to cope with techniques for full formal development would be expensive.
As discussed in Chapter 1, lightweight approach in the use of formal methods has
been a new trend, where they are targeted primarily on the early stages of development
and are focused towards defect detection through rigorous examination. This research
has focused in the development of the plug-in UC-B for Rodin. UC-B is aimed to be
a pragmatic lightweight approach that allow the textual specification of use cases to
be detailed in using Event-B’s mathematical language, while enabling the automatic
generation of corresponding Event-B models. The generated Event-B models are sub-
jected to automatic verification tools on Rodin that check for defects in the behaviour
specified by the use cases.
| |
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Figure 6.2: Relation between the Use Case and Event-B on the Rodin platform with UC-B.| |
In Figure 6.2, an overview of the implementation of UC-B on the Rodin platform
is provided. The aim of UC-B is to introduce a level for use case modelling that is
placed on top of the existing Event-B development environment. These two levels are
described as follows:
Use Case Level At the use case level, the focus is placed on the authoring and man-
agement of the use case model. The specification of the use cases is supported by
a dual representation of informal and formal notation. This brings precision and
clarity in specifying use cases. At this level, a formally specified use case can be
subjected for translation to an Event-B model.
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Event-B Level The generated Event-B models are immediately subjected to the veri-
fication tools supported by Event-B, provers that help identify inconsistencies in
the model via proof obligations (POs). The pass and fail of these proof obliga-
tions defects in the specification of the use case, at the use case level. In addition,
tools such ProB support activities to identifying traces that aid in the validation
of the use cases (scenarios) using the generated Event-B model.
In this chapter, the goals for UC-B are first discussed in Section 6.2. The architec-
ture and technologies used to implement these goals are provided in Section 6.3.
6.2 Goals
The following specifies the goals required in the development of UC-B:
• UC-B will be an application that can be installed on the Rodin platform.
• UC-B must allow use case models to be authored and managed on the Rodin
platform.
– The use case model must support the use case types: use case, extension
use case and accident case.
– The use case model must support specification of contract and scenario for
use cases.
– The use case model shall support consistent and automatic labelling of use
case model elements.
• UC-B must enable use case specification to be detailed with both informal and
formal notation.
– The formal notation must be based on the mathematical language of Event-
B [1].
– The informal and formal notation shall coexist side-by-side in the specifica-
tion of the use case.
• UC-B must support the automatic generation of an Event-B model from formally
specified use cases.
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6.3 Architecture & Technologies
This section describes the technologies employed in building UC-B and its architecture,
as seen in Figure 6.3. The framework proof traceability (dotted box) has not been
implemented at this stage, and is addressed as part of the future work in Chapter 8.
| |
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Figure 6.3: UC-B: Architecture and Technologies| |
6.3.1 Eclipse
Eclipse [34] is a platform for general purpose applications with an extensible plug-
in system. It is known as an integrated development environment (IDE) for Java
development, although the Java IDE is just one specialised application of the platform.
Eclipse employs plug-ins in order to provide all of its functionality on top of the run-time
system, this is based on Equinox, an OSGi standard compliant implementation. The
Eclipse platform provides facilities for workspace management, GUI building, a help
system, team support and more. These components are examples of plug-ins. Plug-ins
may provide extension points, to which other plug-ins may connect via extensions. A
typical Eclipse installation contains hundreds of extensions.
6.3.2 The Eclipse Modelling Framework (EMF)
The Eclipse Modelling Framework [103] is a modelling and code generation facility.
EMF provides tools and runtime support to produce Java code for the model and
adaptor classes that enable viewing and command-based editing of the model. EMF is
attractive for UC-B as it is modular and it takes care of many mundane tasks in GUI
development. An EMF-application typically consists of three layers:
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Model The model layer contains the data model and is stored in the form of an Ecore
model [103]. The Ecore model can be either generated from scratch or imported.
Customisation of the Ecore model include namespace, containment of elements
and other. There is a corresponding Genmodel (Generator Model) that allows
fine-tuning of the generated code for Model, Edit, Editor and Tests. Applied to
the model layer, it generates the Java code for the data model.
Edit The Edit layer consists of so-called ItemProviders, which represent the bridge
between the data model and a GUI. The ItemProviders can provide an alternative
structure of the data. It is not unusual that the structure of the data model differs
from the structure in the GUI. ItemProviders also provide basic information
like labels and icons. They also collect the properties that are presented in the
property view and collect the properties that are presented in the property view
and collect the commands that a use can perform on a data element. Finally, they
provide facilities to support Undo/Redo, Copy, Cut and Paste, Drag and Drop,
and more. The ItemProvider code is also customised through and generated by
the Genmodel.
Editor EMF can also generate code for an Eclipse-based editor. Such an editor is
generic, in the sense that it can be driven by any set of ItemProviders. The
editor support many standard features that one would expect of a modern model
editor.
The development of the UC-B uses EMF to establish the meta-model for construct-
ing a use case model on the Rodin platform. The edit and editor layers are used to
author and mange the data structured on use case meta-model. The meta-model for
UC-B is discussed in Section 6.3.3, and the editor is discussed in Section 6.3.4.
6.3.3 UC-B Meta-model
The UC-B meta-model defines the data structure of UC-B projects. The model is
structured into three packages for clarity. The core package contains a structure of
abstract meta-classes so that models can be treated generically as far as possible.
There are two sub-packages contained with the core page: one for agents and one for
use cases.
Abstract Basis
The meta-model is built upon a structure of meta-classes. Abstract meta-classes are the
ones that cannot be directly instantiated. Their instances are always instances of their
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| |
Figure 6.4: UC-B: Abstract meta-class| |
concrete sub-meta-classes. The abstract meta-classes are useful because they enable
a feature to be defined once in the meta-model and then be used, via inheritance, by
many concrete meta-classes. Apart from making it easier to maintain the meta-model,
this makes it possible to write code that is more generic, since it can work on features
without knowing which concrete meta-class the instance it is working on belongs to.
To easily distinguish the abstract meta-classes from concrete ones, the names of the
abstract meta-class are prefixed with UCB.
For abstract classes, the convention of including all the features that are inherited by
that meta-class within the name is followed. For example, UCBLabelledPredicateEle-
ment inherits from UCBLabelledElement and UCBPredicate. The abstract meta-classes
which are to be used to define concrete meta-classes are arranged in a hierarchy. Each
feature is contained in a meta-class outside of this hierarchy. This provides a flexible
choice of how to access model objects, either at a point in the hierarchy to generalise
over parts of its structure, or via the feature containers to generalise over all elements
that may own that feature. The root of all meta-classes in the UC-B meta-model is
the abstract base class UCBObject. UCBObject extends the EMF class EObject. A
description of the base meta-classes are provided in Figure 6.5.
Project
Figure 6.6 illustrates how UC-B projects are modelled in the UC-B meta-model. This
provides support for the UC-B authoring tool (editor) to author and manage the con-
tents of a UC-B project. A project contains a collection of UC which are generalisation
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Abstract Meta Class Description
UCBLabelledNamedDescribedElement Provides a common basis to have an element with a
label, name and description.
UCBLabelledPredicateElement Provides a string attribute, formal predicate, for an
Event-B mathematical predicate, it also provides the
attribute informal predicate, which corresponds to
informal description of the predicate using natural
language. The element also inherits a label.
UCBLabelledActionElement Provides a string attribute, formal action, for an
Event-B mathematical substitution, it also provides
the attribute informal predicate, that corresponds
to informal description of the predicate using natu-
ral language. The element also inherits a label.
Figure 6.5: Abstract meta-classes and their description.| |
for use case, extension use case and accident case, and Agents. The class Agent and
UC inherits the abstract meta-class UCBLabelledNamedDescribedElement. This allows
agents and use cases to be specified with a label, name and description.
| |
Figure 6.6: UC-B: Project| |
Agent
Figure 6.7 illustrates how agents are modelled in UC-B. The Agent class may contain
carrier sets, constants, variables. The class CarrierSet may have a collection of Element
objects. The benefit of creating the set and its elements, is that the Event-B model
generation automatically creates an axiom that enumerates the set with the elements
using the partition operator. For example, a user may define a set DOOR with the
elements Open and Closed in UC-B, as seen in Figure 6.8a. In Event-B the elements
are introduced as constants in the context, in which the set DOOR belongs to. The
partition operator is used to enumerate the set with the elements, as seen in Figure
6.8b.
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| |
Figure 6.7: UC-B meta-class: Agent| |
| |
(a) UC-B: Agent.
Sets
DOOR
Constants
Open,Closed
Axioms
@DOOR Enum: partition(DOOR, {Open}, {Closed})
(b) Event-B: Context.
Figure 6.8: Example: Agent Door with ennumerated set DOOR.| |
The class Constant and Variable inherit the abstract meta-class UCBLabelledPredi-
cateElement. This allows each constant and variable to specify a label (the identifier), a
predicate to describe its type, and an informal description. The identifier specified via
the label is required to be unique. In addition, the variable has a string initialisation,
that allows it to specify an assignment.
Use Cases
Figure 6.7 illustrates how use cases are modelled in UC-B. The abstract class UC may
contain a scenario. This abstract meta-class is inherited by UseCase and AccidentCase,
which allows use cases and accident cases may contain a scenario. The UseCase may
also contain a Contract. The Contract may contain a collection of preconditions,
postconditions and invariants. The class Precondition, Postcondition and Invariant
inherit the abstract meta-class UCBLabelledPredicate. This allows an instance of these
classes to specify a label, a formal predicate, and an informal description.
The UseCase may also contain deviations and extensions that relate the use case to
AccidentCase and ExtensionUsecase. The ExtensionUsecase inherits the class UseCase,
i.e. it is also allowed to have a contract, scenario, deviations and extensions. The class
Scenario may contain one main flow and a collection of alternate flows. The MainFlow
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Figure 6.9: UC-B meta-class: UC| |
and AlternateFlow may contain a collection of steps. The AlternateFlow may specify a
alternatepoint and rejoinpoint that refer to a step. The element extension may specify
a status that can have the values Ordinary or Prevent.
Steps
The abstract meta-class, Steps, is inherited by Step, If and While. The meta-class
Step inherits UCBLabelledAction, which allows each Step to specify labelled action,
with formal assignment and informal description. The meta-classes If and While in-
herit the abstract-meta class UCBLabelledPredicate. This allows these meta-classes to
specify a label, predicate and informal description. The meta-classes may also contain
a collection of steps themselves.
| |
Figure 6.10: UC-B meta-class: Step| |
6.3.4 UC-B
An UC-B editor (extended from the editor produced by EMF) is provided to allow
for the authoring and management of use case model based on the UC-B meta-model
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provided in Section 6.3.3. The Rodin APIs allow for the use of Event-B’s mathematical
language in detailing the use case model formally, and support for the generation of an
Event-B model from a target use case.
Am UC-B editor provides four views to help manage the use case model: (1) UC-B
Project, (2) Agents, (3) Use Cases and (4) Event-B model generation. Each of these
views help the user focus on authoring and managing parts of the use case model.
UC-B Project
| |
Figure 6.11: UC-B: Project for water tank system.| |
Figure 6.11 provides a screen shot of the UC-B project view for the water tank
system. This view allows the user to provide a title and description for the use case
model created. It also provides a list of the use cases and agents that belong to the
project. In this section, new agents and use cases can be added to and removed from
the project. At this view, only the title, label and description of the use cases and
agents can be modified. The tool provides a static check that ensures that the label
for any use case or agent created is unique, upon saving any changes to the project.
The creation of use cases support the types: use case, accident case and extension use
case.
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| |
Figure 6.12: UC-B: View for agents.| |
Agents
Every agent created in the project view appears in the agent view, as seen in Figure 6.12.
Here, the user is allowed to define carrier sets, constants and variables for the agent.
The constants and variables allow a type to be specified using Event-B’s predicate
language. The tool ensures that identifiers for carrier sets, constants and variables
are unique. A static check is performed to ensure that the formal language used is
syntactically correct and the identifiers used have been defined. For each variable,
there is also a specification for its initialisation. All elements created for the agents
may specify an informal description.
Use Cases
The use cases view allows for each use case created to be specified with both informal
and formal notation, as seen in Figure 6.13. The view allows the user to select a created
use case, via a drop-down list of all the created use cases. Once selected, the content of
the use case, namely its contract (unless its an accident case) and scenario is provided.
The use case and extension use case can further introduce extensions and deviations
that refer to extension use case and accident cases, respectively. The contract and
scenario can be specified using both informal and formal notation. Allowing these
notations to co-exist enable precision in the requirements documentation while still
maintaining ease of communication. A use case can be specified formally only with
the declared sets, variables and constants defined by agents that play a role in the use
case. The use case view allows the use case to specify agents that play a role in it.
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Figure 6.13: UC-B: View for use cases.| |
Event-B Model Generation
Once the use cases have been specified, the Event-B view allows for a target use case to
be provided for Event-B model generation. The translation rules provided in Chapter
5 are used to generate the Event-B model from a target use case. The tool creates
a project with the title of the target use case, and creates the machines and contexts
components of the Event-B model that correspond to the use case, based on the trans-
lation rules. Rodin provers and syntax checks run automatically on the generated
Event-B model providing an immediate display of errors or inconsistencies found at
the Event-B level. Animation tools, such as ProB can be used to identify traces that
help to validate the use cases against the generated Event-B model.
| |
Figure 6.14: Event-B model generation.| |
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6.4 Summary & Discussion
The Rodin platform, as an Event-B tool, serves as a host for the UC-B plug-in devel-
oped to give tool support to author and manage use case models. The theory under-
pinning the UC-B plug-in has been presented in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter
5; The applications to case studies will be presented in Chapter 7. The tool benefits
from features of EMF, to create a use case model on the Rodin platform. The APIs
provided by Rodin allow for the use of the Event-B language in specifying the use case
models formally, and automate the generation of the Event-Bs from a target, formally
specified use case. We consider developing a graphical user interface for the use case
diagram, in diagrammatic view, as future work. The automatic generation of Event-
B from a formally specified use case, is aimed to decrease the effort of modelling in
Event-B while allowing the user to focus on specifying use cases.
Chapter7
Case Studies & Evaluation
7.1 Introduction
| |
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Figure 7.1: Thesis roadmap for Chapter 7.| |
This chapter evaluates the appraoch via a set of case studies. UC-B and the ver-
ification support provided by their corresponding Event-B model are used to support
the evaluation. Figure 7.1, highlights which part of the roadmap that is being imple-
mented. The case studies will cover: (1) the use case types: use case, accident case
and extension use case; (2) simple and complex branching in scenarios; and (3) the
extension types: ordinary and prevent. The case studies are as follows:
UC1 In Section 7.2, the water tank system (WTS), our running example, is discussed.
The use case model has a use case, accident case and extension use case. The
extension use case covers the use of the prevent relationship.
UC2 In Section 7.3, a case study of a train door control system (TDCS) is provided.
The use case model has a use case, accident case and extension use case. It
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covers the use of simple branching via the conditional if within the scenario of a
use case. The extension use case covers the use of the prevent relationship.
UC3 In Section 7.4, a case study of an automated teller machine (ATM) is provided. It
covers the use of complex branching via alternate flows, and the use an ordinary
extension type in the use case.
UC4 In Section 7.5, a simplified case study sense and avoid (SAA) provided by BAE
Systems is discussed. It covers the use of use case, accident case and extension
use case. The extension use case is introduced to prevent the occurrence of the
accident introduced by the accident case.
Each case study comprises of a use case model that contain the informal and formal
specification of use cases, the corresponding Event-B model generated for the source
use case, and the verification support provided by Event-B. The generated Event-B
models for these case studies are provided in Appendix B. In addition, the state charts
generated via Pro-B, associated with each Event-B model is provided in Appendix C.
The traces generated by Pro-B help validate the Event-B model against the source use
cases.
7.2 Case Study UC1: Water Tank System
The case study for the water tank system has been gradually introduced as a running
example in this thesis. In this section, the case study is discussed as a whole, with the
use case diagram, use case specifications and its corresponding Event-B model.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the aim of the water tank system is to maintain the
water level between the high (H) and low (L) limits of the water tank, via the use of
a controller (referred to as the water tank system), as seen in Figure 7.2. To achieve
this intent, the controller interacts with two external components, namely the sensor
system and pump. The sensor system monitors the water level in the tank with respect
to the high threshold (HT) and low threshold (LT) sensor readings. Based on these
readings, the controller either activates or deactivates the pump. When the pump is
active, its motor is switched on, which subsequently increases the water level in the
tank. On the other hand when the pump is deactivated, its motor is switched off which
then allows the water level in the tank gradually decrease.
In addition, the controller also interacts with a drain component that is introduced
as a safety control structure. In the event of a failure in the pump component, the
controller may activate the drain, which subsequently opens an exit valve. This exit
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H
L
Drain Input Signal
SensorHT
Sensor HT, LT and Motor 
Readings
Water Tank
Water Level
SensorLT
Pump
Pump Input Signal
Controller
Sensor 
System
Water
Drain
Exit Valve
HT
LT
Motor Signal
Figure 7.2: A description of the water tank system.| |
valve is located at the base of the water tank, at the low limit (L). When the exit valve
is open the water level is reduced to the low limit in the event of a component failure.
Use Case Diagram
The use case diagram for the water tank system can be seen in Figure 7.3. It contains
the use case MaintainH, the accident case ExceedH and extension use case DrainToL.
The intent of MaintainH is to maintain the water level in the water tank below the high
limit. The actors Water Tank, Pump and Sensor System, play a role in this use case to
achieve this functionality. This use case is deviated by the accident case ExceedH via
the deviate relationship.
| |
Water Tank System (WTS)
MaintainHWater
Tank Pump
Sensor
System
ExceedH
<<deviate>>
DrainToL
<<extend>>
<<prevent>>
Drain
Figure 7.3: Water tank system use case diagram.| |
The accident case introduces undesired behaviour that allows the water level to
exceed above the high limit. In order to prevent this accident, the extension use case
DrainToL is introduced that extends the functionality of MaintainH by preventing the
final outcome of the accident case ExceedH. The actor Drain plays a role in this extension
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use case. The extension use case DrainToL introduces the interaction between the water
tank system and the drain component in order to reduce the water level to the low
limit of the tank.
7.2.1 Use Case Model
Agents
The actors and subject in the use case diagram of the water tank system are represented
by agents in the use case model. These agents define the carrier sets, constants and
variables that are required to specify the use cases MaintainH, ExceedH and DrainToL.
This can be seen in Figure 7.4,
| |
Agent: Water Tank
Constants
H :: H > HT
HT :: HT > LT
LT :: LT > L
L :: L = 0
DEC :: DEC ∈ (H−HT)..(HT− LT)
INC :: INC ∈ (LT− L)..(HT− LT)
DRN :: DRN = L
Variables
waterlevel :: waterlevel ∈ L...H
Initialisation
waterlevel :: waterlevel := H
Agent: Drain
Variables
valve :: valve ∈ BOOL
Initialisation
valve :: valve := FALSE
Agent: Sensor System
Variables
sensorHT :: sensorHT ∈ BOOL
Initialisation
sensorHT :: sensorHT := FALSE
Agent: Water Tank System
Variables
pump :: pump ∈ BOOL
drain :: drain ∈ BOOL
Initialisation
pump :: pump := TRUE
drain :: drain := FALSE
Agent: Pump
Variables
motor :: motor ∈ BOOL
Initialisation
motor :: motor := TRUE
Figure 7.4: Agents of the water tank system in the use case model.| |
As discussed in Chapter 4, the Water Tank agent defines the limits and thresholds
of the tank (L,H,LT, and HT) as constants, as they are not expected to be modified
by the behaviour of the use cases. Their types specify important assumptions on the
domain of the water tank, e.g. the high threshold if above the low threshold HT > LT.
The water level in the tank is denoted by the variable waterlevel as its values are
expected to change. It is of type, waterlevel ∈ L..H, where the water level is always
expected to be between the L and H limits of the water tank. This variable is initialised
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to the value H. The constants DEC and INC, denote a discrete representation in the
decrease and increase of the water level in the tank, respectively.
The agents Sensor System, Pump, Water Tank System, and Drain, introduce the
variables, sensorHT, pump, motor, drain, valve. These variables are all of the type
BOOL, where TRUE indicates activated, and FALSE indicate deactivated. These sets,
constants and variables can be used to specify a use case in which the agent plays a
role in.
Use Case Specification
The informal and formal specification for the MaintainH use case is seen in Figure 7.5.
| |
Use case: MaintainH (MH)
Roles: Sensor System, Water Tank System,
Pump, Water Tank.
Contract
Pre-conditions:
@MH Pre 1: Water level is above high
threshold, and lesser than or equal to the high
limit.
Post-conditions:
@MH Post 1: Water level is between the low
limit and high threshold.
Invariants:
@MH Inv 1: Water level is always between
low and high limit.
Scenario
Triggers:
@MH Trig 1: Water level above HT.
Main Flow :
MH 1. Sensor system activates sensor HT.
MH 2. Water tank system deactivates pump.
〈deviation-point: ExceedH〉
MH 3. Pump deactivates motor.
MH 4. Water level in tank decreases.
Deviations
Deviation: ExceedH; Deviation-point: MH 3
Extensions
Extension: DrainToL; Status: Prevent
Extension-point: EH 2; Rejoin-point: EH 2
(a) Informal
Use case: MaintainH (MH)
Roles: Sensor System, Water Tank System, Pump,
Water Tank.
Contract
Pre-conditions:
@MH Pre 1: waterlevel > HT ∧ waterlevel ≤ H
Post-conditions:
@MH Post 1: waterlevel ≥ L ∧ waterlevel ≤ HT
Invariants:
@MH Inv 1: waterlevel ∈ L..H
Scenario
Triggers:
@MH Trig 1: waterlevel > HT
Main Flow :
MH 1. sensorHT := TRUE
MH 2. pump := FALSE
〈deviation-point: ExceedH〉
MH 3. motor := FALSE
MH 4. waterlevel := waterlevel −DEC
Deviations
Deviation: ExceedH; Deviation-point: MH 3
Extensions
Extension: DrainToL; Status: Prevent
Extension-point: EH 2; Rejoin-point: EH 2
(b) Formal.
Figure 7.5: Informal and formal specification for use case MaintainH.| |
As the actors Water Tank, Sensor System, Pump, Drain, are associated with Main-
tainH, their corresponding agents have the role relationship with this use case. The
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constants and variables defined by the agents are used to specify the contract and
scenario of MaintainH formally. The pre-condition, post-condition, and invariant, are
specified by predicates that clearly express the agreement of the stakeholders. The
scenario specifies a main flow, that captures a trigger and a sequence of steps (MH 1
to MH 4). Each step is of the kind action, that captures assignments that modify the
variables of the agents that play a role in this use case. The execution of the main flow
is required to satisfy contract of the use case.
The specification of ExceedH only provides a scenario as it is an accident case. This
scenario is seen in Figure 7.6 is specified with both informal and formal notation. The
deviation relation in the use case model, allows the variables and constants defined by
the agents that play a role in the use case MaintainH, to be used to specify the scenario
of ExceedH.
| |
Accident case: ExceedH (EH)
Scenario
Triggers:
@EH Trig 1: Water level above HT.
Main Flow :
EH 1. Motor remains switched on.
〈extension-point: DrainToL〉
EH 2. Water level in tank increases.
(a) Informal
Accident case: ExceedH (EH)
Scenario
Triggers:
@EH Trig 1: wl > HT
Main Flow :
EH 1. motor := TRUE
〈extension-point: DrainToL〉
EH 2. wl := wl + INC
(b) Formal.
Figure 7.6: Informal and formal specification for accident case ExceedH.| |
The element extension is introduced in the specification of MaintainH, as seen in
Figure 7.5. It specifies the status and extension-point and refers to the extension
use case DrainToL. The extension-point specifies a step, EH 2, in the scenario of the
accident case ExceedH, as the status for the extension is prevent. This introduces the
behaviour of the extension use case between the steps EH 1 and EH 2. The rejoin-
point returns the flow back to the accident scenario at EH 2. By introducing this
extension use case the water level is drained to the low limit. This prevents the water
level from exceeding the high limit, even after pump increasing the water level at step
EH 2.
The DrainToL extension use case is specified with both formal and informal notation,
as seen in Figure 7.7. The extension use case is specified with the carrier sets, constants
and variables that were used to specify MaintainH. The Drain agent plays a role in this
extension use case, which allows the specification to use the variables drain and valve
and constant DRN , defined by the agent.
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Extension Use Case: DrainToL (DL)
Roles: Drain.
Contract
Pre-conditions:
@DL Pre 1: Pump has been deactivated
and motor remains active.
Post-conditions:
@DL Post 1: Water level is at L.
Scenario
Triggers:
@DL Trig 1: Pump has been deacti-
vated and motor remains active.
Main Flow :
DL 1. WTS activates drain.
DL 2. Drain activates valve.
DL 3. Water level in tank is drained.
(a) Informal
Extension Use Case: DrainToL (DL)
Roles: Drain.
Contract
Pre-conditions:
@DL Pre 1: pump = FALSE ∧
motor = TRUE
Post-conditions:
@DL Post 1: waterlevel = L
Scenario
Trigger:
@DL Trig 1: pump = FALSE ∧
motor = TRUE
Main Flow :
DL 1. drain := TRUE
DL 2. valve := TRUE
DL 3. waterlevel := DRN
(b) Formal.
Figure 7.7: Informal and formal specification for extension use case DrainToLT.| |
7.2.2 Event-B
The Event-B model for MaintainH has three machine layers: m0 MaintainH Contract,
m1 MaintainH Scenario, and m2 DrainToL Scenario. Each machine layer introduces
new variables and events that model the use case MaintainH, along with any extensions.
The generated Event-B model also contains three contexts: MH Static, MH Flow and
EH Flow. The context MH Static models all the static aspects (constants and sets)
associated with the use case including the extension use case and accident case that
are related to it. The contexts MH Flow and EH Flow model a type for the scenario
of MaintainH and DrainToL. The state charts produced by ProB for this Event-B model
is seen in Appendix C.1.
m0 MaintainH Contract
This machine models the contract of the MaintainH use case. The variable waterlevel is
introduced in this machine as it occurs in the pre-condition (@MH Pre 1) and post-
condition (@MH Post 1). In addition, there is an auxiliary boolean variable, MH,
introduced by the encoding to denote the execution of the use case. The machine
contains an event MaintainH, which models the pre-condition and post-condition, as
its guard and action. The post-condition (@MH Post 1) which is predicate, is trans-
formed to a non-deterministic action, where all occurrence of the variable waterlevel
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(highlighted) are primed (after value), on the RHS of operator : |, as follows:
waterlevel : | waterlevel’ ≥ L ∧ waterlevel’ ≤ HT
(action MH Post Act in event MaintainH)
The invariant, labelled @MH Inv 1, constraints the variable waterlevel to be al-
ways between the high (H) and low (L) limits. The main mathematical judgement
made in this abstract machine is ensure that what is achieved by the post-condition of
the use case maintains the constraints of this invariant. The following invariant preser-
vation proof obligation is produced for event MaintainH for invariant @MH Inv 1, and
is automatically proved by the provers at the Event-B level:
L = 0 ∧ L < LT ∧ LT < HT ∧HT < H
waterlevel’ ≥ L ∧ waterlevel’ ≤ HT
`
waterlevel’ ∈ L..H (MaintainH/MH Inv 1/INV)
Proving this PO establishes what is achieved by the use case is within bounds of
the invariant. This machine is refined to introduce the scenario of MaintainH.
m1 MaintainH Scenario
This machine introduces the scenario of MaintainH. This takes into account the devi-
ation from the accident case ExceedH and the extension from DrainToL that aims to
prevent the scenario of the accident case from resulting in an accident. The variables
introduced in this machine are separated by the encoding, as follows:
Abstract variables The variables MH and waterlevel, which were introduced for the
event MaintainH in the abstract machine, are treated as abstract variables in this
machine.
Concrete variables Variables sensorHT, pump, motor, waterlevel m1 and MH flow
are introduced to model the scenario of MaintainH. The gluing invariants labelled
@MH Glue Variables and @MH Glue Flow, are introduced to relate the concrete
variables waterlevel m1 and MH flow to their corresponding abstract variables
waterlevel and MH.
The scenario is introduced as events that modify the concrete variables via its
actions. The event MaintainH Final refines the abstract event MaintainH. The gluing
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invariants help to automatically discharge the guard strengthening (GRD) and action
simulation (SIM) POs.
The invariants @MH Scenario Post and @MH Scenario Inv, are introduced to en-
sure that the scenario that modify the concrete variable, waterlevel m1, achieve the
post-condition (@MH Post 1) and maintain the invariant (@MH Inv 1) for the use
case. In these invariants, all occurrence of the abstract variable waterlevel is replaced
by waterlevel m1 (highlighted):
MH flow = MH Final⇒ waterlevel m1 ≥ L ∧ waterleve m1 ≤ HT
(MH Scenario Post)
waterlevel m1 ∈ L..H (MH Scenario Inv)
The invariant @MH Scenario Post introduces a constraint where the events that
lead to the end of the use case, i.e. having the action MH flow := MH Final,
are required to achieve the post-condition (@MH Post 1) for the concrete variable
waterlevel m1. This constraint is placed on the events MH 4 and EH 2 as they
lead to the end of the use case, producing the invariant preservation proof obligations
MH 4/MaintainH Scenario Post/INV and EH 4/MaintainH Scenario Post/INV.
The PO MH 4/MaintainH Scenario Post/INV requires that the action of the event
(step) MH 4 decreases the water level (waterlevel m1 := waterlevel m1−DEC) to
ensure that the level has been reduced to some value between the high threshold (HT)
and low limit (L). The PO is as follows:
MH flow = MH 4
waterlevel m1 ∈ L..H
`
waterlevel m1− DEC ≥ L ∧ waterlevel m1− DEC ≤ HT
(MH 4/MaintainH Scenario Post/INV)
To help prove this PO the invariant labelled @MH StepAssert 1 was manually
introduced to help denote that the water level remained above the high threshold from
the steps from MH 1 and MH 4. That is, after the scenario triggered, the water level
remained above the high threshold during the interactions between the Sensor System,
WTS and Pump, till the decrease took place. Automating the invariant discovery for
these manually introduced invariants is part of the future work, which is discussed in
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Chapter 8.
MH flow ∈ {MH 1,MH 2,MH 3,MH 4} ⇒ (waterlevel m1 > HT )
(MH StepAssert 1)
The PO EH 2/MaintainH Scenario Post/INV is produced to ensure that the final
step of the accident scenario achieves the post-condition. However, the final step
introduces an action that increases the water level in the tank (due the failure of the
pump component) which is expected to not achieve the post-condition of MaintainH.
In order to prevent the water level from exceeding the high limit, the extension
use case DrainToL is introduced before the step EH 2 via an extension-point. This
introduces the event DrainToL and DrainToL FALSE in the scenario of the accident
case, before step EH 2. This extension use case drains the water level to the low limit
(L) which prevents the increase of water level above H. Due to the prevent status of the
extension, the invariant @DL Prevent is introduced to ensure that the event DrainToL
always executes during the execution of the accident scenario. This is achieved by
ensuring that the event DrainToL FALSE is never enabled:
¬(DL = FALSE ∧MH flow = EH 2 ∧ ¬(pump = FALSE ∧motor = TRUE))
(DL Prevent)
The event DrainToL models the pre-condition (@DL Pre 1) and post-condition
(@DL Post 1) of the extension use case as its guard and action, respectively, based
on the encoding for the extension use case. This machine is later refined to introduce
the scenario of @DrainToL. The execution of this event achieves the post-condition
(@DL Post 1) that reduces the water level to the low limit (L). This allows the PO
for event EH 4 to maintain the post-condition as the increase of the water level from
the low level is proved to be below the high threshold.
MH flow = EH 2
waterlevel m1 = L
`
waterlevel m1 + INC ≥ L ∧ waterlevel m1 + INC ≤ HT
(EH 2/MaintainH Scenario Post/INV)
To help prove this PO, the invariant @MH AssertStep 2 was manually introduced
to ensure that water level was at the low level before the event EH 2 was executed.
Again, the automatic identification of these invariants that are introduced manually
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form part of the future work, discussed in Chapter 8.
MH flow = EH 2⇒ waterlevel m1 = L (MH AssertStep 2)
The invariant preservation POs for invariant @MH Scenario Post was automati-
cally discharged for events MH 4, EH 2, and DrainToL, as the actions were shown to
decrease the water level to some point between the low and high limits of the water
tank. This machine establishes the scenario of MaintainH is consistent with its con-
tract, with inclusion of the deviation of the accident case with the prevention of the
extension use case.
m2 DrainToL Scenario
The machine m2 DrainToL Scenario refines m1 MaintainH Scenario to introduce the
scenario of DrainToL. The abstract event DrainToL is refined by the events that model
the scenario of the extension use case. The variables in this machine are distinguished
as follows:
Abstract variables The variables waterlevel m1, pump, motor, DL and MH flow that
are associated with the abstract event DrainToL are treated as the abstract vari-
ables.
Concrete variables The variables drain, valve, pump m2, motor m2, waterlevel m2
and DL flow are the concrete variables associated with the scenario of DrainToL.
The gluing invariants labelled @DL Glue Variables and @DL Glue Flow, are
introduced to relate the concrete variables waterlevel m2, pump m2, motor m2
and DL flow to their corresponding abstract variables.
Note, the invariant (@MH Inv 1) of MaintainH is considered an invariant of its
extension use case DrainToL. These invariants are as follows, where all occurrence of
the abstract variables are replaced by corresponding concrete variables (highlighted):
DL flow = DL Final⇒ waterlevel m2 = L (DL Scenario Post)
waterlevel m2 ∈ L..H (DL Scenario Inv)
The invariant @DL Scenario Post ensures the event @DL 3 that leads to the end
of the extension use case, via the action DL flow := DL Final, achieves the post-
condition where the water level is reduced to the low limit (@DL Post 1). This
produces the invariant preservation PO, DL 3/DL Scenario Post/INV. This PO is
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automatically discharged as the final step, which reduces the water level to the level of
the drain, i.e the low limit where the drain is set DRN = L.
The PO DL 3/DL Scenario Inv/INV is also automatically proved as the action
to drain to water level to the low limit is within the constraints of the invariant
@DL Scenario Inv. This machines reveals more of the system with respect to the
operation of the drain and valve. The refinement by this machine ensures that the
scenario of the extension use case is consistent with its contract.
7.3 Case Study UC2: Train Door Control System
The train door control system (TDCS) provides the functionality to open train doors
based on the request of the train operator. The use case diagram for TDCS is provided
in Figure 7.8. It provides the use case OpenDoor and the external actors Train, Door,
and Operator that are associated with it. The OpenDoor use case defines the behaviour
to open the train doors provided based on the request of the train operator. This case
study describes the use of simple branching via a conditional if in the use case scenario.
A potential accident in the operation of this system would be for a passenger to
fall off a moving train (this accident is labelled PassengerFallsOffMovingTrain). This
accident could result from a hazardous action for the train doors to be opened while
the train is moving (an environmental condition). This cause of the accident Passen-
gerFallsOffMovingTrain can be written as follows:
Door opened (Act.) + Train is moving (Cond.)⇒ PassengerFallsOffMovingTrain
This accident is introduced in the use case diagram as seen in Figure 7.8 as an acci-
dent case PassengerFallsOffMovingTrain. A safety requirement for this system is for the
train doors to always remain closed while the train is moving. The behaviour defined
by the accident case is expected to violate this safety requirement. However, an exten-
sion use case EmergencyBraking is introduced to prevent this accident. This extension
use case interacts with the actor Brake System which can reduce the train speed to
stationary if it detects a fault that could result in the accident. The specification for
these use cases are provided in Section 7.3.1.
The use case model for this case study is provided in Section 7.3.1 and the generated
Event-B model for the use case OpenDoor is discussed in Section 7.3.2.
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| |
Train Door Control System 
(TDCS)
OpenDoorOperator
Door
Train
PassengerFalls
OffMovingTrain
Emergency
Braking
<<deviate>>
<<extend>>
<<prevent>>
Brake
Figure 7.8: Use case diagram for Train Door Control System.| |
7.3.1 Use Case Model
Agents
The actors and subject in the use case diagram of TDCS are represented by agents in
the use case model, as seen in Figure 7.9. These agents are described as follows:
Door This agent can be regarded as the provider of information on the current state
of the door. The agent introduces an enumerated set DOOR with the elements
Open, Opening and Closed, and a variable door. This variable is of type DOOR
allowing it to have a value of either Open, Opening or Closed (the state of the
door “closing” is not a necessary abstraction for this case study and hence not
considered to keep the case study simple). This variable denotes the state of the
train doors.
Train This agent can be regarded as the provider of information on the current speed
of the train. The agent introduces an enumerated set SPEED with the elements
Stationary and Moving, and a variable t speed. This variable is of type SPEED
allowing it to have a value of either Stationary or Moving that indicates the
current train speed.
Operator This agent introduces the variable request door of type BOOL. When this
variable has the value TRUE indicates a request from the operator to open train
door, while the value FALSE, indicates the operator requests close the train
doors.
Brake This agent introduces the variable brake of type BOOL. The value TRUE
for this variable denotes the activation of the emergency brake, while the value
FALSE when the value is FALSE denotes the emergency brake is not activated.
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TDCS This agent introduces the variable door cmd of type BOOL. The variable
door cmd denotes the command issued by TDCS to open the train door, i.e.
when the value TRUE.
| |
Agent: Door
Sets
DOOR :: DOOR = {Open,Opening, Closed}
Variables
door :: door ∈ DOOR
Initialisation
door :: door := Closed
Agent: Operator
Variables
request door :: request door ∈ DOOR
Initialisation
request door :: request door := Open
Agent: TDCS
Variables
door cmd :: door cmd ∈ BOOL
Initialisation
door cmd :: door cmd := FALSE
Agent: Train
Sets
SPEED :: SPEED = {Moving,Stationary}
Variables
t speed :: t speed ∈ SPEED
Initialisation
t speed :: t speed := Moving
Agent: Brake
Variables
brake :: brake ∈ BOOL
Initialisation
brake :: brake := FALSE
Figure 7.9: Agents that play a role in the use case OpenDoor.| |
Use Case Specification
The specification for the OpenDoor use case is provided in Figure 7.10. The con-
tract of the use case specifies the pre-condition (@OD Pre 1) where the door is to be
guaranteed to be closed before the use case is executed. The execution of the use case
achieves the post-condition (@OD Post 1) where the train door is open when the train
is stationary, or it remains closed as the train is moving. The invariant (@OD Inv 1)
specifies the safety requirement where the door must never be open when the train is
moving. This property must be maintained throughout the execution of the use case.
The scenario of OpenDoor specifies a main flow that triggers (@OD Trig 1) when
door is closed and the operator has requested the train doors to open. The step
labelled OD 1 introduces a simple branching via conditional where if the speed sensor
has read the train is stationary, then the sub-steps OD 1 1, OD 1 2 and OD 1 2
may execute sequentially. If this condition is false, the execution of the scenario skips
the sub-steps and leads to the end of the use case. This creates a branch in the scenario
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| |
Use case: OpenDoor (OD)
Roles: Train, Operator, Door, Speed Sensor.
Contract
Pre-conditions:
OD Pre 1: Train door is closed.
Post-conditions:
@OD Post 1: Train is stationary and door
is open or train is moving and door remains
closed.
Invariants:
@OD Inv 1: Door must never be open while
train is moving.
Scenario
Triggers:
@OD Trig 1: Operator requests to open
door.
Main Flow :
〈deviation-point: DoorOpensWhileTrainMoving〉
OD 1: if Train speed is stationary then
OD 1 1. TDCS issues open door command.
OD 1 2. Door starts to open.
OD 1 3. Door opened.
Deviations
Deviation: DoorOpensWhileTrainMoving
Deviation-point: OD 2
Extensions
Extension: EmergencyBraking; Status: Prevent
Extension-point: DT 2; Rejoin-point: DT 2
(a) Informal
Use case: OpenDoor (OD)
Roles: Train, Operator, Door, Speed Sensor.
Contract
Pre-conditions:
@OD Pre 1: door = Closed
Post-conditions:
@OD Post 1: (t speed = Stationary ∧ door =
Open) ∨ (t speed = Moving ∧ door = Closed)
Invariants:
@OD Inv 1: ¬(t speed = Moving ∧ door = Open)
Scenario
Triggers:
@OD Trig 1: door = Closed ∧ request door = Open
Main Flow :
〈deviation-point: DoorOpensWhileTrainMoving〉
OD 1: if t speed = Stationary then
OD 1 1. door cmd := TRUE
OD 1 2. door := Opening
OD 1 3. door := Open
Deviations
Deviation: DoorOpensWhileTrainMoving
Deviation-point: OD 2
Extensions
Extension: EmergencyBraking; Status: Prevent
Extension-point: DT 2; Rejoin-point: DT 2
(b) Formal.
Figure 7.10: Informal and formal specification for use case OpenDoor.| |
of the use case, and the choice in this branching is based on the train location and train
speed.
The specification for the accident case PassengerFallsOffMovingTrain is provided in
Figure 7.11. It captures a simple accident scenario where the doors begins to open due
to a fault introduced in step DT 1. The subsequent action is for the door to be fully
opened at step DT 2. This final step in the accident scenario leads to an accident
provided by the environmental condition, which is that the train is moving, is set to
true. This environmental condition is introduced via the trigger condition @DT Trig 1
that allows the accident scenario to only deviate the OpenDoor use case when the train
is moving. In order to prevent this accident, the extension use case EmergencyBraking
is introduced between the steps DT 1 and DT 2 via an extension-point.
The specification for the extension use case EmergencyBraking is provided in Figure
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Accident case: PassengerFallsOffMovingTrain (DT)
Scenario
Triggers:
@DT Trig 1: Train is moving.
Main Flow:
DT 1. Door starts to open (fault).
〈〈extension-point: EmergencyBraking.〉〉
DT 2. Door opened.
(a) Informal
Accident case: PassengerFallsOffMovingTrain (DT)
Scenario
Triggers:
@DT Trig 1: t speed = Moving
Main Flow:
DT 1. door := Opening
〈〈extension-point: EmergencyBraking.〉〉
DT 2. door := Open
(b) Formal.
Figure 7.11: Informal and formal specification for use case PassengerFallsOffMovingTrain.| |
7.12. It introduces an additional functionality to stop the train speed to stationary in
the event of a potential accident. The behaviour of this extension use case is performed
provided that the train doors begin to open while the train is moving (pre-condition
@EB Pre 1). The extension use case introduces the scenario where the emergency
brake is activated at step EB 1. This results in the the train speed being reduced to
stationary at steps EB 2.
| |
Extension use case: EmergencyBraking (EB)
Roles: Brake.
Contract
Pre-conditions:
@EB Pre 1: Door is opening and train is
moving.
Post-conditions:
@EB Post 1: Train speed is stationary.
Scenario
Triggers:
@OD Trig 1: Door is opening and speed sen-
sor detect train is moving.
Main Flow:
EB 1. Emergency brake is activated.
EB 2. Train speed reduced to stationary.
(a) Informal
Extension use case: EmergencyBraking (EB)
Roles: Brake.
Contract
Pre-conditions:
@EB Pre 1: door = Opening ∧ t speed = Moving
Post-conditions:
@EB Post 1: t speed = Stationary
Scenario
Triggers:
@EB Trig 1: door = Opening ∧ speed sensor =
Moving
Main Flow:
EB 1. brake := TRUE
EB 2. t speed := stationary
(b) Formal.
Figure 7.12: Informal and formal specification for extension use case EmergencyBraking.| |
7.3.2 Event-B
The Event-B model produced for OpenDoor has three machines: m0 OpenDoor Contract,
m1 OpenDoor Scenario, m1 OpenDoor Scenario; and two contexts: OpenDoor Static
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and OpenDoor Flow. The full details of these are given in Appendix B.2. The context
OpenDoor Static models the enumerated sets and constants defined by the agents that
are associated with the OpenDoor use case. The context OpenDoor Flow models the
type that is used to simulate the scenario. The state charts produced by ProB for this
Event-B model is seen in Appendix C.2.
m0 OpenDoor Contract
The contract of OpenDoor is introduced in this machine. The event OpenDoor models
the pre-condition (@OD Pre 1) and post-condition (@OD Post 1) as its guard and
action, respectively. The transformation of the post-condition to the action takes the
following form, where all occurrence of the variables door and t speed are primed.
door, t speed : | ( t speed’ = Stationary ∧ door’ = Open) ∨
( t speed’ = Moving ∧ door’ = Closed)
(action OD Post Act in event OpenDoor)
The invariant, labelled @OD Inv 1, is introduced as an invariant of the machine
as it contains the variable door. The main mathematical judgement made in this
abstract machine is to ensure that the action that may open the train door must
only do so when the train is stationary. The invariant preservation proof obligation
OpenDoor/OD Inv 1/INV is produced to ensure that this property is maintained by
the event OpenDoor.
(t speed′ = Stationary ∧ door′ = Open) ∨
(t speed′ = Moving ∧ door′ = Closed)
`
¬(t speed′ = Moving ∧ door′ = Open) (OpenDoor/OD Inv 1/INV)
This PO is automatically proved. It establishes that the use case to open the train
doors of the constraint imposed by the invariant of the use case. This abstract machine
for OpenDoor establishes what the use case achieves, without specifying how.
m1 OpenDoor Scenario
This machine models the scenario of OpenDoor and refines the abstract machine
m0 OpenDoor Contract. It introduces the variables and events associated with de-
tailing the scenario. The variables introduced in this machine are separated by the
encoding, as follows:
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Abstract variables The variables OD, door and t speed that were introduced for the
event OpenDoor in the abstract machine are treated as abstract variables in this
machine.
Concrete variables The variables request door, door m1, t speed m1 and OD flow
are introduced to model the scenario of MaintainH. The gluing invariants labelled
@OD Glue Variables and @OD Glue Flow, are introduced to relate the concrete
variables t speed m1, door m1 and OD flow to their corresponding abstract
variables t speed, door and OD, respectively.
Events are introduced that model the scenario of OpenDoor in this machine. The
invariants @OD Scenario Post and @OD Scenario Inv are introduced to ensure that
the events that model the scenario maintains the invariants and post-condition of
OpenDoor. In these invariants, the concrete variable door m1 (highlighted) replaces
all occurrences of its corresponding abstract variable door, as follows:
OD flow = OD Final⇒( t speed m1 = Stationary ∧ door m1 = Open)
∨ ( t speed m1 = Moving ∨ door m1 = Closed)
(OD Scenario Post)
¬( t speed m1 = Moving ∧ door m1 = Open) (OD Scenario Inv)
As the main flow has a simple branching (at step @OD 1) via the conditional
if, there are two paths that lead to the end of the use case. The step @OD 1 is
modelled by two events OD 1 If and OD 1 If False. The event OD 1 is enabled
when the execution reaches flowod = OD 1 and the condition of the step OD 1 is
true. The execution of this event goes through the event sequence OD 1 1, OD 1 2
and finally to the end of the use case, i.e. action OD flow := OD Final. On the other
hand, the event OD 1 If False leads directly to the end of the use case, i.e. action
OD flow := OD Final. The condition (predicate) specified for step @OD 1 is negated
(highlighted) and introduced as the guard for event OD 2 If False, as follows:
¬ (speed sensor = Stationary) (A guard of event OD 1 If False)
The invariants labelled @OD StepAssert 1 and @OD StepAssert 2, ensure certain
properties are maintained over certain steps. For example, the speed sensor readings
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remain the same over steps OD 1 1, OD 1 2 and OD 1 3.
OD flow ∈ {OD 1 1,OD 1 2,OD 1 3} ⇒t speed m1 = Stationary
(OD StepAssert 3)
The INV POs for invariant @OD Scenario Post on events OD 1 If False and
OD 1 3 are required to ensure that the door must only be opened when the train is sta-
tionary and aligned. However, the only information available for events @OD 1 If False
and @OD 1 3 are the readings from the speed sensor. For event OD 1 If False it
is known that the speed sensor have detected that the train is moving and the door
remains closed.
OD flow = OD 2
door m1 = Closed
¬(t speed m1 = Moving)
`
(t speed m1 = Stationary ∧ door m1 = Open) ∨
(t speed m1 = Moving ∧ door m1 = Closed)
(OD 1 If False/OD Scenario Post/INV)
The POs for invariant @OD Inv 1 on events OD 2 2 and OD 2 If False are
automatically discharged. The scenario of the accident case is introduced by steps
DT Trigger, DT 1 and DT 2. The event DT 2 is required to achieve the post-
condition of the use case as it leads to the end of the use case scenario. The action of
this final event opens the train door due to a fault. The extension use case is introduced
to prevent this accident scenario by introducing the two events EmergencyBraking and
EmergencyBraking FALSE between events DT 1 and DT 2.
The event EmergencyBraking models the pre-condition (@EB Pre 1) and post-
condition (@EB Post 1) of the extension use case as its guard and action, respec-
tively, based on the encoding for the extension use case. This machine is later refined
to introduce the scenario of @EmergencyBraking. The execution of this event achieves
the post-condition (@EB Post 1) that reduces the train speed to stationary via the
emergency brake. This allows the PO for event DT 2 to prove that the post-condition,
in which the action to open the train doors does not violate the safety constraint and
the train speed is stationary.
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m2 EmergencyBraking Scenario
This machine m2 EmergencyBraking Scenario refines m1 OpenDoor Scenario to in-
troduce the scenario of EmergencyBraking. The abstract event EmergencyBraking is
refined by the events that model the scenario of the extension use case. In this refine-
ment, the variable brake is introduced. The steps in the scenario of the extension use
case EB 1, EB 2 and EB 3 are introduced as events.
The invariant @EB Scenario Post ensures that the event @EB 3, which leads to
the end of the extension use case, achieves the post-condition where the train speed
is required to be stationary (@EL Post 1). This produces the invariant preservation
PO, EB 3/EB Scenario Post/INV. This PO is automatically discharged as the final
step ensures the train speed is stationary via the reading from the speed sensor.
7.4 Case Study UC3: Automated Teller Machine
An automated teller machine (ATM) is a banking subsystem that provides bank cus-
tomers with access to financial transactions in a public space without the need for a
cashier or bank teller. A customer may use the ATM for services such as to check
balance, cash withdrawal, depositing funds, etc. The ATM case study is a popular ex-
ample used to describe UML use cases. The case study used in this thesis is partially
based on the one found in [47]. A use case diagram for an ATM can be seen in Figure
7.13. In the use case diagram, the withdrawal service is taken into account via the use
case Withdraw. The use case is associated with the actors Customer and Bank that are
external to the system.
| |
Automated Teller Machine 
(ATM)
Withdraw
Bank Customer
BlockCard
<<extend>>
Figure 7.13: Use case diagram for the automated teller machine (ATM).| |
The withdrawal service is allowed to initiate when the customer card is inserted
into the ATM. It captures the functionality to dispense a sufficient withdrawal request
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from the customer. The customer is authenticated via a PIN (Personal Identification
Number) registered to the bank account of the customer. The customer is allowed to
enter the PIN incorrectly only two times. When the third attempt is incorrect, the
customer card is withheld and the customer account is blocked. The extension use case
BlockCard extends Withdraw to introduce this additional functionality.
The purpose of this case study is twofold: (1) is to use complex branching in the
scenario of the use case via alternate flows, and (2) to use an ordinary extension use
case opposed to ones used for mitigate and prevent accident cases. The use case model
for this case study is provided in Section 7.4.1 and the Event-B model generated for
the use case Withdraw is described in Section 7.4.2
7.4.1 Use Case Model
Agents
The actors and subject in the use case diagram Customer, Bank and ATM are introduced
as agents in the use case model, as seen in Figure 7.14. These agents are described as
follows:
| |
Agent: Bank
Sets
PIN
Constants
b AccountBalance :: b AccountBalance ≥ 0
b AccountPIN :: b AccountPIN ∈ PIN
Variables
b FailPINAttempt :: b FailPINAttempt ∈ 0..3
b AccountBlock :: b AccountBlock ∈ BOOL
Initialisation
b FailPINAttempt :: b FailPINAttempt := 0
b AccountBlock :: b AccountBlock := FALSE
Agent: Customer
Sets
CARD :: CARD = {Inserted,Returned,Withheld}
Variables
c Card :: c Card ∈ CARD
c PIN :: c PIN ∈ PIN
c WithdrawRequest :: c WithdrawRequest ∈ N
Initialisation
c Card :: c Card := Inserted
c PIN :: c PIN :∈ PIN
c WithdrawRequest :: c WithdrawRequest := 0
Agent: ATM
Sets
REQUEST :: REQUEST = {Request Card,
Request PIN,Request Amount)
Variables
atm Request :: atm Request ∈ REQUEST
atm Dispense :: atm Dispense ∈ N
Initialisation
atm Request :: atm Request := Request Card
atm Dispense :: atm Dispense := 0
Figure 7.14: Agents that play a role in the use case Withdraw.| |
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Bank This agent introduces the constants b AccountBalance and b AccountPIN that
denote a balance and PIN registered to the bank account of the customer. The
set PIN represents a collection of PINs where, b AccountPIN ∈ PIN, registers
one PIN to the account. The variable b FailPINAttempt denotes the number
of registered failed PIN attempts by the customer on the account with its value
ranging from 0 to 3. The variable b AccountBlock is of type BOOL, where TRUE
indicates the account is blocked, while FALSE indicate that it is not blocked.
Customer The customer defines the variables c PIN and c WithdrawRequest, which
denote the PIN and amount for withdrawal the customer may provide to the
ATM, respectively. The variable c Card is the card provided to the ATM. It
is of type CARD, which is an enumerated set where the card provided is either
Inserted, Returned or Withheld.
ATM The ATM agent introduces the variables atm Request and atm Dispense. Vari-
able atm Request is used to indicate the requests that the ATM can make to the
customer during the withdrawal service. This variable is of type REQUEST which
is an enumerated set of values Request Card, Request PIN, Request Withdrawal.
The atm Dispense variable is a numerical value that represents the amount of
money dispensed by the ATM during the withdrawal service.
Use Cases
The informal and formal specification for the use case Withdraw is provided in Figure
7.15. The contract specifies a pre-condition (@W Pre 1), which requires that the
customer to have inserted the card into the ATM for the withdrawal service. The
invariant (@W Inv 1) specifies an important constraint where the ATM must only
dispense an amount within the limit of the customer bank account balance, and if
the customer card is withheld, then no money must be dispensed. The post-condition
(@W Post 1) states that the customer card is returned and some amount of money
within the limit of the customer’s account balance is dispensed, or the card is withheld
and no money is dispensed.
The scenario for Withdraw specifies a main flow and an alternate flow. The main
flow specifies an sunny day scenario where the interaction between customer and the
ATM have no errors or exceptions. For example, at step W 2 and W 4, the customer
provides the correct PIN and requests a sufficient amount for withdrawal (within the
bank account balance). However, the alternate flow introduces an alternate-point at
step W 2, where the steps W A 1 and W A 2 are introduced. These steps capture
the interaction where the customer provides an incorrect PIN and the ATM informs
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Use case: Withdraw (W)
Contract
Pre-conditions:
@W Pre 1: Card has been inserted into ATM.
Post-conditions:
@W Post 1: ATM has returned customer card
and dispensed a sufficient withdrawal, or ATM
has withheld card and no money is dispensed.
Invaraints:
@W Inv 1: ATM must never dispense more
money than what is available in customer bank
account balance when card is returned.
Scenario
Triggers:
@W Trig 1: Card has been inserted into ATM.
Main flow :
〈〈extension-point: BlockCard〉〉
W 1. ATM request customer for PIN.
W 2. Customer provides ATM correct PIN.
W 3. ATM requests customer for withdrawal.
W 4. Customer requests sufficient withdrawal.
W 5. ATM returns card to customer.
W 6. ATM dispenses requested withdrawal.
Alternate flow :
Alternate-point: W 2; Rejoin-point: W 1
W A 1. Customer provides ATM incorrect PIN.
W A 2. ATM informs bank failed PIN attempt.
Extensions
Extension: BlockCard; Status: Ordinary
Extension-point: W 1; Rejoin-point: Final
(a) Informal
Use case: Withdraw (W)
Contract
Pre-conditions:
@W Pre 1: c Card = Inserted
Post-conditions:
@W Post 1: (c Card = Returned ∧
atm Dispense ∈ 0..b AccountBalance)∨ (c Card =
Withheld ∧ atm Dispense = 0)
Invaraints:
@W Inv 1: (atm Dispense = 0 ∧ c Card ∈
{Inserted,Withheld}) ∨ (atm Dispense ∈
0..b AccountBalance ∧ c Card = Returned))
Scenario
Triggers:
@W Trig 1: c Card = Inserted
Main flow :
〈〈extension-point: BlockCard〉〉
W 1. atm Request := Request PIN
W 2. c PIN := b AccountPIN
W 3. atm Request := Request Amount
W 4. c WithdrawRequest := 0..b AccountBalance
W 5. atm Card := Returned
W 6. atm Dispense := u WithdrawRequest
Alternate flow :
Alternate-point: W 2; Rejoin-point: W 1
W A 1. c PIN :∈ PIN \ {b AccountPIN}
W A 2. b FailPINAttempt := b FailPINAttempt + 1
Extensions
Extension: BlockCard; Status: Ordinary
Extension-point: W 1; Rejoin-point: Final
(b) Formal.
Figure 7.15: Informal and formal specification for use case Withdraw.| |
the bank of the failed PIN attempt. The alternate flow specifies a rejoin-point where
the flow returns to the main flow at step W 1, where the customer is requested to
enter the PIN again.
An extension is introduced in Withdraw that refers to the extension use case Block-
Card. The specification for this extension use case is seen in Figure 7.16. This extension
specifies an extension-point at step W 1 in Withdraw. That is, the behaviour of the
extension use case is introduced before this step. The extension use case may execute
when the number of failed PIN attempts exceed two, as denoted by the pre-condition
(@B Pre 1) of the extension use case. The post-condition (@B Post 1) requires the
ATM to have dispensed no money and the customer card withheld. The scenario of the
extension use case ensures that this post-condition is achieved and also interacts with
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| |
Extension Use Case: BlockCard (BC)
Contract
Pre-conditions:
@B Pre 1: More than two failed PIN
attempts.
Post-conditions:
@B Post 1: ATM has withheld cus-
tomer card and no money has been dis-
pensed.
Scenario
Triggers:
@B Trig 1: More than two failed PIN
attempts.
Main Flow :
B 1. Bank blocks customers account.
B 2. ATM withholds customer card.
B 3. ATM dispenses no money.
(a) Informal
Extension Use Case: BlockCard (BC)
Contract
Pre-conditions:
@B Pre 1: b FailPINAttempt > 2
Post-conditions:
@B Post 1: c Card = Withheld ∧
atm dispense = 0
Scenario
Triggers:
@B Trig 1: b FailPINAttempt > 2
Main Flow:
B 1. b AccountBlock := TRUE
B 2. c card := Withheld
B 3. atm dispense := 0
(b) Formal.
Figure 7.16: Informal and formal specification for extension use case BlockCard.| |
the bank to block the customer bank account B 1. The rejoin-point for this extension
is specified at Final, which indicates the execution returns to the ends of the use case
Withdraw.
7.4.2 Event-B
The Event-B model produced for Withdraw has three machines: m0 Withdraw Contract,
m1 Withdraw Scenario and m1 BlockCard Scenario. It also contains three contexts:
Withdraw Static, Withdraw Flow and BlockCard Flow, as seen in Appendix B.3. The
context Withdraw Static captures the enumerated sets and constants defined by the
agents that are associated with detailing Withdraw and BlockCard. The context Whit-
draw Flow models the type FLOW W for the scenario of Withdraw, and the context
BlockCard Flow models the type FLOW BC for the scenario of BlockCard. The state
charts produced by ProB for this Event-B model is seen in Appendix C.3.
m0 Withdraw Contract
This machine models the contract of the Withdraw use case. The event Withdraw is
enabled when the pre-condition @W Pre 1 of the card inserted in ATM is true. The
execution of this event achieves the post-condition @W Post 1, where the customer
card is returned and some money has been dispensed or the card has been withheld
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and no money has been dispensed. The transformation of the post-condition to the
action takes the following form, where all occurrence of the variables atm Dispense
and c Card, are primed (highlighted), as follows:
atm Dispense, c Card : |( c Card’ = Returned ∧
atm Dispense’ ∈ 0..b AccountBalance) ∨
( c Card’ = Withheld ∧ atm Dispense’ = 0)
(action W Post Act in event Withdraw)
The invariant, @W Inv 1, contains the variables atm Dispense and c Card and
therefore is introduced in the abstract machine. The main mathematical judgement
made in this abstract machine is to ensure that what is achieved by the post-condition
(@W Post 1) of the use case maintains the constraints of this invariant. The following
invariant preservation PO is produced for event Withdraw and is automatically proved:
(c Card’ = Returned ∧ atm Dispense’ ∈ 0..b AccountBalance) ∨
(c Card’ = Withheld ∧ atm Dispense’ = 0)
`
(atm Dispense’ = 0 ∧ c Card’ ∈ {Inserted,Withheld}) ∨
(atm Dispense’ ∈ 0..b AccountBalance ∧ c Card’ = Returned))
(Withdraw/W Inv 1/INV)
m1 Withdraw Scenario
This machine models the scenario of Withdraw, and refines the abstract machine. The
abstract event Withdraw is refined by the events that model its scenario. The abstract
and concrete variables identified by the encoding of the scenario for this machine, are
as follows:
Abstract variables The variables W, atm Dispense and c card that were introduced
as part of the abstract event Withdraw are treated as abstract variables in this
machine.
Concrete variables The variables atm Request, c PIN, b FailPINAttempt, c Card m1,
atm Dispense m1 and W flow, are the concrete variables associated with the
scenario. The gluing invariants @W Glue Variables and @W Glue Flow are in-
troduced to relate the concrete variables atm Dispense m1, c Card m1 and
W flow to their corresponding abstract variables atm Dispense, c Card, and
W respectively. The gluing invariants are introduced to relate the concrete and
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abstract variables.
The encoding introduces the main flow and alternate flow of Withdraw in this machine.
The extension use case BlockCard is introduced before the step W1 via the extension-
point. It is modelled by two events: BlockCard and BlockCard False. The following
invariants W Scenario Post and W Scenario Inv ensure that the post-condition and
invariant for the concrete variables c Card m1 and atm Dispense m1 (highlighted)
are achieved by the events that model the scenario:
W flow = W Final⇒( c Card m1 = Returned ∧
atm Dispense m1 ∈ 0..b AccountBalance) ∨
( c Card m1 = Withheld ∧ atm Dispense m1 = 0)
(W Scenario Post)
( atm Dispense m1 = 0 ∧ c Card m1 ∈ {Inserted,Withheld}) ∨
( atm Dispense m1 ∈ 0..b AccountBalance ∧ c Card m1 = Returned))
(W Scenario Inv)
The alternate flow introduces steps that captures the interaction where the cus-
tomer provides an incorrect PIN and the bank is informed of the failed PIN attempts.
BlockCard models the pre-condition (@BC Pre 1) and post-condition (@BC Post 1)
of the extension use case. This event BlockCard ensures that when the customer has
three failed PIN attempts, then the customer card is withheld and no money is dis-
pensed. This extension use case is executed and the flow returns to the end of the use
case, as specified by the rejoin-point, via action W flow := W Final. This results in
the following proof obligation for BlockCard in order to ensure the post-condition is
achieved by the scenario.
W flow = W 1,W flow’ = W Final
atm Dispense m1’ = 0 ∧ c Card m1’ = Withheld
`
(atm Dispense m1’ = 0 ∧ c Card m1’ ∈ {Inserted,Withheld}) ∨
(atm Dispense m1’ ∈ 0..b AccountBalance ∧ c Card m1’ = Returned))
(BlockCard/W Scenario Post/INV)
The insertion of the extension use case before step W 1 is important as it prevents
the number of failed PIN attempts from being incremented more than three times by
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the event W A 2 in the alternate flow. The following PO is produced to ensure the
type b FailPINAttempt ∈ 0..3 is maintained by event W A 2 that increments this
variable.
W flow = W A 2
b FailPINAttempt ∈ 0..3
`
b FailPINAttempt + 1 ∈ 0..3 (W A 2/atm FailPINAttempt Type/INV)
The invariant W StepAssert 1 was introduced manually to state that the execution
of the steps W 1, W 2 and W A 2 ensures that the number of failed PIN attempts
(highlighted) is not more than two. This invariant is maintained due to the insertion
of the extension use case which ensures that to reach step W 1 the number of failed
PIN attempts is not more than 2.
(BC = TRUE ∧W flow = W 1⇒ ¬(b FailPINAttempt > 2)) ∧
(W flow ∈ {W 2,W A 2} ⇒ ¬(b FailPINAttempt > 2)) (W StepAssert 1)
The PO W 6/W Scenario Post was generated for the final step (W 6) in the
main flow to ensure that it achieves the post-condition. This results in the following
PO which is automatically discharged.
W flow = W 6
c Card m1 = Returned
`
(c Card m1 = Returned ∧ c WithdrawRequest ∈ 0..b AccountBalance) ∨
(c Card m1 = Withheld ∧ c WithdrawRequest = 0)
(W 6/W Scenario Post/INV)
The invariant W StepAssert 2 was manually introduced to state that the steps
W 5 and W 6 ensure that the withdrawal requested by the customer was within the
limit of the account (highlighted), and the customer card was returned before the
money was dispensed.
(W flow ∈ {W 5,W 6} ⇒ c WithdrawRequest ∈ 0..b AccountBalance)∧
(W flow = W 6⇒ c Card m1 = Returned) (W StepAssert 2)
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This invariant helps to prove the W 6/W Scenario Post/INV PO which ensures
that the scenario achieves the post-condition for of Withdraw is satisfied.
m2 BlockCard Scenario
The machine m1 Withdraw Scenario is refined by machine m2 BlockCard Scenario
to introduce the scenario of the extension use case BlockCard. The abstract event
BlockCard is refined by the events that model the scenario of BlockCard. The encoding
of the scenario in this machine distinguishes the variables as follows:
Abstract variables The variables b FailPINAttempt, atm dispense m1, c card m1,
BC and W flow that are associated with the abstract event BlockCard and are
therefore treated as abstract variables in this machine.
Concrete variables The variables b BlockCard, b FailPINAttempt m2, c Card m2,
atm Dispense m2, and BC flow are introduced in this machine as the concrete
variables associated with the scenario. The gluing invariants @BC Glue Variables,
@BC Glue Flow are introduced to relate the concrete variables atm Dispense m2,
b FailPINAttempt m2, c Card m2, BC flow to their corresponding abstract
variables.
The invariants @BC Scenario Post ensures that the post-condition on the concrete
variables is maintained by the scenario of the extension use case. The extension use
case BlockCard inherits the invariants W Inv 1 of its parent use case Withdraw. The
invariant BC Scenario Inv ensures that this invariant of the use case is maintained by
the events that model the scenario of the extension use case.
BC flow = BC Final ∧W flow = W Final⇒
( c Card m2 = Withheld ∧ atm Dispense m2 = 0) (BC Scenario Post)
( atm Dispense m2 = 0 ∧ c Card m2 ∈ {Inserted,Withheld}) ∨
( atm Dispense m2 ∈ 0..b AccountBalance ∧ c Card m2 = Returned))
(BC Scenario Inv)
The post-condition of BlockCard requires that the customer card to be withheld
and no money to be dispensed, as the number of failed PIN attempts have exceeded
two. The scenario of the extension use case informs the bank to block the card at
step B 1, while steps B 2 and B 3 withhold the card and dispense no money. The
invariant @BC StepAssert 1 is introduced manually that ensures the state of the card
Chapter 7. Case Studies & Evaluation 148
being withheld is maintained till the final step B 3. The invariant @BC StepAssert 2
ensures no money has been dispensed by the ATM till step BC 2.
BC flow = BC 3⇒ c Card m2 = Withheld (BC StepAssert 1)
BC flow ∈ {BC Trigger,BC 1,BC 2} ⇒ atm Dispense m2 = 0
(BC StepAssert 2)
These invariants help the proof obligations associated with the invariant and post-
condition of the extension use case to be automatically proved. This machine estab-
lishes the consistency of the scenario of the extension use case with its contract.
7.5 Case Study UC4: Sense and Avoid
Sense and Avoid (SAA) is system designed to, where possible, give authority and
responsibility for aerial collision avoidance to the pilot of an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
(UAV). SAA is developed as part of the UK’s ASTRAEA1 (Autonomous Systems
Technology Related Airborne Evaluation & Assessment) project. While UAVs are not
currently permitted to routinely fly in non-segregated UK airspace, the ASTRAEA
project has helped to establish some of the concepts of operation of a UAV in non-
segregated airspace by developing and demonstrating a synthetic UAV in a controlled
environment. BAE Systems2 is one of the industry project partners of ASTRAEA.
One of their objectives has been to determine the requirements and design of a UAV
avionics system. SAA forms one of the requisite technologies as part of this project.
In SAA, the sense capability enables the UAV to sense (using visual, radar, co-
operative transponder or other advanced technologies) all other air traffic in the airspace
or ground based obstacles, and to determine whether any air traffic poses a potential
conflict. The avoid capability enables the UAV to take action to circumvent an im-
pending collision in situations where a loss of separation has occurred. This system
provides the UAV pilot with data to determine any course or altitude change to avoid
intruders or to autonomously manoeuvre the UAV to eliminate the conflict. In order
to provide this service for sense and avoid, the safe separation and collision avoidance
zones are established, as follows:
Safe Separation (SS) SS is a zone around the ownship aircraft is defined (normally
0.5nm Horizontal and 500ft Vertical radii). Safe Separation is maintained if all
1ASTRAEA Project Home - http://astraea.aero.
2BAE Systems3 http://www.baesystems.com/
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other air vehicles remain outside this defined zone along its future flight path.
The SAA system will detect if and when Safe Separation is predicted to be
compromised and then warn the UAV pilot who may then take action to remedy
the situation.
Collision Avoidance (CA) An emergency Collision Avoidance zone is defined around
the ownership aircraft (normally 500 ft Horizontal and 350ft Vertical radii). The
SAA system will ensure that this zone always remains free of all other air vehicles
along its flight path. Should other safety provisions fail and it is predicted that
the collision avoidance zone will be breached; the SAA system will autonomously
manoeuvre to maintain safety.
| |
Safe Separation
Zone
Collision Avoidance 
Zone
Ownship 
Aircraft
Intruder
Aircraft
Aircraft Operator
(Ground Control 
Station)
Figure 7.17: General description for Sense and Avoid.| |
Figure 7.17 provides an informal description of these zones for an ownship (UAV)
aircraft. The general requirements for the sense and avoid system are as follows:
• Determination of the risk of loss of safe separation with other airborne objects.
• Calculate a plan as avoidance manoeuvre, if necessary, capable of ensuring breach
of safe separation is avoided.
• Advice on both risk and avoidance manoeuvres to the decision making authority
(aircraft operator) for acceptance or rejection, depending on the urgency of the
risk.
• Autonomous collision avoidance action in the absence of timely intervention by
the decision making authority, if necessary.
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Figure 7.18, provides the use case diagram for sense and avoid. The use case diagram
introduces the use case SafeSeparation, accident case CollisionWithIntruderAircraft, and
extension use case CollisionAvoidance. This case study of Sense and Avoid is simplified,
and only take into account the interaction between the actors Intruder Aircraft, Ownship
Aircraft, Aircraft Operator and the (subject) Sense and Avoid. Interaction with external
entities, such as the Air Traffic Controller (ATC), are not taken into account to reduce
the complexity of this case study. The intent of those use cases are as follows:
| |
Sense and Avoid (SAA)
SafeSeparationIntruder 
Aircraft
Aircraft 
Operator
Ownship
Aircraft
CollisionWith
IntruderAircraft
<<deviate>>
Collision
Avoidance
<<extend>>
<<prevent>>
Figure 7.18: Use case diagram for the Sense and Avoid.| |
SafeSeparation The intent of this use case is to provide service to maintain the safe
separation (SS) for an ownship aircraft in the event of an intruder aircraft is
detected. The use case is associated with the actors, Ownship Aircraft, Intruder
Aircraft, and Aircraft Operator, to achieve this functionality.
CollisionWithIntruderAircraft This accident case introduces a deviation from the
functionality of the SafeSeparation use case, where undesired behaviour in the
failure to maintain safe separation is provided. Allowing this accident case to
complete results in the loss of separation between the intruder and ownship air-
craft. There are no new actors introduced by the accident case.
CollisionAvoidance This extension use case is introduced as a means to provide an
emergency service of collision avoidance (CA) in the event of failure in the func-
tionality to provide safe separation. This extension use case extends SafeSepa-
ration, where any occurrence of its deviating accident case, CollisionWithIntrud-
erAircraft, is prevented.
These actors and use cases from the use case diagram, as seen in Figure 7.18, are
further detailed in the use case model.
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7.5.1 Use Case Model
Agents
The actors and subject in the use case diagram are: Intruder Aircraft, Ownship Aircraft,
Aircraft Operator and Sense and Avoid (subject). These can be as seen in Figure 7.18, are
introduced as agents in the use case model (Figure 7.19). These agents are described
as follows:
Intruder Aircraft This can be regarded as a provider of information about external
non-cooperative airborne entities to the SAA. The agent introduces the variable
intruder of type BOOL. When this variable has the value TRUE, it indicates
that an intruder aircraft has been detected.
Sense and Avoid This is the system under consideration. It provides a risk and a plan
for forecast of loss of separation or forecast collision with an intruder aircraft.
This agent provides the variables ss risk and ca risk, of type RISK. The value
Significant for either of these variables, indicates that the SAA has determined
the risk to be significant for the zone they represent. The variables ss plan and
ca plan are of type BOOL, where TRUE indicates that the SAA has provided
either a safe separation or collision avoidance plan to the aircraft operator.
Aircraft Operator This agent can be regarded as the user of the SAA. Its role is
to receive and send command control data. The agent provides the variables
ss response and ca response, which are of type RESPONSE. The values of
these variables indicate the communication between the aircraft operator and
the SAA. The aircraft operator may accept, reject or remains idle with respect
to the safe separation or collision avoidance plan being provided by the SAA.
Ownship Aircraft This agent can be regarded as the vehicle that hosts the SAA sys-
tem. It introduces the variable separation of type BOOL. The value TRUE
for a variable denotes that the separation of the ownship aircraft is maintained,
and FALSE denotes that the separation is lost. The variables ss breach and
ca breach are of type BOOL. If they are TRUE then the safe separation and
collision avoidance zones are breached. The variable mission denotes the current
plan being performed by the ownship aircraft. This is of type PLAN. This set is
enumerated with elements: On Route, SS Plan and CA Plan.
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| |
Actor: Ownship Aircraft
Sets
PLAN :: PLAN = {On Route, SS P lan,CA Plan}
Variables
separation :: separation ∈ BOOL
ss breach :: ss breach ∈ BOOL
ca breach :: ca breach ∈ BOOL
mission :: mission ∈ PLAN
Initialisation
separation :: separation := TRUE
ss breach :: ss breach := FALSE
ca breach :: ca breach := FALSE
mission :: mission := On Route
Actor: Intruder Aircraft
Variables
intruder :: intruder ∈ BOOL
Initialisation
intruder :: intruder := TRUE
Actor: Aircraft Operator
Sets
RESPONSE :: RESPONSE = {Accept, Reject, Idle}
Variables
ss response :: ss response ∈ RESPONSE
ca response :: ca response ∈ RESPONSE
Initialisation
ss response :: ss response := Idle
ca response :: ca response := Idle
Actor: Sense and Avoid
Sets
RISK :: RISK = {Significant, Insignificant}
Variables
ss risk :: ss risk ∈ RISK
ss plan :: ss plan ∈ BOOL
ca risk :: ca risk ∈ RISK
ca plan :: ca plan ∈ BOOL
Initialisation
ss risk :: ss risk := Insignificant
ss plan :: ss plan := FALSE
ca risk :: ca risk := Insignificant
ca plan :: ca plan := FALSE
Figure 7.19: Actors that play a role in use case Withdraw.| |
Use Cases
The use case specification for SafeSeparation is provided in Figure 7.20. The func-
tionality of SafeSeparation is performed when an intruder aircraft has been detected
(@SS Pre 1). The execution of this use case must ensure that the intruder aircraft
is no longer a threat and the separation between the ownship and intruder aircraft
is maintained (@SS Post 1). The invariants in the contract explicitly state a con-
straint where separation must always be provided (@SS Inv 1). It also states the
relationships in the breach of the safe separation and collision avoidance zones with
respect to the overall separation provided, by invariants @SS Inv 2, @SS Inv 3 and
@SS Inv 4.
The scenario of SafeSeparation provides a main flow where the expected interaction
to maintain safe separation is provided. There can be alternate flows to this main flow,
but these are excluded to maintain the complexity of this case study. The main flow
introduces a scenario where the risk from the intruder aircraft to breach safe separation
zone is determined to be significant (step SS 1).This results in a safe separation plan
being produced by the SAA, which is provided to the aircraft operator (step SS 2).
The aircraft operator accepts the plan (step SS 3) as the main flow describes an ideal
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Use case: SafeSeparation (SS)
Contract
Pre-conditions:
@SS Pre 1: Threat from intruder aircraft detected.
Post-conditions:
@SS Post 1: No threat from intruder aircraft and
separation between ownship and intruder aircraft is
maintained.
Invariants:
@SS Inv 1: Separation must always be provided.
@SS Inv 2: Separation is provided when SS zone
and CA zone are not breached, or if CA zone is not
breached.
@SS Inv 3: Separation lost when CA zone is breached.
@SS Inv 4: CA zone cannot be breached without
breach of SS zone.
Scenario
Triggers:
@S Trig 1: Threat from intruder aircraft detected.
Main Flow :
SS 1. SAA determines risk to SS is significant.
SS 2. SAA generates plan to maintain SS.
SS 3. Aircraft operator accepts SS plan.
SS 4. Ownship performs SS plan as manoeuvre.
SS 5. Threat from intruder aircraft is mitigated.
Deviation
Accident case: CollisionWithIntruderAircraft
Deviation-point: SS 2
Extension
Extension use case: CollisionAvoidance
Status: Prevent;
Extension-point: F 2; Rejoin-point: Final
(a) Informal
Use case: SafeSeparation (SS)
Contract
Pre-conditions:
@SS Pre 1: intruder = TRUE
Post-conditions:
@SS Post 1: intruder = FALSE ∧ separation =
TRUE
Invariants:
@SS Inv 1: separation = TRUE
@SS Inv 2: separation = TRUE ⇔
(ss breach = FALSE ∧ ca breach = FALSE) ∨
(ss breach = TRUE ∧ ca breach = FALSE)
@SS Inv 3: separation = FALSE ⇔
ca breach = TRUE
@SS Inv 4: ¬(ca breach = TRUE ∧
ss breach = FALSE)
Scenario
Triggers:
@SS Trig 1: intruder = TRUE
Main Flow
SS 1. ss risk := Significant
SS 2. ss plan := TRUE
SS 3. ss response := Accept
SS 4. mission := SS Plan
SS 5. intruder := FALSE
Deviation
Accident case: CollisionWithIntruderAircraft
Deviation-point: SS 2
Extension
Extension use case: CollisionAvoidance
Status: Prevent
Extension-point: F 2; Rejoin-point: Final
(b) Formal.
Figure 7.20: Specification for use case SafeSeparation.| |
scenario, and the ownship aircraft performs the safe separation plan (step SS 4) to
maintain the safe separation zone. This subsequently removes the threat from intruder
aircraft (step SS 5).
The accident case CollisionWithIntruderAircraft is introduced as a deviation of Safe-
Separation at step SS 1. The scenario of the accident case may only trigger (@F Trig 1)
when the risk to breach the safe separation zone is significant. It introduces an accident
scenario where the SAA fails to produce a safe separation plan (step F 1), and the
ownship aircraft remains on route (step F 2). This results in the safe separation zone
being determined by SAA to be breached (step F 3), and subsequently the breach of
the collision avoidance zone (step F 5). Allowing the accident scenario to complete
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Accident case: CollisionWithIntruderAircraft (F)
Scenario
Triggers:
@F Trig 1: Risk to breach of SS is significant.
Main Flow :
F 1. SAA fails to generate SS plan.
F 2. Ownship aircraft remains on route.
F 3. Breach of safe separation zone.
〈〈extension-point: CollisionAvoidance〉〉
F 4. Breach of collision avoidance zone.
(a) Informal
Accident case: CollisionWithIntruderAircraft (F)
Scenario
Triggers:
@F Trig 1: ss risk = TRUE
Main Flow :
F 1. ss plan := FALSE
F 2. mission := On Route
F 3. ss breach := TRUE
〈〈extension-point: CollisionAvoidance〉〉
F 4. ca breach := TRUE
(b) Formal.
Figure 7.21: Informal and formal specification for accident case CollisionWithIntruderAir-
craft.| |
will result in the loss of separation between the ownship and intruder aircraft.
An extension is provided to the SafeSeparation use case, where any occurrence of
the accident case CollisionWithIntruderAircraft is prevented by the extension use case
CollisionAvoidance. This extension use case is introduced before the step F 4 via
the extension-point. The functionality of CollisionAvoidance is performed given the
breach of safe separation zone (@CA Pre 1) and the ownship aircraft remains on
route (@CA Pre 2). The execution of CollisionAvoidance ensures that the threat from
intruder aircraft is averted (@CA Post 1) and the collision avoidance zone is not
breached (@CA Post 2). The functionality of collision avoidance may result in the
ownship aircraft either performing a collision avoidance plan or remaining on route
(@CA Post 3). The extension use case specifies a rejoin-point that returns the exe-
cution to the end of the SafeSeparation use case. The extension use case is introduced
to prevent the final step of the accident scenario from completing execution.
7.5.2 Event-B
The Event-B model produced for SafeSeparation is provided in Appendix B.4. This
takes into account the deviation to the accident case CollisionWithIntruderAircraft, and
extension from the extension use case CollisionAvoidance. The context SafeSepara-
tion Static models all the sets and constants associated with the SafeSeparation (this
includes the accident case and extension use case). The context SafeSeparation Flow
and CollisionAvoidance Flow model the type for the scenario of SafeSeparation and
CollisionAvoidance, respectively. The state charts produced by ProB for this Event-B
model is seen in Appendix C.4.
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Extension use case: CollisionAvoidance (CA)
Contract
Pre-conditions:
@CA Pre 1: Failure to maintain safe separation
and ownship aircraft remains on route.
Post-conditions:
@CA Post 1: No threat from intruder aircraft.
@CA Post 2: CA zone is not breached.
@CA Post 3: Ownship aircraft remains on
route or performs collision avoidance plan.
Scenario
Triggers:
@CA Trig 1: Failure to maintain safe separation.
Main Flow:
CA 1. SAA determines risk to CA is significant.
CA 2. SAA generates plan to maintain CA.
CA 3. Aircraft operator accepts CA plan.
CA 4. Ownship aircraft performs CA plan.
CA 5. No threat from intruder aircraft.
(a) Informal
Extension use case: CollisionAvoidance (CA)
Contract
Pre-conditions:
@CA Pre 1: ss breach = TRUE
@CA Pre 2: mission = On Route
Post-conditions:
@CA Post 1: intruder = FALSE
@CA Post 2: ca breach = FALSE
@CA Post 3: mission ∈ {On Route, CA Plan}
Scenario
Triggers:
@CA Trig 1: ss breach = TRUE
Main Flow:
CA 1. ca risk := Significant
CA 2. ca plan := TRUE
CA 3. ca response := Accept
CA 4. mission := CA Plan
CA 5. intruder := FALSE
(b) Formal.
Figure 7.22: Specification for extension use case CollisionAvoidance.| |
m0 SafeSeparation Contract
In this machine, only the variables intruder and separation are introduced as they occur
in the pre-condition (@SS Pre 1) and post-condition (@SS Post 1) of SafeSeparation.
An event SafeSeparation models the pre-condition and post-condition as its guard and
action respectively. The event is enabled when the intruder aircraft is detected, and
its execution results in the threat from an intruder aircraft to be averted and the
separation to be maintained. The post-condition @SS Post 1, which is a predicate, is
transformed to the action, where all occurrence of the variables intruder and separation
are primed (highlighted) on the RHS of the : | operator, as follows :
intruder, separation : | intruder’ = FALSE ∧ separation’ = TRUE
(action SS Post Act in event SafeSeparation)
The invariant labelled @SS Inv 1, is introduced in this machine. It establishes a
constraint where the separation must always be provided. The proof obligation pro-
duced to ensure that the SafeSeparation event maintains this invariant is automatically
proved as the post-condition @SS Post 1 ensures the separation is provided. The
invariants @SS Inv 2 and @SS Inv 3 are not introduced in this machine as they con-
tain variables that do not occur in the pre-conditions and post-conditions of the use
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case, i.e. ss breach and ca breach. These variables and invariants are later introduced
in later refinement.
m1 SafeSeparation Scenario
The machine m0 SafeSeparation Contract is refined by by this machine to introduce
the scenario. The accident scenario of CollisionWithIntruderAircraft and the contract of
CollisionAvoidance are taken into account via the deviation and extension relationships.
The variables in this machine are treated as abstract and concrete variables as follows:
Abstract variables The variables SS, separation and intruder that are associated with
modelling the abstract event SafeSeparation are treated as the abstract variables.
Concrete variables The variables ss risk, ss plan, mission, ss response, ss breach,
ca breach, intruder m1 and SS flow are introduced as concrete variables in this
machine. The gluing invariants @SS Glue Variables and @SS Glue Flow are
used to relate concrete variable intruder m1 and SS Flow to their correspond-
ing abstract variable intruder and SS, respectively.
The invariants @SS Scenario Inv and SS Scenario Post are introduced to ensure
that the post-condition and invariants of the use case Separation are satisfied by the
scenario. The invariant @SS Inv 2 and @SS Inv 3, which were not introduced in
the abstract machine, are introduced as part of the invariant SS Scenario Inv. The
invariant @SS Scenario Inv relate the abstract variable separation to the concrete
variables ss breach and ca breach.
SS flow = SS Final⇒ intruder m1 = FALSE ∧ separation = TRUE
(SS Scenario Post)
The events SS 5 and F 4 (final steps) that lead to the end of the use case are re-
quired to ensure that the post-condition is achieved. The SS 5/SS Scenario Post/INV
PO for event SS 5 is automatically proved, as the final step of the main flow ensure
there is no threat from the intruder via its action and, that there is no breach of safe
separation or collision avoidance zones in the main flow.
(separation = TRUE) ∧
(separation = TRUE ⇔ (ss breach = FALSE ∧ ca breach = FALSE)
∨ (ss breach = TRUE ∧ ca breach = FALSE)) ∧
(separation = FALSE ⇔ ca zone = FALSE) ∧
¬(ca breach = TRUE ∧ ss breach = FALSE) (SS Scenario Inv)
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On the other hand, event F 4 from the accident, does not achieve the post-condition
or maintain the invariant, as its action introduces a breach of safe separation and the
collision avoidance zones. In order to prevent the accident scenario from completing
the extension use case CollisionAvoidance was introduced before the step F 4 via an
extension-point. This extension use case is modelled by two events: CollisionAvoidance
and CollisionAvoidance False. The event CollisionAvoidance models the pre-conditions
(@CA Pre 1 and @CA Pre 2) and post-conditions (@CA Post 1 , @CA Post 2 and
@CA Post 3) of the extension use case as its guards and actions, respectively. As the
extension use case is of type prevent, the invariant CA Prevent is introduced. It negates
the guards of the event CollisionAvoidance False, and the guards of the events from the
extension-point to the end of the accident scenario, i.e. in this case step F 4.
¬(CA = FALSE ∧ SS flow = F 3 ∧ ¬(ss breach = TRUE) ∧
¬(mission = On Route)) ∧ ¬(SS flow = F 3 ∧ CA = TRUE) (CA Prevent)
This invariant introduces a constraint where the CollisionAvoidance extension use
case always executes during the scenario of the accident case, and ensures that the final
step of the accident case is not allowed to execute. This required the extension use case
to be inserted at the correct step that enables it to capture the failure conditions. The
execution of the extension use case returns the flow back to the main flow of the use case
it extends, in this case at the end of SafeSeparation (SS Flow := SS Final) as the
rejoin point. The post-condition of the extension use case ensures that the threat from
the intruder no longer exists and the collision avoidance zone is maintained. The proof
obligations generated to ensure that the events SS 5 and CollisionAvoidance satisfy the
invariant @SS Scenario Inv and @SS Scenario Post are automatically proved. This
machine establishes the scenario of SafeSeparataion is consistent with the contract.
m2 CollisionAvoidance Scenario
The machine m1 SafeSeparation Scenario is refined by this machine to introduce the
scenario of the extension use case, CollisionAvoidance. The abstract event Collision-
Avoidance is refined by the events that model the scenario of the extension use case.
The variables in this machine are distinguished into:
Abstract variables The variables ca breach, mission, SS Flow, CA and intruder m1
that are associated with the abstract event CollisionAvoidance are treated as the
abstract variables.
Concrete variables The variables ca risk, ca plan, ca response, CA Flow , mission m2,
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ca breach m2 and intruder m2, which are associated with the scenario, are in-
troduced as concrete variables in this machine. Invariants @CA Glue Variables
and @CA Glue Flow are introduced to relate the concrete variable ca breach m2,
intruder m2, mission m2 and CA Flow with their corresponding to the ab-
stract variables.
The invariants @CA Scenario Inv and @CA Scenario Post are introduced to en-
sure that the post-condition and invariants of the extension use case are satisfied by the
events that model the scenario of CollisionAvoidance. The invariant @CA Scenario Inv
takes into account the invariants @SS Inv 1, @SS Inv 2 and @SS Inv 3 of the parent
use case SafeSeparation. The invariant replaces all occurrence of the abstract variable
ca breach with the concrete variables ca breach m2 (highlighted):
CA flow = CA Final⇒ intruder m2 = FALSE ∧ ca breach m2 = FALSE∧
mission m2 ∈ {On Route, CA Plan}
(CA Scenario Post)
(separation = TRUE) ∧
(separation = TRUE⇔ (ss breach m2 = FALSE ∧ ca breach m2 = FALSE)
∨ (ss breach m2 = TRUE ∧ ca breach m2 = FALSE)) ∧
(separation = FALSE⇔ ca zone m2 = FALSE) ∧
¬(ca breach m2 = TRUE ∧ ss breach m2 = FALSE) (CA Scenario Inv)
These invariants impose constraints on the events that model the scenario of the
extension use case. The invariant CA Scenario Post places a constraint on the final
step CA 5 that requires the post-condition to be achieved by the execution of this
event. The action of event CA 5 ensures that the intruder aircraft is no longer a
threat. It is necessary to show that the mission performed by the ownship aircraft is a
collision avoidance plan. The invariant CA StepAssert 1 is introduced to ensure that
the step CA 4 provides the mission with the plan for collision avoidance.
CA flow = CA 5⇒ mission m2 = CA Plan (CA StepAssert 1)
This approach of formalising UML use cases was discussed with engineers working
within the Intelligence Systems team at BAE Systems, Warton. These engineers rou-
tinely used UML use cases to define and analyse system behaviour during the early
stages in their systems development process. They found the dual representation of
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the use case specification with informal and formal notation helped bring precision to
the use cases while maintaining ease of communication. The generation of an Event-B
model from a formally specified use case helped provide formal assurance in the be-
haviour specified by the use cases via proof obligations. However, it was difficult for
practitioners, who were not familiar with the Event-B modelling environment, to man-
ually relate failed proof obligations back to the use case specification. Further work
was required to automatically help relate failed or undischarged proof obligations at
the Event-B level back to the level of the use case specification. This is addressed as
part of the future work in Section . Finally, the use of model checking tool Pro-B on
the generated Event-B models helped animate the execution of steps in the use case
scenario, which provided a better understanding of the use cases. Also, the production
of statecharts from the Pro-B tool helped visualise the execution of the different paths
in a scenario of use case.
7.6 Summary & Discussion
In this chapter four case studies for UC-B have been introduced. The case studies have
covered the different use case types, use case, extension use case and accident case, as
well as simple and complex branching within the scenario of the use case. Each case
study has been examined with respect the verification provided by the proof obligations
generated at the level of the Event-B model. The evaluation describe properties of the
requirements that are checked by the formal analysis. In this evaluation some auxiliary
invariants were required to be manually introduced to prove some of the generated proof
obligations.
The industrial project partnership provided the opportunity to discuss the approach
of formalising UML use cases with systems engineers working within the Intelligence
Systems team at BAE Systems, Warton. They found the enhancement of the informal
use case specification with the formal counterpart provided precision while detailing
the use cases. This helped tackle issues with ambiguity while detailing the use cases.
The automatic generation of Event-B models from formally specified use cases helped
provide formal assurance in the behaviour specified in the use cases. However, it was dif-
ficult for practitioners who were not familiar with the Event-B modelling environment
to manually relate failed proof obligations back to the use case specification. Further
work was required to automatically relate failed proof obligations at the Event-B level
back to the level of the use case specification. This is addressed as part of the future
work in Chapter 8.
Chapter8
Future Work & Conclusion
8.1 Contributions revisited
Here we elaborate upon the contributions of the thesis that were outlined in Chapter
1:
• Accident case: UML use cases have been extended with the notion of accident
case in Chapter 3. This extension enables undesired behaviour identified from
the safety analysis to be considered at an early stage in the requirements analysis
process. The deviate relationship is provided that allows an accident case to be
introduced as a deviation from the desired behaviour of a use case. The accident
case specifies an accident scenario. The prevent relationship is introduced. It
provides a mechanism to use an extension use case to introduce additional be-
haviour that may prevent an accident scenario from completing. This extension
of UML use cases with accident case provides a platform for systems and safety
engineers to communicate appropriate design recommendations at an early stage
of the systems development process.
• Use case model: In Chapter 4, a use case model was introduced that allows the
textual specification of use cases to be specified formally using Event-B’s math-
ematical language. The use case model provides a specifications for the actor,
subject and use cases. The specification aims to reduce the gap between informal
and formal methods by allowing a dual representation of requirements with both
informal and formal notation. Writing the specification in a precise language
removes ambiguity, while maintaining a corresponding informal description pro-
vides ease of communication. The abstract syntax for the use cases in the use
case model is provided.
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• Encoding use cases in Event-B: Given a formally specified use case, Chapter
5 has provided an encoding of the use case as an Event-B model. The generic
structure of a use cases can be viewed in terms of various levels of abstraction.
This has been used to dictate the structure of refinement in the corresponding
Event-B model. The encoding has identified gluing invariants that relate the
abstract and concrete states in the Event-B model. Providing sufficient but
provable gluing invariants can be a significant task. The encoding also takes into
account the use case types, accident case and extension use case. The translation
rules for encoding the use case model to the Event-B model has been provided.
• Tool development: The Rodin platform has been extended to support the
authoring and management of a use case model in Chapter 6. The tool, UC-
B, enables the specifications to be detailed using the mathematical language
of Event-B as well as corresponding informal descriptions in natural language.
This dual representation of the specification enables the user to better relate
informal and formal artefacts. The translation rules for encoding the use case in
an Event-B model, is implemented by the tool. This supports the generation of
an Event-B model given a formally specified use case. The generated Event-B
model is subjected to Rodin’s automatic provers and syntax checkers to ensure
the model produced is correct. The aim of this implementation is to reduce the
formal modelling effort while allowing the use case modeller to benefit from the
use of formal methods during requirements analysis.
• Case studies: Evidence of formally specified use cases and their encoding in
Event-B has been provided through four case studies in Chapter 7. The case
studies have covered: the different types of use cases (use case, extension use
case and accident case); simple (conditional) and complex branching (alternate
flow) in the scenario; and the deviate and prevent relationship. The use case
model of these case studies have been provided that describe how the concepts of
use cases are specified formally. Their verification provided by proof obligations
generated in the Event-B model describe if the behaviour specified by the use
case is consistent, i.e. that the scenario satisfies the contract.
8.2 Limitations
The following describe the limitations in the approach proposed in this thesis:
• Include use case: In UML use cases, the use case type includes [19] is used to
modularise common parts of behaviours of two or more use cases. The use case
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model provided in this thesis (Chapter 4) does not treat this type of use case as
it was not essential for the case studies being examined. However, in order to
make the approach more accessible to practitioners, all use case types must be
considered.
• Auxiliary invariants: The generated Event-B model often require additional
auxiliary invariants to ensure that certain properties are maintained over the steps
in the scenario of a use case. These invariants are not crucial to the requirements
specification. At this stage, these auxiliary invariants are manually inserted in
the Event-B model in order to help prove some of the proofs obligations. The
aim of UC-B is to allow the user to be concerned only with the artefacts in the
use case specification and not the Event-B model.
• Traceability: A generated Event-B model from a source use case produces many
proof obligations that provide an indication towards defects in the use case spec-
ification. At this stage, the user is required to manually relate failed proof obli-
gations back to the use case specification. The UC-B tool automatically provides
labels at the use case level, and these are used used to label the generated Event-B
model elements.
• Redundant variables: The encoding of a formal use case in Event-B often
results in a variable at the use case level having more than one corresponding
variables at the Event-B level. This is because the encoding does not replace all
abstract variables with concrete variables in the Event-B model. The abstract
variables remain along side the concrete variables, and gluing invariants used to
relate their states. However, this results in the user having to cope with more
variables in the Event-B model.
8.3 Future Work
The work described in the thesis has opened several opportunities for future.
Include Use Case
As part of the future work, the approach will be extended to take into account the
includes relationship in UML use cases. This introduced the includes use case in the
formal use case model and provide its encoding in Event-B. The relation between
the include use case and accident case is also required to be examined. Taking into
account the includes use case would provide the use case modeller with more flexibility
in documenting and analysing the requirements.
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Auxiliary Invariants
The generated Event-B models require auxiliary invariants to help prove some proof
obligations. These invariants often specify constraints over a series of steps in the
scenario of the use case. At this stage, they are introduced manually by the user once
the Event-B model has been generated. This can be time consuming and difficult for
users who are primarily interested identifying defects in the requirements. As part of
the future work, it would be possible for these auxiliary invariants to be specified at
the use case level. These auxiliary invariants could be included as an assertion for each
step. These assertions could the be generated in the Event-B model to state properties
that are required to be true over that step in the execution of the use case scenario.
Traceability
In Chapter 5, proof obligations at the Event-B level have been identified and the
meaning of their failure to the use case specification have been described. This work
can be further extended by tool support to relate the failed proof obligation to the
use case specification. Mechanising the traceability between proofs generated in the
Event-B model to the parent use case could help to quickly identify defects in the
specification of the use case. At this stage, the user is required to manually related
failed proofs between the generated Event-B model and use case specification.
Conformance Testing with Formal Use Cases
Use cases can be used to guide test case generation [84]. Our formalisation of use
cases potentially enables a systematic method to identify scenarios that could be used
for conformance testing. In comparison to classical test engineering, a much higher
degree of automation could be achieved by this work. This future work may provide
scenarios for black-box conformance testing from formally specified use cases. The test
case generation could computes all paths to states that can be reached. A path may
be terminated when the end of the use case is visited. The test generation based on
use cases would remain an interactive process, as a human test engineer would still be
required to assign priorities to test sequences.
A Methodology for Accident Case
As discussed in Chapter 1, the requirements and safety analysis process are often per-
formed in an ad-hoc manner [73]. While the safety process remains entirely separate
from the requirements definition process, the problem associated with incompleteness
in requirements with regards to safety is unlikely to be resolved. The extension to
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UML use cases with the accident case allow for the safety-related artefacts accidents,
hazards and accident scenarios from the safety analysis to be taken into account into
the requirements analysis process. This enables the artefacts that originated from the
safety analysis to be captured and treated in a manner consistent with other require-
ments applicable at the development phase, as recommended in ARP4754 [10], which
provides guidelines for development of civil aircraft and systems.
A future work for the accident case is to develop and evaluate a methodology that
aims to bridge the requirements and safety analysis process, using this extension of
the accident case. An initial development for this methodology is provided in Figure
8.1. The methodology aims to state: ‘what’ steps to take, ‘how’ these steps are to
be performed and most importantly the reasons ‘why’ the methodology follow those
steps in the suggested order. Defining such a methodology is aimed at alleviating some
of the current discontinuities that exist between the requirements and safety process,
and improve the confidence in the systematic identification of safety-related functional
requirements.
| |
Safety AnalysisRequirements Analysis
Start
Introduce Accident Case as 
deviation to Use Cases
Does 
the use case 
prevent  accident 
case?
Stop
No
Identify Accidents 
and associated Hazards
Identify accident scenarios 
for Hazards.
[Use Cases]
Yes
Identify Use Cases and 
Scenarios
[Accidents]
[Accident Scenarios]
Document for Safety 
Assessment
Can 
use case be 
updated to control 
accident?
Yes
No
Figure 8.1: Future work: A methodology to bridge requriements and safety analysis process
using accident case.| |
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UML Profile
A profile [42] in the UML provides a generic extension mechanism for customizing
UML models for particular domains and platforms. Extension mechanisms allow refin-
ing standard semantics in strictly additive manner, preventing them from contradicting
standard semantics. The future work for UC-B will aim towards create a profile for
UML use cases to make the extension with accident cases conform to the UML stan-
dard.
Tool Development
The future work aims to investigate the use of the approach in a live development
project in order to examine how the tool can take into account the evolution of re-
quirements. In addition, the integration of UC-B with other established UML tools
such as Papyrus [68] (eclipse-based UML modelling tool) can help better relate the use
case specification from UC-B to other UML diagrams such as sequence diagrams and
activity diagrams. The integration of UC-B with Papyrus will aim to keep the UML
model (from Papyrus) synchronised with UC-B use case specifications, i.e. creating a
UML use case diagram (use cases, actors and subject) in Papyrus would automatically
generate the corresponding elements in UC-B. In Papyrus, only the use case diagram
would be shown while the content of the use case specification could be managed and
enriched with UC-B.
8.4 Concluding Remarks
We have developed an approach that helps to bridge the gap between informal use cases
and formal modelling. Moreover, our approach has extended UML use cases with the
notion of accident cases with aim of defining system behaviour with context to safety.
We believe that this work makes a contribution to a broader goal of making formal
methods more accessible to industry. The work presented in this thesis provides a step
as part of an on-going effort to help in the industrial adoption of formal methods and
of a more specific effort to consider safety concerns.
AppendixA
Syntax of Event-B Mathematical Language
This appendix present the syntax of predicates and of expressions used in the mathe-
matical language of Event-B [79].
A.1 Predicate Language
The grammar used for predicates is defined as follows:
〈predicate〉 ::= { 〈quantifier〉 } 〈unquantified-predicate〉
〈quantifier〉 ::= ‘∀’ 〈ident-list〉 ‘·’
| ‘∃’ 〈ident-list〉 ‘·’
〈ident-list〉 ::= 〈ident〉 { ‘,’ 〈ident〉 }
〈unquantified-predicate〉 ::= 〈simple-predicate〉 [ ‘⇒’ 〈simple-predicate〉 ]
| 〈simple-predicate〉 [ ‘⇔’ 〈simple-predicate〉 ]
〈simple-predicate〉 ::= 〈literal-predicate〉 { ‘∧’ 〈literal-predicate〉 }
| 〈literal-predicate〉 { ‘∨’ 〈literal-predicate〉 }
〈literal-predicate〉 ::= { ‘¬’ 〈atomic-predicate〉
〈atomic-predicate〉 ::= ‘⊥’
| ‘>’
| ‘finite’ ‘(’ 〈expression〉 ‘)’
| 〈pair-expression〉 〈relop〉 〈pair-expression〉
| ‘(’ 〈predicate〉 ‘)’
〈relop〉 ::= ‘=’ | ‘ 6=’ | ‘∈’ | ‘/∈’ | ‘⊂’ | ‘ 6⊂’ | ‘⊆’ | ‘*’ | ‘<’ | ‘≤’ | ‘>’
| ‘≥’
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A.2 Expression Language
The grammar used for expressions is defined as follows:
〈expression〉 ::= 〈expression〉 〈binary-operator〉 〈expression〉
| 〈unary-operator〉 〈expression〉
| 〈expression〉 ‘−1’
| 〈expression〉 ‘[’ 〈expression〉 ‘]’
| 〈expression〉 ‘(’ 〈expression〉 ‘)’
| ‘λ’ 〈ident-pattern〉 ‘·’ 〈predicate〉 ‘|’ 〈expression〉
| 〈quantifier〉 〈ident-list〉 ‘·’ 〈predicate〉 ‘|’ 〈expression〉
| 〈quantifier〉 〈expression〉 ‘·’ 〈predicate〉
| ‘{’ 〈ident-list〉 ‘·’ 〈predicate〉 ‘|’ 〈expression〉 ‘}’
| ‘{’ [ 〈expression〉 ‘|’ 〈predicate〉 ‘}’
| ‘bool’ ‘(’ 〈predicate〉 ‘)’
| ‘{’ [ 〈expression-list〉 ] ‘}’
| ‘(’ 〈expression〉 ‘)’
| ‘∅’
| ‘Z’ | ‘N’ | ‘N1’
| ‘BOOL’ | ‘TRUE’ | ‘FALSE’
| 〈ident〉
| 〈integer-literal〉
〈binary-operator〉 ::= ‘↔’ | ‘←↔’ | ‘↔→’ | ‘ 7→’ | ‘→’ | ‘ 7’ ’ | ‘’ | ‘ 7’ | ‘’ | ‘’ | ‘∩’
| ‘∪’ | ‘\’ | ‘×’ | ‘‖’ | ‘⊗’ | ‘;’ | ‘−’ | ‘◦’ | ‘’ | ‘−’ | ‘’ | ‘−’ |
‘..’ | ‘+’ | ‘−’ | ‘÷’ | ‘∗’ | ‘mod ’ | ‘̂’
〈unary-operator〉 ::= ‘−−’ | ‘card’ | ‘P’ | ‘P1’ | ‘union’ | ‘inter’ | ‘dom’ | ‘ran’ |
‘prj | ‘id’
〈quantifier〉 ::= ‘⋂’ | ‘⋃’
〈ident-pattern〉 ::= 〈ident-pattern〉 ‘7→’ 〈ident-pattern〉
| ‘(’ 〈ident-pattern〉 ‘)’
| 〈ident〉
〈expression-list〉 ::= 〈expression-list〉 ‘,’ 〈expression〉
| 〈expression〉
AppendixB
Case Studies: Event-B Model
B.1 UC1: Water Tank System
An Event-B Specification of MaintainH Static
CONTEXT MaintainH Static
CONSTANTS
H,HT,LT, L,DEC, INC,DRN
AXIOMS
H Type : H > HT
HT Type : HT > LT
LT Type : LT > L
L Type : L = 0
DEC Type : DEC ∈ (H −HT ) .. (HT − LT )
INV Type : INC ∈ (LT − L) .. (HT − LT )
DRN Type : DRN = L
END
An Event-B Specification of m0 MaintainH Contract
MACHINE m0 MaintainH Contract
SEES MaintainH Static
VARIABLES
MH,waterlevel
INVARIANTS
waterlevel Type : waterlevel ∈ N
MH Inv 1 : waterlevel ∈ L .. H
MH Type : MH ∈ BOOL
EVENTS
Initialisation
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begin
waterlevel Init : waterlevel := H
MH Init : MH := FALSE
end
Event MaintainH =̂
when
MH Grd : MH = FALSE
MH Pre 1 : waterlevel > HT ∧ waterlevel ≤ H
then
MH Act : MH := TRUE
MH Post Act : waterlevel : |waterlevel′ ≥ L ∧ waterlevel′ ≤ HT
end
END
An Event-B Specification of MaintainH Flow
CONTEXT MaintainH Flow
SETS
MH FLOW
CONSTANTS
MH Initial,MH Trigger,MH 1,MH 2,MH 3,MH 4,MH Final, EH 1, EH 2
AXIOMS
MH FLOW Type : partition(MH FLOW, {MH Initial}, {MH Trigger}, {MH 1},
{MH 2}, {MH 3}, {MH 4}, {EH 1}, {EH 2}, {MH Final})
END
An Event-B Specification of m1 MaintainH Scenario
MACHINE m1 MaintainH Scenario
REFINES m0 MaintainH Contract
SEES MaintainH Static, MaintainH Flow
VARIABLES
MH,DL,MH flow,waterlevel, waterlevel m1, sensorHT, pump,motor
INVARIANTS
MH flow Type : MH flow ∈MH FLOW
DL Type : DL ∈ BOOL
sensorHT Type : sensorHT ∈ BOOL
pump Type : pump ∈ BOOL
motor Type : motor ∈ BOOL
MH Glue Variables : MH flow = MH Trigger ∨ (MH flow = MH Final ∧MH = TRUE)⇒
(waterlevel m1 = waterlevel)
MH Glue Flow : MH flow ∈MH FLOW \ {MH Initial,MH Final}⇒MH = FALSE
MH Scenario Pre : MH flow ∈MH FLOW \{MH Initial}∧MH = FALSE⇒(waterlevel > HT∧waterlevel ≤
H)
MH Scenario Inv : waterlevel m1 ∈ L .. H
MH Scenario Post : MH flow = MH Final⇒
waterlevel m1 ≥ L ∧ waterlevel m1 ≤ HT
DL Prevent : ¬(DL = FALSE ∧MH flow = EH 2 ∧ ¬(pump = FALSE ∧motor = TRUE))
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MH StepAssert 1 : MH flow ∈ {MH 1,MH 2,MH 3,MH 4}⇒ (waterlevel m1 > HT )
MH StepAssert 2 : (MH flow ∈ {MH 3, EH 1}⇒ pump = FALSE)
MH StepAssert 3 : (MH flow = EH 2 ∧DL = TRUE⇒ waterlevel m1 = L)
EVENTS
Initialisation
extended
begin
waterlevel Init : waterlevel := H
MH Init : MH := FALSE
MH Flow Init : MH flow := MH Initial
DL Init : DL := FALSE
waterlevel m1 Init : waterlevel m1 := H
motor Init : motor := TRUE
pump Init : pump := TRUE
sensorHT Init : sensorHT := FALSE
end
Event MaintainH Initial =̂
when
MH Flow Grd : MH flow = MH Initial
MH Pre 1 : waterlevel > HT
MH Grd : MH = FALSE
then
MH Flow Act : MH flow := MH Trigger
waterlevel Equal : waterlevel m1 := waterlevel
end
Event MaintainH Trigger =̂
when
MH Flow Grd : MH flow = MH Trigger
MH Trig 1 : waterlevel m1 > HT
then
MH Flow Act : MH flow := MH 1
end
Event MH 1 =̂
when
MH Flow Grd : MH flow = MH 1
then
MH Flow Act : MH flow := MH 2
MH 1 Act : sensorHT := TRUE
end
Event MH 2 =̂
when
MH Flow Grd : MH flow = MH 2
then
MH Flow Act : MH flow := MH 3
MH 2 Act : pump := FALSE
end
Event MH 3 =̂
when
MH Flow Grd : MH flow = MH 3
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then
MH Flow Act : MH flow := MH 4
MH 3 Act : motor := FALSE
end
Event MH 4 =̂
when
MH Flow Grd : MH flow = MH 4
then
MH Flow Act : MH flow := MH Final
MH 3 Act : waterlevel m1 := waterlevel m1−DEC
end
Event ExceedH Trigger =̂
when
EH DeviationPoint : MH flow = MH 3
EH Trig 1 : waterlevel m1 > HT
then
MH Flow Act : MH flow := EH 1
end
Event EH 1 =̂
when
MH Flow Grd : MH flow = EH 1
then
MH Flow Act : MH flow := EH 2
DL Act : DL := FALSE
EH 1 Act : motor := TRUE
end
Event DrainToL =̂
when
DL Grd : DL = FALSE
DL Pre 1 : pump = FALSE ∧motor = TRUE
DL ExtensionPoint : MH flow = EH 2
then
DL RejoinPoint : MH flow := EH 2
DL Act : DL := TRUE
DL Post Act : waterlevel m1 : |(waterlevel m1′ = L)
end
Event DrainToL False =̂
when
DL Grd : DL = FALSE
DL Pre 1 Neg : ¬(pump = FALSE ∧motor = TRUE)
DL ExtensionPoint : MH flow = EH 2
then
DL Act : DL := TRUE
end
Event EH 2 =̂
when
MH Flow Grd : MH flow = EH 2
DL Grd : DL = TRUE
then
MH Flow Act : MH flow := MH Final
EH 2 Act : waterlevel m1 := waterlevel m1 + INC
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end
Event MaintainH Final =̂
refines MaintainH
when
MH Flow Grd : MH flow = MH Final
MH Grd : MH = FALSE
then
MH Act : MH := TRUE
waterlevel Equal : waterlevel := waterlevel m1
end
END
An Event-B Specification of DrainToL Flow
CONTEXT DrainToL Flow
SETS
DL FLOW
CONSTANTS
DL Initial,DL Trigger,DL 1, DL 2, DL 3, DL Final
AXIOMS
DL FLOW Type : partition(DL FLOW, {DL Initial}, {DL Trigger}, {DL 1},
{DL 2}, {DL 3}, {DL Final})
END
An Event-B Specification of m2 DrainToL Scenario
MACHINE m2 DrainToL Scenario
REFINES m1 MaintainH Scenario
SEES MaintainH Static, MaintainH Flow, DrainToL Flow
VARIABLES
MH,DL,MH flow,DL flow,waterlevel, waterlevel m1, pump,
sensorHT,motor, waterlevel m2, pump m2,motor m2, drain, valve
INVARIANTS
DL flow Type : DL flow ∈ DL FLOW
pump m2 Type : pump m2 ∈ BOOL
motor m2 Type : motor m2 ∈ BOOL
valve Type : valve ∈ BOOL
drain Type : drain ∈ BOOL
DL Glue Variables : DL flow = DL Trigger ∨
(DL flow = DL Final ∧DL = TRUE ∧MH flow = EH 2)⇒ waterlevel m2 = waterlevel m1
DL Glue Flow : DL flow ∈ DL FLOW \ {DL Initial,DL Final}⇒
DL = FALSE ∧MH flow = EH 2
DL Scenario Pre : DL flow ∈ DL FLOW \ {DL Initial} ∧DL = FALSE ∧MH flow = EH 2⇒
pump = FALSE ∧motor = TRUE
DL Scenario Inv : waterlevel m2 ∈ L .. H
DL Scenario Post : DL flow = DL Final⇒ waterlevel m2 = L
EVENTS
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Initialisation
extended
begin
waterlevel Init : waterlevel := H
MH Init : MH := FALSE
MH Flow Init : MH flow := MH Initial
DL Init : DL := FALSE
waterlevel m1 Init : waterlevel m1 := H
motor Init : motor := TRUE
pump Init : pump := TRUE
sensorHT Init : sensorHT := FALSE
DL flow Init : DL flow := DL Initial
waterlevel m2 Init : waterlevel m2 := H
drain Init : drain := FALSE
valve Init : valve := FALSE
pump Init m2 : pump m2 := TRUE
motor Init m2 : motor m2 := TRUE
end
Event MaintainH Initial =̂
extends MaintainH Initial
when
MH Flow Grd : MH flow = MH Initial
MH Pre 1 : waterlevel > HT
MH Grd : MH = FALSE
then
MH Flow Act : MH flow := MH Trigger
waterlevel Equal : waterlevel m1 := waterlevel
end
Event MaintainH Trigger =̂
extends MaintainH Trigger
when
MH Flow Grd : MH flow = MH Trigger
MH Trig 1 : waterlevel m1 > HT
then
MH Flow Act : MH flow := MH 1
end
Event MH 1 =̂
extends MH 1
when
MH Flow Grd : MH flow = MH 1
then
MH Flow Act : MH flow := MH 2
MH 1 Act : sensorHT := TRUE
end
Event MH 2 =̂
extends MH 2
when
MH Flow Grd : MH flow = MH 2
then
MH Flow Act : MH flow := MH 3
MH 2 Act : pump := FALSE
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end
Event MH 3 =̂
extends MH 3
when
MH Flow Grd : MH flow = MH 3
then
MH Flow Act : MH flow := MH 4
MH 3 Act : motor := FALSE
end
Event MH 4 =̂
extends MH 4
when
MH Flow Grd : MH flow = MH 4
then
MH Flow Act : MH flow := MH Final
MH 3 Act : waterlevel m1 := waterlevel m1−DEC
end
Event ExceedH Trigger =̂
extends ExceedH Trigger
when
MH Flow Grd : MH flow = MH 3
EH Trig 1 : waterlevel m1 > HT
then
MH Flow Act : MH flow := EH 1
end
Event EH 1 =̂
extends EH 1
when
MH Flow Grd : MH flow = EH 1
then
MH Flow Act : MH flow := EH 2
DL Act : DL := FALSE
EH 1 Act : motor := TRUE
end
Event DrainToL Init =̂
when
DL Grd : DL = FALSE
DL ExtPoint : MH flow = EH 2
DL Pre 1 : pump = FALSE ∧motor = TRUE
MP Flow Grd : DL flow = DL Initial
then
MP Flow Act : DL flow := DL Trigger
waterlevel Equal : waterlevel m2 := waterlevel m1
pump Equal : pump m2 := pump
motor Equal : motor m2 := motor
end
Event DrainToL Trigger =̂
when
DL Flow Grd : DL flow = DL Trigger
DL Trig 1 : motor m2 = TRUE ∧ pump m2 = FALSE
then
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DL Flow Act : DL flow := DL 1
end
Event DL 1 =̂
when
DL Flow Grd : DL flow = DL 1
then
DL Flow Act : DL flow := DL 2
DL 1 Act : drain := TRUE
end
Event DL 2 =̂
when
DL Flow Grd : DL flow = DL 2
then
DL Flow Act : DL flow := DL 3
DL 2 Act : valve := TRUE
end
Event DL 3 =̂
when
DL Flow Grd : DL flow = DL 3
then
DL Flow Act : DL flow := DL Final
DL 3 Act : waterlevel m2 := DRN
end
Event DrainToL Final =̂
refines DrainToL
when
DL Flow Grd : DL flow = DL Final
DL Grd : DL = FALSE
DL ExtPoint : MH flow = EH 2
then
DL Act : DL := TRUE
DL RejPoint : MH flow := EH 2
waterlevel Equal : waterlevel m1 := waterlevel m2
end
Event DrainToL False =̂
extends DrainToL False
when
DL Grd : DL = FALSE
DL Pre 1 Neg : ¬(pump = FALSE ∧motor = TRUE)
DL ExtPoint : MH flow = EH 2
then
DL Act : DL := TRUE
end
Event EH 2 =̂
extends EH 2
when
MH Flow Grd : MH flow = EH 2
DL Grd : DL = TRUE
then
MH Flow Act : MH flow := MH Final
EH 2 Act : waterlevel m1 := waterlevel m1 + INC
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end
Event MaintainH Final =̂
extends MaintainH Final
when
MH Flow Grd : MH flow = MH Final
MH Grd : MH = FALSE
then
MH Act : MH := TRUE
waterlevel Equal : waterlevel := waterlevel m1
end
END
B.2 UC2: Train Door Control System
An Event-B Specification of OpenDoor Static
CONTEXT OpenDoor Static
SETS
DOOR,SPEED,LOCATION
CONSTANTS
Open,Opening, Closed,Moving, Stationary
AXIOMS
DOOR Enum : partition(DOOR, {Open}, {Opening}, {Closed})
SPEED Enum : partition(SPEED, {Stationary}, {Moving})
END
An Event-B Specification of m0 OpenDoor Contract
MACHINE m0 OpenDoor Contract
SEES OpenDoor Static
VARIABLES
OD
door
t speed
INVARIANTS
OD Type : OD ∈ BOOL
door Type : door ∈ DOOR
OD Inv 1 : ¬(door = Open ∧ t speed = Moving)
t speed Type : t speed ∈ SPEED
EVENTS
Initialisation
begin
door Init : door := Closed
OD Init : OD := FALSE
t speed Init : t speed := Stationary
end
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Event OpenDoor =̂
when
OD Grd : OD = FALSE
OD Pre 1 : door = Closed
then
OD Act : OD := TRUE
OD Post Act : door, t speed
: |
(t speed′ = Stationary ∧ door′ = Open)
∨
(t speed′ = Moving ∧ door′ = Closed)
end
END
An Event-B Specification of OpenDoor Flow
CONTEXT OpenDoor Flow
SETS
OD FLOW
CONSTANTS
OD Initial, OD 1, OD 1 1, OD 1 2, OD 1 3, OD Trigger,OD Final, PT 1, PT 2
AXIOMS
OD FLOW Type : partition(OD FLOW, {OD Initial}, {OD Trigger}, {OD 1}, {OD 1 1},
{OD 1 2}, {OD 1 3}, {PT 1}, {PT 2}, {OD Final})
END
An Event-B Specification of m1 OpenDoor Scenario
MACHINE m1 OpenDoor Scenario
REFINES m0 OpenDoor Contract
SEES OpenDoor Static, OpenDoor Flow
VARIABLES
OD,OD flow, door, door m1, request door, door cmd, t speed, t speed m1, EB
INVARIANTS
OD flow Type : OD flow ∈ OD FLOW
operator request Type : request door ∈ BOOL
door cmd Type : door cmd ∈ BOOL
door m1 Type : door m1 ∈ DOOR
t speed m1 Type : t speed m1 ∈ SPEED
OD Glue Variables : OD flow = OD Trigger ∨ (OD flow = OD Final ∧OD = TRUE)
⇒ door = door m1
OD Glue Flow : OD flow ∈ OD FLOW \ {OD Initial, OD Final}⇒OD = FALSE
OD Scenario Pre : OD flow ∈ OD FLOW \ {OD Initial} ∧OD = FALSE⇒ door = Closed
OD Scenario Inv : ¬(door m1 = Open ∧ t speed m1 = Moving)
OD Scenario Post : OD flow = OD Final⇒ (t speed m1 = Stationary ∧ door m1 = Open)
∨ (t speed m1 = Moving ∧ door m1 = Closed)
EB Type : EB ∈ BOOL
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OD Prevent : ¬((EB = FALSE) ∧ (OD flow = PT 2) ∧ ¬
(door m1 = Opening ∧ t speed m1 = Moving))
OD StepAssert 1 : OD flow ∈ {OD 1}⇒ door m1 = Closed
OD StepAssert 2 : OD flow ∈ {OD 1 1, OD 1 2, OD 1 3}⇒ t speed m1 = Stationary
OD StepAssert 3 : OD flow = OD Initial⇒ t speed = t speed m1
OD StepAssert 4 : OD flow = PT 2 ∧ EB = TRUE⇒ t speed m1 = Stationary
OD StepAssert 5 : OD flow = PT 1⇒ t speed m1 = Moving
EVENTS
Initialisation
extended
begin
door Init : door := Closed
OD Init : OD := FALSE
t speed Init : t speed := Stationary
OD flow Init : OD flow := OD Initial
door m1 Init : door m1 := Closed
operator request Init : request door := TRUE
door cmd Init : door cmd := FALSE
t speed m1 Init : t speed m1 := Stationary
EB Init : EB := FALSE
end
Event OpenDoor Initial =̂
when
OD flow Grd : OD flow = OD Initial
OD Grd : OD = FALSE
OD Pre 1 : door = Closed
then
OD flow Act : OD flow := OD Trigger
door m1 Equal : door m1 := door
t speed m1 Equal : t speed m1 := t speed
end
Event OpenDoor Trigger =̂
when
OD flow Grd : OD flow = OD Trigger
OD Trig 1 : request door = TRUE ∧ door m1 = Closed
then
OD flow Act : OD flow := OD 1
end
Event OD 1 If =̂
when
OD flow Grd : OD flow = OD 1
OD 3 Grd : t speed m1 = Stationary
then
OD flow Act : OD flow := OD 1 1
end
Event OD 1 If False =̂
when
OD flow Grd : OD flow = OD 1
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OD 3 Grd Neg : ¬(t speed m1 = Stationary)
then
OD flow Act : OD flow := OD Final
end
Event OD 1 1 =̂
when
OD flow Grd : OD flow = OD 1 1
then
OD flow Act : OD flow := OD 1 2
OD 2 1 Act : door cmd := TRUE
end
Event OD 1 2 =̂
when
OD flow Grd : OD flow = OD 1 2
then
OD flow Act : OD flow := OD 1 3
OD 2 2 Act : door m1 := Opening
end
Event OD 1 3 =̂
when
OD flow Grd : OD flow = OD 1 3
then
OD flow Act : OD flow := OD Final
OD 2 2 Act : door m1 := Open
end
Event OpenDoor Final =̂
refines OpenDoor
when
OD flow Grd : OD flow = OD Final
OD Grd : OD = FALSE
then
OD Act : OD := TRUE
door Equal : door := door m1
t speed Equal : t speed := t speed m1
end
Event PT Trigger =̂
when
OD flow Grd : OD flow = OD 1
DeviationPoint : t speed m1 = Moving
then
OD flow Act : OD flow := PT 1
end
Event PT 1 =̂
when
OD flow Grd : OD flow = PT 1
then
OD flow Act : OD flow := PT 2
PT 1 Act : door m1 := Opening
EB Act : EB := FALSE
end
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Event EmergencyBraking =̂
when
EB Grd : EB = FALSE
EB ExtesnionPoint : OD flow = PT 2
EB Pre 1 : (door m1 = Opening ∧ t speed m1 = Moving)
then
EB Post Act : t speed m1 : |t speed m1′ = Stationary
EB Act : EB := TRUE
EB RejoinPoint : OD flow := PT 2
end
Event EmergencyBraking FALSE =̂
when
EB Grd : EB = FALSE
EB ExtesnionPoint : OD flow = PT 2
EB Pre 1 Negate : ¬(door m1 = Opening ∧ t speed m1 = Moving)
then
EB Act : EB := TRUE
end
Event PT 2 =̂
when
OD flow Grd : OD flow = PT 2
EB Grd : EB = TRUE
then
OD flow Act : OD flow := OD Final
PT 1 Act : door m1 := Open
end
END
An Event-B Specification of EmergencyBraking Flow
CONTEXT EmergencyBraking Flow
EXTENDS OpenDoor Flow
SETS
EB FLOW
CONSTANTS
EB Initial, EB Trigger, EB 1, EB 2, EB 3, EB Final
AXIOMS
EB FLOW Type : partition(EB FLOW, {EB Initial}, {EB Trigger}, {EB 1}, {EB 2},
{EB 3}, {EB Final})
END
An Event-B Specification of m2 EmergencyBraking Scenario
MACHINE m2 EmergencyBraking Scenario
REFINES m1 OpenDoor Scenario
SEES OpenDoor Static, EmergencyBraking Flow
VARIABLES
OD,OD flow, door, door m1, request door, door cmd, t speed,EB flow,
brake, t speed m1, t speed m2, EB
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INVARIANTS
EB flow Type : EB flow ∈ EB FLOW
t speed m2 Type : t speed m2 ∈ SPEED
brake Type : brake ∈ BOOL
EB Scenario Pre : EB flow ∈ EB FLOW \ {EB Initial} ∧
EB = FALSE ∧OD flow = PT 2⇒ (door m1 = Opening ∧ t speed m1 = Moving)
EB Scenario Post : EB flow = EB Final⇒ (t speed m2 = Stationary)
EB Scenario Inv : EB flow ∈ EB FLOW \ {EB Initial, EB Final}⇒
¬(door m1 = Open ∧ t speed m2 = Moving)
EB Glue Variables : (EB flow = EB Trigger ∧OD flow = PT 2) ∨
(EB flow = EB Final ∧ EB = TRUE ∧OD flow = PT 2)⇒ (t speed m2 = t speed m1)
EB Glue Flow : EB flow ∈ EB FLOW \ {EB Initial, EB Final}⇒
EB = FALSE ∧OD flow = PT 2
EB StepAssert 1 : EB flow = EB 3⇒ t speed m2 = Stationary
EVENTS
Initialisation
extended
begin
door Init : door := Closed
OD Init : OD := FALSE
t speed Init : t speed := Stationary
OD flow Init : OD flow := OD Initial
door m1 Init : door m1 := Closed
operator request Init : request door := TRUE
door cmd Init : door cmd := FALSE
t speed m1 Init : t speed m1 := Stationary
EB Init : EB := FALSE
EB flow Init : EB flow := EB Initial
t speed m2 Init : t speed m2 := Stationary
brake Init : brake := FALSE
end
Event OpenDoor Initial =̂
extends OpenDoor Initial
when
OD flow Grd : OD flow = OD Initial
OD Grd : OD = FALSE
OD Pre 1 : door = Closed
then
OD flow Act : OD flow := OD Trigger
door m1 Equal : door m1 := door
t speed m1 Equal : t speed m1 := t speed
end
Event OpenDoor Trigger =̂
extends OpenDoor Trigger
when
OD flow Grd : OD flow = OD Trigger
OD Trig 1 : request door = TRUE ∧ door m1 = Closed
then
OD flow Act : OD flow := OD 1
end
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Event OD 1 If =̂
extends OD 1 If
when
OD flow Grd : OD flow = OD 1
OD 3 Grd : t speed m1 = Stationary
then
OD flow Act : OD flow := OD 1 1
end
Event OD 1 If False =̂
extends OD 1 If False
when
OD flow Grd : OD flow = OD 1
OD 3 Grd Neg : ¬(t speed m1 = Stationary)
then
OD flow Act : OD flow := OD Final
end
Event OD 1 1 =̂
extends OD 1 1
when
OD flow Grd : OD flow = OD 1 1
then
OD flow Act : OD flow := OD 1 2
OD 2 1 Act : door cmd := TRUE
end
Event OD 1 2 =̂
extends OD 1 2
when
OD flow Grd : OD flow = OD 1 2
then
OD flow Act : OD flow := OD 1 3
OD 2 2 Act : door m1 := Opening
end
Event OD 1 3 =̂
extends OD 1 3
when
OD flow Grd : OD flow = OD 1 3
then
OD flow Act : OD flow := OD Final
OD 2 2 Act : door m1 := Open
end
Event OpenDoor Final =̂
extends OpenDoor Final
when
OD flow Grd : OD flow = OD Final
OD Grd : OD = FALSE
then
OD Act : OD := TRUE
door Equal : door := door m1
t speed Equal : t speed := t speed m1
end
Event PT Trigger =̂
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extends PT Trigger
when
OD flow Grd : OD flow = OD 1
DeviationPoint : t speed m1 = Moving
then
OD flow Act : OD flow := PT 1
end
Event PT 1 =̂
extends PT 1
when
OD flow Grd : OD flow = PT 1
then
OD flow Act : OD flow := PT 2
PT 1 Act : door m1 := Opening
EB Act : EB := FALSE
end
Event EB Initial =̂
when
EB flow Grd : EB flow = EB Initial
EB Grd : EB = FALSE
EB ExtensionPoint : OD flow = PT 2
EB Pre 1 : (door m1 = Opening ∧ t speed m1 = Moving)
then
EB flow Act : EB flow := EB Trigger
t speed m2 Equal : t speed m2 := t speed m1
end
Event EB Trigger =̂
when
EB flow Grd : EB flow = EB Trigger
then
EB flow Act : EB flow := EB 1
end
Event EB 1 =̂
when
EB flow Grd : EB flow = EB 1
then
EB flow Act : EB flow := EB 2
EB 1 Act : brake := TRUE
end
Event EB 2 =̂
when
EB flow Grd : EB flow = EB 2
then
EB flow Act : EB flow := EB Final
EB 2 Act : t speed m2 := Stationary
end
Event EB Final =̂
refines EmergencyBraking
when
EB Grd : EB = FALSE
EB flow Grd : EB flow = EB Final
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EB ExtensionPoint : OD flow = PT 2
then
EB Act : EB := TRUE
t speed m1 Equal : t speed m1 := t speed m2
EB RejoinPoint : OD flow := PT 2
end
Event EmergencyBraking FALSE =̂
extends EmergencyBraking FALSE
when
EB Grd : EB = FALSE
EB ExtesnionPoint : OD flow = PT 2
EB Pre 1 Negate : ¬(door m1 = Opening ∧ t speed m1 = Moving)
then
EB Act : EB := TRUE
end
Event PT 2 =̂
extends PT 2
when
OD flow Grd : OD flow = PT 2
EB Grd : EB = TRUE
then
OD flow Act : OD flow := OD Final
PT 1 Act : door m1 := Open
end
END
B.3 UC3: Automated Teller Machine
An Event-B Specification of Withdraw Static
CONTEXT Withdraw Static
SETS
PIN,REQUEST,CARD
CONSTANTS
b AccountBalance, b AccountPIN,Request PIN,
Request Withdrawal, Request Card, Inserted,Returned,Withheld
AXIOMS
DISPLAY Enum : partition(REQUEST, {Request Card}, {Request PIN}, {Request Withdrawal})
CARD Enum : partition(CARD, {Inserted}, {Returned}, {Withheld})
b AccountBalance Type : b AccountBalance ≥ 0 ∧ b AccountBalance = 1
bank AccountPIN Type : b AccountPIN ∈ PIN
END
An Event-B Specification of m0 Withdraw Contract
MACHINE m0 Withdraw Contract
SEES Withdraw Static
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VARIABLES
W, c Card, atm Dispense
INVARIANTS
W Type : W ∈ BOOL
c Card Type : c Card ∈ CARD
atm Dispense Type : atm Dispense ∈ N
W Inv 1 : (atm Dispense = 0 ∧ c Card ∈ {Inserted,Withheld}) ∨
(c Card = Returned ∧ atm Dispense ∈ 0 .. b AccountBalance)
EVENTS
Initialisation
begin
W Init : W := FALSE
c Card Init : c Card := Inserted
atm Dispense Init : atm Dispense := 0
end
Event Withdraw =̂
when
W Grd : W = FALSE
W Pre 1 : c Card = Inserted
then
W Act : W := TRUE
W Post Act : atm Dispense, c Card : |
(c Card′ = Returned ∧ atm Dispense′ ∈ 0 .. b AccountBalance) ∨
(c Card′ = Withheld ∧ atm Dispense′ = 0)
end
END
An Event-B Specification of Withdraw Flow
CONTEXT Withdraw Flow
SETS
W FLOW
CONSTANTS
W Initial,W Trigger,W 1,W 2,W 3,W 4,W 5,W 6,
W A 1,W A 2,W Final
AXIOMS
W FLOW Type : partition(W FLOW, {W Initial}, {W Trigger}, {W 1}, {W 2},
{W 3}, {W 4}, {W 5}, {W 6}, {W A 1}, {W A 2}, {W Final})
END
An Event-B Specification of m1 Withdraw Scenario
MACHINE m1 Withdraw Scenario
REFINES m0 Withdraw Contract
SEES Withdraw Static, Withdraw Flow
VARIABLES
W
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BC
W flow
atm Dispense
atm Request
c PIN
c WithdrawRequest
c Card
b FailPINAttempt
atm Dispense m1
c Card m1
INVARIANTS
W flow Type : W flow ∈W FLOW
BC Type : BC ∈ BOOL
atm Request Type : atm Request ∈ REQUEST
atm Dispense m1 Type : atm Dispense m1 ∈ N
c PIN Type : c PIN ∈ PIN
c WithdrawRequest Type : c WithdrawRequest ∈ N
c Card m1 Type : c Card m1 ∈ CARD
b FailPINAttempt Type : b FailPINAttempt ∈ 0 .. 3
W Manual 1 : (W flow ∈ {W 5,W 6}⇒ c WithdrawRequest = b AccountBalance)
∧
(W flow ∈ {W 6}⇒ c Card m1 = Returned)
W StepAssert 1 : W flow = W A 2⇒¬(b FailPINAttempt > 2)
W Manual 2 1 : W flow = W 2⇒¬(b FailPINAttempt > 2)
Withdraw Manual 3 : BC = TRUE ∧W flow = W 1⇒¬(b FailPINAttempt > 2)
W Glue Variables : W flow = W Trigger ∨ (W flow = W Final ∧W = TRUE)⇒
(c Card m1 = c Card) ∧ (atm Dispense m1 = atm Dispense)
W Glue Flow : W flow ∈W FLOW \ {W Initial,W Final}⇒W = FALSE
W Scenario Pre : W flow ∈W FLOW \ {W Initial} ∧W = FALSE⇒ c Card = Inserted
W Scenario Post : W flow = W Final⇒
(c Card m1 = Returned ∧ atm Dispense m1 ∈ 0 .. b AccountBalance) ∨
(c Card m1 = Withheld ∧ atm Dispense m1 = 0)
W Scenario Inv : (atm Dispense m1 = 0 ∧ c Card m1 ∈ {Inserted,Withheld}) ∨
(c Card m1 = Returned ∧ atm Dispense m1 ∈ 0 .. b AccountBalance)
W Step Aeert 1 : W flow ∈ {W 1,W 2,W A 2}⇒ atm Dispense m1 = 0
EVENTS
Initialisation
extended
begin
W Init : W := FALSE
c Card Init : c Card := Inserted
atm Dispense Init : atm Dispense := 0
W flow Init : W flow := W Initial
atm Request Init : atm Request := Request Card
atm Dispense m1 Init : atm Dispense m1 := 0
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c PIN Init : c PIN := b AccountPIN
b FailPINAttempt Init : b FailPINAttempt := 0
c WithdrawRequest Init : c WithdrawRequest := 0
c Card m1 Init : c Card m1 := Inserted
BC Init : BC := FALSE
end
Event Withdraw Initial =̂
when
W flow Grd : W flow = W Initial
W Grd : W = FALSE
W Pre 1 : c Card = Inserted
then
W flow Act : W flow := W Trigger
c Card m1 Equal : c Card m1 := c Card
atm Dispense m1 Equal : atm Dispense m1 := atm Dispense
end
Event Withdraw Trigger =̂
when
W flow Grd : W flow = W Trigger
W Trig 1 : c Card m1 = Inserted
then
W flow Act : W flow := W 1
BC Act : BC := FALSE
end
Event W 1 =̂
when
W flow Grd : W flow = W 1
BF Grd : BC = TRUE
then
W flow Act : W flow := W 2
W 1 Act : atm Request := Request PIN
end
Event W 2 =̂
when
W flow Grd : W flow = W 2
then
W flow Act : W flow := W 3
W 2 Act : c PIN := b AccountPIN
end
Event W A 1 =̂
when
W flow Grd : W flow = W 2
then
W flow Act : W flow := W A 2
W A 1 Act : c PIN :∈ PIN \ {b AccountPIN}
end
Event W A 2 =̂
when
W flow Grd : W flow = W A 2
then
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W flow Act : W flow := W 1
W A 2 Act : b FailPINAttempt := b FailPINAttempt + 1
BC Act : BC := FALSE
end
Event BlockCard =̂
when
BC ExtensionPoint : W flow = W 1
BC Grd : BC = FALSE
BC Pre 1 : b FailPINAttempt > 2
then
BC RejoinPoint : W flow := W Final
BC Act : BC := TRUE
BC Post Act : c Card m1, atm Dispense m1 : |
c Card m1′ = Withheld ∧ atm Dispense m1′ = 0
end
Event BlockCard FALSE =̂
when
BC ExtensionPoint : W flow = W 1
BC Grd : BC = FALSE
BC Pre 1 Neg : ¬(b FailPINAttempt > 2)
then
BC Act : BC := TRUE
end
Event W 3 =̂
when
W flow Grd : W flow = W 3
then
W flow Act : W flow := W 4
W 3 Act : atm Request := Request Withdrawal
end
Event W 4 =̂
when
W flow Grd : W flow = W 4
then
W flow Act : W flow := W 5
W 4 Act : c WithdrawRequest := b AccountBalance
end
Event W 5 =̂
when
W flow Grd : W flow = W 5
then
W flow Act : W flow := W 6
W 5 Act : c Card m1 := Returned
end
Event W 6 =̂
when
W flow Grd : W flow = W 6
then
W flow Act : W flow := W Final
W 6 Act : atm Dispense m1 := c WithdrawRequest
Appendix B. Case Studies: Event-B Model 189
end
Event Withdraw Final =̂
refines Withdraw
when
W flow Grd : W flow = W Final
W Grd : W = FALSE
then
W Act : W := TRUE
atm Dispense Equal : atm Dispense := atm Dispense m1
c Card Equal : c Card := c Card m1
end
END
An Event-B Specification of BlockCard Flow
CONTEXT BlockCard Flow
SETS
BC FLOW
CONSTANTS
BC Initial, BC Trigger,BC 1, BC 2, BC 3, BC Final
AXIOMS
BC FLOW Type : partition(BC FLOW, {BC Initial}, {BC Trigger}, {BC 1}, {BC 2},
{BC 3}, {BC Final})
END
An Event-B Specification of m2 BlockCard Scenario
MACHINE m2 BlockCard Scenario
REFINES m1 Withdraw Scenario
SEES Withdraw Static, Withdraw Flow, BlockCard Flow
VARIABLES
W,BC,W flow, atm Dispense, atm Request, c PIN, c WithdrawRequest,
c Card, b FailPINAttempt, b AccountBlock, atm Dispense m1, c Card m1,
BC flow, c Card m2, atm Dispense m2
INVARIANTS
BC flow Type : BC flow ∈ BC FLOW
c Card m2 Type : c Card m2 ∈ CARD
atm Dispense m2 Type : atm Dispense m2 ∈ 0 .. b AccountBalance
b AccountBlock Type : b AccountBlock ∈ BOOL
BC Glue Variables : (BC flow = BC Final ∧BC = TRUE ∧W flow = W Final)⇒
(c Card m2 = c Card m1) ∧ (atm Dispense m2 = atm Dispense m1)
BC Glue Flow : BC flow ∈ BC FLOW \ {BC Initial, BC Final}⇒
BC = FALSE ∧W flow = W 1
BC Scenario Pre : BC flow ∈ BC FLOW \ {BC Initial} ∧
BC = FALSE ∧W flow = W 1⇒ b FailPINAttempt > 2
BC Scenario Post : BC flow = BC Final ∧W flow = W 1⇒
(c Card m2 = Withheld ∧ atm Dispense m2 = 0)
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BC Scenario Inv : (atm Dispense m2 = 0 ∧ c Card m2 ∈ {Inserted,Withheld}) ∨
(c Card m2 = Returned ∧ atm Dispense m2 ∈ 0 .. b AccountBalance)
BC StepAssert 1 : BC flow = BC 3⇒ c Card m2 = Withheld
BC StepAssert 2 : BC flow ∈ {BC Trigger,BC 1, BC 2}⇒ atm Dispense m2 = 0
BC StepAssert 3 : (W flow ∈ {W 1,W 2,W A 2}⇒ atm Dispense m1 = 0) ∧
(W flow ∈W FLOW \ {W Final} ∧BC = TRUE⇒¬(BC flow = BC Final))
EVENTS
Initialisation
extended
begin
W Init : W := FALSE
c Card Init : c Card := Inserted
atm Dispense Init : atm Dispense := 0
W flow Init : W flow := W Initial
atm Request Init : atm Request := Request Card
atm Dispense m1 Init : atm Dispense m1 := 0
c PIN Init : c PIN := b AccountPIN
b FailPINAttempt Init : b FailPINAttempt := 0
c WithdrawRequest Init : c WithdrawRequest := 0
c Card m1 Init : c Card m1 := Inserted
BC Init : BC := FALSE
act1 : BC flow := BC Initial
act2 : atm Dispense m2 := 0
act3 : c Card m2 := Inserted
act4 : b AccountBlock := FALSE
end
Event Withdraw Initial =̂
extends Withdraw Initial
when
W flow Grd : W flow = W Initial
W Grd : W = FALSE
W Pre 1 : c Card = Inserted
then
W flow Act : W flow := W Trigger
c Card m1 Equal : c Card m1 := c Card
atm Dispense m1 Equal : atm Dispense m1 := atm Dispense
end
Event Withdraw Trigger =̂
extends Withdraw Trigger
when
W flow Grd : W flow = W Trigger
W Trig 1 : c Card m1 = Inserted
then
W flow Act : W flow := W 1
BC Act : BC := FALSE
act1 : BC flow := BC Initial
end
Event W 1 =̂
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extends W 1
when
W flow Grd : W flow = W 1
BF Grd : BC = TRUE
then
W flow Act : W flow := W 2
W 1 Act : atm Request := Request PIN
end
Event W 2 =̂
extends W 2
when
W flow Grd : W flow = W 2
then
W flow Act : W flow := W 3
W 2 Act : c PIN := b AccountPIN
end
Event W A 1 =̂
extends W A 1
when
W flow Grd : W flow = W 2
then
W flow Act : W flow := W A 2
W A 1 Act : c PIN :∈ PIN \ {b AccountPIN}
end
Event W A 2 =̂
extends W A 2
when
W flow Grd : W flow = W A 2
then
W flow Act : W flow := W 1
W A 2 Act : b FailPINAttempt := b FailPINAttempt + 1
BC Act : BC := FALSE
act1 : BC flow := BC Initial
end
Event BlockCard FALSE =̂
extends BlockCard FALSE
when
BC ExtPoint : W flow = W 1
BC Grd : BC = FALSE
BC Pre 1 Neg : ¬(b FailPINAttempt > 2)
then
BC Act : BC := TRUE
end
Event W 3 =̂
extends W 3
when
W flow Grd : W flow = W 3
then
W flow Act : W flow := W 4
W 3 Act : atm Request := Request Withdrawal
end
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Event W 4 =̂
extends W 4
when
W flow Grd : W flow = W 4
then
W flow Act : W flow := W 5
W 4 Act : c WithdrawRequest := b AccountBalance
end
Event W 5 =̂
extends W 5
when
W flow Grd : W flow = W 5
then
W flow Act : W flow := W 6
W 5 Act : c Card m1 := Returned
end
Event W 6 =̂
extends W 6
when
W flow Grd : W flow = W 6
then
W flow Act : W flow := W Final
W 6 Act : atm Dispense m1 := c WithdrawRequest
end
Event Withdraw Final =̂
extends Withdraw Final
when
W flow Grd : W flow = W Final
W Grd : W = FALSE
then
W Act : W := TRUE
atm Dispense Equal : atm Dispense := atm Dispense m1
c Card Equal : c Card := c Card m1
end
Event BlockCard Initial =̂
when
BC flow Grd : BC flow = BC Initial
BC Grd : BC = FALSE
BC ExtensionPoint : W flow = W 1
BC Pre 1 : b FailPINAttempt > 2
then
BC flow Act : BC flow := BC Trigger
c Card m2 Equal : c Card m2 := c Card m1
atm Dispense m2 Equal : atm Dispense m2 := atm Dispense m1
end
Event BlockCard Trigger =̂
when
BC flow Grd : BC flow = BC Trigger
BC Trig 1 : b FailPINAttempt > 2
then
act1 : BC flow := BC 1
end
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Event BC 1 =̂
when
BC flow Grd : BC flow = BC 1
then
BC flow Act : BC flow := BC 2
BC 1 Act : b AccountBlock := TRUE
end
Event BC 2 =̂
when
BC flow Grd : BC flow = BC 2
then
BC flow Act : BC flow := BC 3
BC 2 Act : c Card m2 := Withheld
end
Event BC 3 =̂
when
BC flow Grd : BC flow = BC 3
then
BC flow Act : BC flow := BC Final
BC 3 Act : atm Dispense m2 := 0
end
Event BlockCard Final =̂
refines BlockCard
when
BC flow Grd : BC flow = BC Final
BC Grd : BC = FALSE
W flow Grd : W flow = W 1
then
BC Act : BC := TRUE
BC RejoinPoint : W flow := W Final
c Card m1 Equal : c Card m1 := c Card m2
atm Dispense m1 Equal : atm Dispense m1 := atm Dispense m2
end
END
B.4 UC4: Sense and Avoid
An Event-B Specification of SafeSeparation Static
CONTEXT SafeSeparation Static
SETS
RESPONSE,PLAN
CONSTANTS
Accept, Reject, Idle, SS P lan,CA Plan,On Route
AXIOMS
RESPONSE Enum : partition(RESPONSE, {Accept}, {Reject}, {Idle})
PLAN Enum : partition(PLAN, {SS P lan}, {CA Plan}, {On Route})
END
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An Event-B Specification of m0 SafeSeparation Contract
MACHINE m0 SafeSeparation Contract
SEES SafeSeparation Static
VARIABLES
SS, intruder, separation
INVARIANTS
SS Type : SS ∈ BOOL
intruder Type : intruder ∈ BOOL
separation Type : separation ∈ BOOL
SS Inv 1 : separation = TRUE
EVENTS
Initialisation
extended
begin
S Init : SS := FALSE
intruder Init : intruder := TRUE
separation Init : separation := TRUE
end
Event SafeSeparation =̂
when
SS Pre 1 : intruder = TRUE
SS Grd : SS = FALSE
then
SS Act : SS := TRUE
SS Post Act : intruder, separation : |intruder′ = FALSE ∧ separation′ = TRUE
end
END
An Event-B Specification of SafeSeparation Flow
CONTEXT SafeSeparation Flow
SETS
SS FLOW
CONSTANTS
SS Initial, SS Trigger, SS 1, SS 2, SS 3, SS 4
SS 5, F 1, F 2, F 3, F 4, SS F inal
AXIOMS
SS FLOW Type : partition(SS FLOW, {SS Initial}, {SS Trigger}, {SS 1}, {SS 2},
{SS 3}, {SS 4}, {SS 5}, {F 1}, {F 2}, {F 3}, {F 4}, {SS Final})
END
An Event-B Specification of m1 SafeSeparation Scenario
MACHINE m1 SafeSeparation Scenario
REFINES m0 SafeSeparation Contract
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SEES SafeSeparation Static, SafeSeparation Flow
VARIABLES
SS,CA, SS flow, intruder, separation, ss risk, ss plan
ss response, ss breach, ca breach, intruder m1,mission
INVARIANTS
CA Type : CA ∈ BOOL
SS flow Type : SS flow ∈ SS FLOW
ss risk Type : ss risk ∈ BOOL
ss response Type : ss response ∈ RESPONSE
ss plan Type : ss plan ∈ BOOL
ss breach Type : ss breach ∈ BOOL
mission Type : mission ∈ PLAN
intruder m1 Type : intruder m1 ∈ BOOL
ca breach Type : ca breach ∈ BOOL
SS Scenario Inv : (separation = TRUE⇔ (ss breach = FALSE ∧ ca breach = FALSE) ∨
(ss breach = TRUE ∧ ca breach = FALSE)) ∧ (separation = FALSE⇔ ca breach = TRUE) ∧
(¬(ca breach = TRUE ∧ ss breach = FALSE)) ∧ (separation = FALSE⇔ ca breach = TRUE)
SS Scenario Pre : SS flow ∈ SS FLOW \ {SS Initial} ∧ SS = FALSE⇒ intruder = TRUE
SS Scenario Post : SS flow = SS Final⇒ intruder m1 = FALSE ∧ separation = TRUE
SS Glue Variables : SS flow = SS Trigger ∨ (SS flow = SS Final ∧ SS = TRUE)⇒
intruder = intruder m1
SS Glue Flow : SS flow ∈ SS FLOW \ {SS Initial, SS F inal}⇒ SS = FALSE
Prevent CA : ¬(CA = FALSE ∧ SS flow = F 4 ∧ ¬(ss breach = TRUE ∧mission = On Route)) ∧
¬(SS flow = F 4 ∧ CA = TRUE)
SS StepAssert 1 : SS flow = F 3⇒mission = On Route
EVENTS
Initialisation
extended
begin
S Init : SS := FALSE
intruder Init : intruder := TRUE
separation Init : separation := TRUE
CA Init : CA := FALSE
SS flow Init : SS flow := SS Initial
ss risk Init : ss risk := FALSE
ss response Init : ss response := Idle
ss plan Init : ss plan := FALSE
ss breach Init : ss breach := FALSE
intruder m1 Init : intruder m1 := TRUE
ca breach Init : ca breach := FALSE
mission Init : mission := On Route
end
Event SafeSeparation Initial =̂
when
SS Grd : SS = FALSE
SS flow Grd : SS flow = SS Initial
SS Pre 1 : intruder = TRUE
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then
SS flow Act : SS flow := SS Trigger
intruder m1 Equal : intruder m1 := intruder
end
Event SafeSeparation Trigger =̂
when
SS flow Grd : SS flow = SS Trigger
SS Trig 1 : intruder m1 = TRUE
then
SS flow Act : SS flow := SS 1
end
Event SS 1 =̂
when
SS flow Grd : SS flow = SS 1
then
SS flow Act : SS flow := SS 2
SS 1 Act : ss risk := TRUE
end
Event SS 2 =̂
when
SS flow Grd : SS flow = SS 2
then
SS flow Act : SS flow := SS 3
SS 2 Act : ss plan := TRUE
end
Event SS 3 =̂
when
SS flow Grd : SS flow = SS 3
then
SS flow Act : SS flow := SS 4
SS 3 Act : ss response := Accept
end
Event SS 4 =̂
when
SS flow Grd : SS flow = SS 4
then
SS flow Act : SS flow := SS 5
SS 4 Act : mission := SS P lan
end
Event SS 5 =̂
when
SS flow Grd : SS flow = SS 5
then
SS flow Act : SS flow := SS Final
SS 5 Act : intruder m1 := FALSE
end
Event SafeSeparation Final =̂
refines SafeSeparation
when
SS Grd : SS = FALSE
SS flow Grd : SS flow = SS Final
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then
SS Act : SS := TRUE
intruder equal : intruder := intruder m1
end
Event SafeSeperationFailure Trigger =̂
when
SS flow Grd : SS flow = SS 2
F Trig 1 : ss risk = TRUE
then
SS flow Act : SS flow := F 1
end
Event F 1 =̂
when
SS flow Grd : SS flow = F 1
then
SS flow Act : SS flow := F 2
F 1 Act : ss plan := FALSE
end
Event F 2 =̂
when
SS flow Grd : SS flow = F 2
then
SS flow Act : SS flow := F 3
F 2 Act : mission := On Route
end
Event F 3 =̂
when
SS flow Grd : SS flow = F 3
then
SS flow Act : SS flow := F 4
F 3 Act : ss breach := TRUE
CA Act : CA := FALSE
end
Event CollisionAvoidance =̂
when
CA ExtPoint : SS flow = F 4
CA Pre 1 : ss breach = TRUE ∧mission = On Route
CA Grd : CA = FALSE
then
CA Act : CA := TRUE
CA RejPoint : SS flow := SS Final
CA Post Act : ca breach, intruder m1,mission : |ca breach′ = FALSE ∧ intruder m1′ = FALSE ∧mission′ ∈
{CA Plan,On Route}
end
Event CollisionAvoidance FALSE =̂
when
CA Grd : CA = FALSE
CA ExtPoint : SS flow = F 4
CA Pre 1 Neg : ¬(ss breach = TRUE ∧mission = On Route)
then
CA Act : CA := TRUE
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end
Event F 4 =̂
when
SS flow Grd : SS flow = F 4
CA Grd : CA = TRUE
then
F 3 Act : ca breach := TRUE
SS flow Act : SS flow := SS Final
end
END
An Event-B Specification of CollisionAvoidance Flow
CONTEXT CollisionAvoidance Flow
SETS
CA FLOW
CONSTANTS
CA Initial, CA Trigger, CA 1, CA 2, CA 3, CA 4, CA 5, CA Final
AXIOMS
CA FLOW Type : partition(CA FLOW, {CA Initial}, {CA Trigger}, {CA 1}, {CA 2},
{CA 3}, {CA 4}, {CA 5}, {CA Final})
END
An Event-B Specification of m2 CollisionAvoidance Scenario
MACHINE m2 CollisionAvoidance Scenario
REFINES m1 SafeSeparation Scenario
SEES SafeSeparation Static, SafeSeparation Flow, CollisionAvoidance Flow
VARIABLES
SS,CA,CA flow, intruder, separation, SS flow, ss risk, ss plan,mission m2,
ss response, ss breach, intruder m1, ca breach, ca risk, ss breach m2,
ca plan, ca response, intruder m2, ca breach m2,mission
INVARIANTS
CA flow Type : CA flow ∈ CA FLOW
ca plan Type : ca plan ∈ BOOL
ca risk Type : ca risk ∈ BOOL
ca response Type : ca response ∈ RESPONSE
ca breach m2 Type : ca breach m2 ∈ BOOL
intruder threat m2 Type : intruder m2 ∈ BOOL
mission m2 Type : mission m2 ∈ PLAN
ss breach m2 Type : ss breach m2 ∈ BOOL
CA Glue Variables : CA flow = CA Trigger ∨ (CA flow = CA Final ∧ CA = TRUE ∧
SS flow = SS Final)⇒ (ca breach m2 = ca breach) ∧ (intruder m2 = intruder m1)
CA Glue Flow : CA flow ∈ CA FLOW \ {CA Initial, CA Final}⇒
CA = FALSE ∧ SS flow = F 4
CA Scenario Pre : CA flow ∈ CA FLOW \ {CA Initial} ∧
CA = FALSE ∧ SS flow = F 4⇒ ss breach = TRUE ∧mission = On Route
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CA Scenario Post : CA flow = CA Final⇒ ca breach m2 = FALSE ∧ intruder m2 = FALSE ∧
mission m2 ∈ {CA Plan,On Route}
CA Scenario Inv : (separation = TRUE⇔ (ss breach m2 = FALSE ∧ ca breach m2 = FALSE) ∨
(ss breach m2 = TRUE ∧ ca breach m2 = FALSE))
∧
(separation = FALSE⇔ ca breach m2 = TRUE)
∧
(separation = FALSE⇔ ca breach m2 = TRUE)
∧
(¬(ca breach m2 = TRUE ∧ ss breach m2 = FALSE))
CA StepAssert 1 : CA flow = CA 5⇒mission m2 = CA Plan
EVENTS
Initialisation
extended
begin
S Init : SS := FALSE
intruder Init : intruder := TRUE
separation Init : separation := TRUE
CA Init : CA := FALSE
SS flow Init : SS flow := SS Initial
ss risk Init : ss risk := FALSE
ss response Init : ss response := Idle
ss plan Init : ss plan := FALSE
ss breach Init : ss breach := FALSE
intruder m1 Init : intruder m1 := TRUE
ca breach Init : ca breach := FALSE
mission Init : mission := On Route
CA flow Init : CA flow := CA Initial
ca plan Init : ca plan := FALSE
ca risk Init : ca risk := FALSE
ca response Init : ca response := Idle
ca breach m2 Init : ca breach m2 := FALSE
intruder m2 Init : intruder m2 := TRUE
mission m2 Init : mission m2 := On Route
ss breach m2 Init : ss breach m2 := FALSE
end
Event SafeSeparation Initial =̂
extends SafeSeparation Initial
when
SS Grd : SS = FALSE
SS flow Grd : SS flow = SS Initial
SS Pre 1 : intruder = TRUE
then
SS flow Act : SS flow := SS Trigger
intruder m1 Equal : intruder m1 := intruder
end
Event SafeSeparation Trigger =̂
extends SafeSeparation Trigger
when
SS flow Grd : SS flow = SS Trigger
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SS Trig 1 : intruder m1 = TRUE
then
SS flow Act : SS flow := SS 1
end
Event SS 1 =̂
extends SS 1
when
SS flow Grd : SS flow = SS 1
then
SS flow Act : SS flow := SS 2
SS 1 Act : ss risk := TRUE
end
Event SS 2 =̂
extends SS 2
when
SS flow Grd : SS flow = SS 2
then
SS flow Act : SS flow := SS 3
SS 2 Act : ss plan := TRUE
end
Event SS 3 =̂
extends SS 3
when
SS flow Grd : SS flow = SS 3
then
SS flow Act : SS flow := SS 4
SS 3 Act : ss response := Accept
end
Event SS 4 =̂
extends SS 4
when
SS flow Grd : SS flow = SS 4
then
SS flow Act : SS flow := SS 5
SS 4 Act : mission := SS P lan
end
Event SS 5 =̂
extends SS 5
when
SS flow Grd : SS flow = SS 5
then
SS flow Act : SS flow := SS Final
SS 5 Act : intruder m1 := FALSE
end
Event SafeSeparation Final =̂
extends SafeSeparation Final
when
SS Grd : SS = FALSE
SS flow Grd : SS flow = SS Final
then
SS Act : SS := TRUE
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intruder equal : intruder := intruder m1
end
Event SafeSeperationFailure Trigger =̂
extends SafeSeperationFailure Trigger
when
SS flow Grd : SS flow = SS 2
F Trig 1 : ss risk = TRUE
then
SS flow Act : SS flow := F 1
end
Event F 1 =̂
extends F 1
when
SS flow Grd : SS flow = F 1
then
SS flow Act : SS flow := F 2
F 1 Act : ss plan := FALSE
end
Event F 2 =̂
extends F 2
when
SS flow Grd : SS flow = F 2
then
SS flow Act : SS flow := F 3
F 2 Act : mission := On Route
end
Event F 3 =̂
extends F 3
when
SS flow Grd : SS flow = F 3
then
SS flow Act : SS flow := F 4
F 3 Act : ss breach := TRUE
CA Act : CA := FALSE
end
Event CollisionAvoidance Initial =̂
when
CA flow Grd : CA flow = CA Initial
CA Pre 1 : ss breach = TRUE ∧mission = On Route
CA Grd : CA = FALSE
CA ExtPoint : SS flow = F 4
then
CA flow Act : CA flow := CA Trigger
ss breach m2 Equal : ss breach m2 := ss breach
ca zone m2 Equal : ca breach m2 := ca breach
intruder threat m2 Equal : intruder m2 := intruder m1
mission m2 Equal : mission m2 := mission
end
Event CollisionAvoidance Trigger =̂
when
CA flow Grd : CA flow = CA Trigger
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CA Trig 1 : ss breach m2 = TRUE ∧mission m2 = On Route
then
CA flow Act : CA flow := CA 1
end
Event CA 1 =̂
when
CA flow Grd : CA flow = CA 1
then
CA flow Act : CA flow := CA 2
CA 1 Act : ca risk := TRUE
end
Event CA 2 =̂
when
CA flow Grd : CA flow = CA 2
then
CA flow Act : CA flow := CA 3
CA 2 Act : ca plan := TRUE
end
Event CA 3 =̂
when
CA flow Grd : CA flow = CA 3
then
CA flow Act : CA flow := CA 4
CA 2 Act : ca response := Accept
end
Event CA 4 =̂
when
CA flow Grd : CA flow = CA 4
then
CA flow Act : CA flow := CA 5
CA 4 Act : mission m2 := CA Plan
end
Event CA 5 =̂
when
CA flow Grd : CA flow = CA 5
then
CA flow Act : CA flow := CA Final
CA 5 Act : intruder m2 := FALSE
end
Event CollisionAvoidance Final =̂
refines CollisionAvoidance
when
CA flow Grd : CA flow = CA Final
CA Grd : CA = FALSE
CA ExtPoint : SS flow = F 4
then
CA Act : CA := TRUE
CA RejPoint : SS flow := SS Final
intruder m1 Equal : intruder m1 := intruder m2
ca breach Equal : ca breach := ca breach m2
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mission Equal : mission := mission m2
end
Event CollisionAvoidance FALSE =̂
extends CollisionAvoidance FALSE
when
CA Grd : CA = FALSE
CA ExtPoint : SS flow = F 4
CA Pre 1 Neg : ¬(ss breach = TRUE ∧mission = On Route)
then
CA Act : CA := TRUE
end
Event F 4 =̂
extends F 4
when
SS flow Grd : SS flow = F 4
CA Grd : CA = TRUE
then
F 3 Act : ca breach := TRUE
SS flow Act : SS flow := SS Final
end
END
AppendixC
Case Studies: State Charts
C.1 UC1: Water Tank System
| |
root
DEC = 2,DRN = 0,H = 4,
HT = 3,INC = 2,L = 0,
LT = 1
SETUP_CONSTANTS(2,0,4,3,2,0,1)
DL = FALSE,MH_flow = MH_Initial,motor = TRUE,
pump = TRUE,sensorHT = FALSE,waterlevel_m1 = 4,
MH = FALSE,waterlevel = 4
INITIALISATION(FALSE,MH_Initial,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,4,
FALSE,4)
DL = FALSE,MH_flow = MH_Trigger,motor = TRUE,
pump = TRUE,sensorHT = FALSE,waterlevel_m1 = 4,
MH = FALSE,waterlevel = 4
MaintainH_Initial
DL = FALSE,MH_flow = MH_1,motor = TRUE,
pump = TRUE,sensorHT = FALSE,waterlevel_m1 = 4,
MH = FALSE,waterlevel = 4
MaintainH_Trigger
DL = FALSE,MH_flow = MH_2,motor = TRUE,
pump = TRUE,sensorHT = TRUE,waterlevel_m1 = 4,
MH = FALSE,waterlevel = 4
MH_1
DL = FALSE,MH_flow = MH_3,motor = TRUE,
pump = FALSE,sensorHT = TRUE,waterlevel_m1 = 4,
MH = FALSE,waterlevel = 4
MH_2
DL = FALSE,MH_flow = MH_4,motor = FALSE,
pump = FALSE,sensorHT = TRUE,waterlevel_m1 = 4,
MH = FALSE,waterlevel = 4
MH_3
DL = FALSE,MH_flow = EH_1,motor = TRUE,
pump = FALSE,sensorHT = TRUE,waterlevel_m1 = 4,
MH = FALSE,waterlevel = 4
ExceedH_Trigger
DL = FALSE,MH_flow = MH_Final,motor = FALSE,
pump = FALSE,sensorHT = TRUE,waterlevel_m1 = 2,
MH = FALSE,waterlevel = 4
MH_4
DL = FALSE,MH_flow = EH_2,motor = TRUE,
pump = FALSE,sensorHT = TRUE,waterlevel_m1 = 4,
MH = FALSE,waterlevel = 4
EH_1
DL = FALSE,MH_flow = MH_Final,motor = FALSE,
pump = FALSE,sensorHT = TRUE,waterlevel_m1 = 2,
MH = TRUE,waterlevel = 2
MaintainH_Final
DL = FALSE,MH_flow = MH_Final,motor = TRUE,
pump = FALSE,sensorHT = TRUE,waterlevel_m1 = 6,
MH = FALSE,waterlevel = 4
EH_2
Figure C.1: MaintainH Scenario m1: Deviation from ExceedH accident case without pre-
vention from DrainToL extension use case.| |
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| |
root
DEC = 2,DRN = 0,H = 4,
HT = 3,INC = 2,L = 0,
LT = 1
SETUP_CONSTANTS(2,0,4,3,2,0,1)
DL = FALSE,MH_flow = MH_Initial,motor = TRUE,
pump = TRUE,sensorHT = FALSE,waterlevel_m1 = 4,
MH = FALSE,waterlevel = 4
INITIALISATION(FALSE,MH_Initial,TRUE,TRUE,FALSE,4,
FALSE,4)
DL = FALSE,MH_flow = MH_Trigger,motor = TRUE,
pump = TRUE,sensorHT = FALSE,waterlevel_m1 = 4,
MH = FALSE,waterlevel = 4
MaintainH_Initial
DL = FALSE,MH_flow = MH_1,motor = TRUE,
pump = TRUE,sensorHT = FALSE,waterlevel_m1 = 4,
MH = FALSE,waterlevel = 4
MaintainH_Trigger
DL = FALSE,MH_flow = MH_2,motor = TRUE,
pump = TRUE,sensorHT = TRUE,waterlevel_m1 = 4,
MH = FALSE,waterlevel = 4
MH_1
DL = FALSE,MH_flow = MH_3,motor = TRUE,
pump = FALSE,sensorHT = TRUE,waterlevel_m1 = 4,
MH = FALSE,waterlevel = 4
MH_2
DL = FALSE,MH_flow = MH_4,motor = FALSE,
pump = FALSE,sensorHT = TRUE,waterlevel_m1 = 4,
MH = FALSE,waterlevel = 4
MH_3
DL = FALSE,MH_flow = EH_1,motor = TRUE,
pump = FALSE,sensorHT = TRUE,waterlevel_m1 = 4,
MH = FALSE,waterlevel = 4
ExceedH_Trigger
DL = FALSE,MH_flow = MH_Final,motor = FALSE,
pump = FALSE,sensorHT = TRUE,waterlevel_m1 = 2,
MH = FALSE,waterlevel = 4
MH_4
DL = FALSE,MH_flow = EH_2,motor = TRUE,
pump = FALSE,sensorHT = TRUE,waterlevel_m1 = 4,
MH = FALSE,waterlevel = 4
EH_1
DL = FALSE,MH_flow = MH_Final,motor = FALSE,
pump = FALSE,sensorHT = TRUE,waterlevel_m1 = 2,
MH = TRUE,waterlevel = 2
MaintainH_Final
DL = TRUE,MH_flow = EH_2,motor = TRUE,
pump = FALSE,sensorHT = TRUE,waterlevel_m1 = 0,
MH = FALSE,waterlevel = 4
DrainToL
DL = TRUE,MH_flow = MH_Final,motor = TRUE,
pump = FALSE,sensorHT = TRUE,waterlevel_m1 = 2,
MH = FALSE,waterlevel = 4
EH_2
DL = TRUE,MH_flow = MH_Final,motor = TRUE,
pump = FALSE,sensorHT = TRUE,waterlevel_m1 = 2,
MH = TRUE,waterlevel = 2
MaintainH_Final
Figure C.2: MaintainH Scenario m1: Deviation from ExceedH accident case with preven-
tion from DrainToL extension use case.| |
Appendix C. Case Studies: State Charts 206
C.2 UC2: Train Door Control System
| |
root
EB = FALSE,OD_flow = OD_Initial,door_cmd = FALSE,
door_m1 = Closed,request_door = TRUE,speed_sensor = Stationary,
t_speed_m1 = Stationary,OD = FALSE,door = Closed,
t_speed = Stationary
INITIALISATION(FALSE,OD_Initial,FALSE,Closed,TRUE,
Stationary,Stationary,FALSE,Closed,Stationary)
EB = FALSE,OD_flow = OD_Trigger,door_cmd = FALSE,
door_m1 = Closed,request_door = TRUE,speed_sensor = Stationary,
t_speed_m1 = Stationary,OD = FALSE,door = Closed,
t_speed = Stationary
OpenDoor_Initial
EB = FALSE,OD_flow = OD_1,door_cmd = FALSE,
door_m1 = Closed,request_door = TRUE,speed_sensor = Stationary,
t_speed_m1 = Stationary,OD = FALSE,door = Closed,
t_speed = Stationary
OpenDoor_Trigger
EB = FALSE,OD_flow = OD_2,door_cmd = FALSE,
door_m1 = Closed,request_door = TRUE,speed_sensor = Stationary,
t_speed_m1 = Stationary,OD = FALSE,door = Closed,
t_speed = Stationary
OD_1
EB = FALSE,OD_flow = OD_2_1,door_cmd = FALSE,
door_m1 = Closed,request_door = TRUE,speed_sensor = Stationary,
t_speed_m1 = Stationary,OD = FALSE,door = Closed,
t_speed = Stationary
OD_2_If
EB = FALSE,OD_flow = OD_2_2,door_cmd = TRUE,
door_m1 = Closed,request_door = TRUE,speed_sensor = Stationary,
t_speed_m1 = Stationary,OD = FALSE,door = Closed,
t_speed = Stationary
OD_2_1
EB = FALSE,OD_flow = OD_2_3,door_cmd = TRUE,
door_m1 = Opening,request_door = TRUE,speed_sensor = Stationary,
t_speed_m1 = Stationary,OD = FALSE,door = Closed,
t_speed = Stationary
OD_2_2
EB = FALSE,OD_flow = OD_Final,door_cmd = TRUE,
door_m1 = Open,request_door = TRUE,speed_sensor = Stationary,
t_speed_m1 = Stationary,OD = FALSE,door = Closed,
t_speed = Stationary
OD_2_3
EB = FALSE,OD_flow = OD_Final,door_cmd = TRUE,
door_m1 = Open,request_door = TRUE,speed_sensor = Stationary,
t_speed_m1 = Stationary,OD = TRUE,door = Open,
t_speed = Stationary
OpenDoor_Final
Figure C.3: OpenDoor m1: TDCS issues door open command when train speed is station-
ary.| |
Appendix C. Case Studies: State Charts 207
| |
root
EB = FALSE,OD_flow = OD_Initial,door_cmd = FALSE,
door_m1 = Closed,request_door = TRUE,speed_sensor = Moving,
t_speed_m1 = Moving,OD = FALSE,door = Closed,
t_speed = Moving
INITIALISATION(FALSE,OD_Initial,FALSE,Closed,TRUE,
Moving,Moving,FALSE,Closed,Moving)
EB = FALSE,OD_flow = OD_Trigger,door_cmd = FALSE,
door_m1 = Closed,request_door = TRUE,speed_sensor = Moving,
t_speed_m1 = Moving,OD = FALSE,door = Closed,
t_speed = Moving
OpenDoor_Initial
EB = FALSE,OD_flow = OD_1,door_cmd = FALSE,
door_m1 = Closed,request_door = TRUE,speed_sensor = Moving,
t_speed_m1 = Moving,OD = FALSE,door = Closed,
t_speed = Moving
OpenDoor_Trigger
EB = FALSE,OD_flow = OD_2,door_cmd = FALSE,
door_m1 = Closed,request_door = TRUE,speed_sensor = Moving,
t_speed_m1 = Moving,OD = FALSE,door = Closed,
t_speed = Moving
OD_1
EB = FALSE,OD_flow = OD_Final,door_cmd = FALSE,
door_m1 = Closed,request_door = TRUE,speed_sensor = Moving,
t_speed_m1 = Moving,OD = FALSE,door = Closed,
t_speed = Moving
OD_2_If_False
EB = FALSE,OD_flow = PT_1,door_cmd = FALSE,
door_m1 = Closed,request_door = TRUE,speed_sensor = Moving,
t_speed_m1 = Moving,OD = FALSE,door = Closed,
t_speed = Moving
PT_Trigger
EB = FALSE,OD_flow = OD_Final,door_cmd = FALSE,
door_m1 = Closed,request_door = TRUE,speed_sensor = Moving,
t_speed_m1 = Moving,OD = TRUE,door = Closed,
t_speed = Moving
OpenDoor_Final
EB = FALSE,OD_flow = PT_2,door_cmd = FALSE,
door_m1 = Opening,request_door = TRUE,speed_sensor = Moving,
t_speed_m1 = Moving,OD = FALSE,door = Closed,
t_speed = Moving
PT_1
EB = FALSE,OD_flow = OD_Final,door_cmd = FALSE,
door_m1 = Open,request_door = TRUE,speed_sensor = Moving,
t_speed_m1 = Moving,OD = FALSE,door = Closed,
t_speed = Moving
PT_2
Figure C.4: OpenDoor m1: Deviation from PassengerFallsOffMovingTrain accident case.| |
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| |
root
EB = FALSE,OD_flow = OD_Initial,door_cmd = FALSE,
door_m1 = Closed,request_door = TRUE,speed_sensor = Moving,
t_speed_m1 = Moving,OD = FALSE,door = Closed,
t_speed = Moving
INITIALISATION(FALSE,OD_Initial,FALSE,Closed,TRUE,
Moving,Moving,FALSE,Closed,Moving)
EB = FALSE,OD_flow = OD_Trigger,door_cmd = FALSE,
door_m1 = Closed,request_door = TRUE,speed_sensor = Moving,
t_speed_m1 = Moving,OD = FALSE,door = Closed,
t_speed = Moving
OpenDoor_Initial
EB = FALSE,OD_flow = OD_1,door_cmd = FALSE,
door_m1 = Closed,request_door = TRUE,speed_sensor = Moving,
t_speed_m1 = Moving,OD = FALSE,door = Closed,
t_speed = Moving
OpenDoor_Trigger
EB = FALSE,OD_flow = OD_2,door_cmd = FALSE,
door_m1 = Closed,request_door = TRUE,speed_sensor = Moving,
t_speed_m1 = Moving,OD = FALSE,door = Closed,
t_speed = Moving
OD_1
EB = FALSE,OD_flow = OD_Final,door_cmd = FALSE,
door_m1 = Closed,request_door = TRUE,speed_sensor = Moving,
t_speed_m1 = Moving,OD = FALSE,door = Closed,
t_speed = Moving
OD_2_If_False
EB = FALSE,OD_flow = PT_1,door_cmd = FALSE,
door_m1 = Closed,request_door = TRUE,speed_sensor = Moving,
t_speed_m1 = Moving,OD = FALSE,door = Closed,
t_speed = Moving
PT_Trigger
EB = FALSE,OD_flow = OD_Final,door_cmd = FALSE,
door_m1 = Closed,request_door = TRUE,speed_sensor = Moving,
t_speed_m1 = Moving,OD = TRUE,door = Closed,
t_speed = Moving
OpenDoor_Final
EB = FALSE,OD_flow = PT_2,door_cmd = FALSE,
door_m1 = Opening,request_door = TRUE,speed_sensor = Moving,
t_speed_m1 = Moving,OD = FALSE,door = Closed,
t_speed = Moving
PT_1
EB = TRUE,OD_flow = PT_2,door_cmd = FALSE,
door_m1 = Opening,request_door = TRUE,speed_sensor = Stationary,
t_speed_m1 = Stationary,OD = FALSE,door = Closed,
t_speed = Moving
EmergencyBraking
EB = TRUE,OD_flow = OD_Final,door_cmd = FALSE,
door_m1 = Open,request_door = TRUE,speed_sensor = Stationary,
t_speed_m1 = Stationary,OD = FALSE,door = Closed,
t_speed = Moving
PT_2
EB = TRUE,OD_flow = OD_Final,door_cmd = FALSE,
door_m1 = Open,request_door = TRUE,speed_sensor = Stationary,
t_speed_m1 = Stationary,OD = TRUE,door = Open,
t_speed = Stationary
OpenDoor_Final
Figure C.5: OpenDoor m1: Deviation from PassengerFallsOffMovingTrain accident case
with prevention from EmergencyBraking extension use case.| |
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C.3 UC3: Automated Teller Machine
| |
root
b_AccountBalance = 1
SETUP_CONSTANTS(1)
BC = FALSE,W_flow = W_Initial,atm_Dispense_m1 = 0,
atm_Request = Request_Card,b_FailPINAttempt = 0,c_Card_m1 = Inserted,
c_PIN = b_AccountPIN,c_WithdrawRequest = 0,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
INITIALISATION(FALSE,W_Initial,0,Request_Card,0,In
serted,b_AccountPIN,0,FALSE,0,Inserted)
BC = FALSE,W_flow = W_Trigger,atm_Dispense_m1 = 0,
atm_Request = Request_Card,b_FailPINAttempt = 0,c_Card_m1 = Inserted,
c_PIN = b_AccountPIN,c_WithdrawRequest = 0,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
Withdraw_Initial
BC = FALSE,W_flow = W_1,atm_Dispense_m1 = 0,
atm_Request = Request_Card,b_FailPINAttempt = 0,c_Card_m1 = Inserted,
c_PIN = b_AccountPIN,c_WithdrawRequest = 0,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
Withdraw_Trigger
BC = TRUE,W_flow = W_1,atm_Dispense_m1 = 0,
atm_Request = Request_Card,b_FailPINAttempt = 0,c_Card_m1 = Inserted,
c_PIN = b_AccountPIN,c_WithdrawRequest = 0,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
BlockCard_FALSE
BC = TRUE,W_flow = W_2,atm_Dispense_m1 = 0,
atm_Request = Request_PIN,b_FailPINAttempt = 0,c_Card_m1 = Inserted,
c_PIN = b_AccountPIN,c_WithdrawRequest = 0,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
W_1
BC = TRUE,W_flow = W_3,atm_Dispense_m1 = 0,
atm_Request = Request_PIN,b_FailPINAttempt = 0,c_Card_m1 = Inserted,
c_PIN = b_AccountPIN,c_WithdrawRequest = 0,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
W_2
BC = TRUE,W_flow = W_A_2,atm_Dispense_m1 = 0,
atm_Request = Request_PIN,b_FailPINAttempt = 0,c_Card_m1 = Inserted,
c_PIN = PIN2,c_WithdrawRequest = 0,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
W_A_1
BC = TRUE,W_flow = W_4,atm_Dispense_m1 = 0,
atm_Request = Request_Withdrawal,b_FailPINAttempt = 0,c_Card_m1 = Inserted,
c_PIN = b_AccountPIN,c_WithdrawRequest = 0,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
W_3
BC = FALSE,W_flow = W_1,atm_Dispense_m1 = 0,
atm_Request = Request_PIN,b_FailPINAttempt = 1,c_Card_m1 = Inserted,
c_PIN = PIN2,c_WithdrawRequest = 0,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
W_A_2
BC = TRUE,W_flow = W_5,atm_Dispense_m1 = 0,
atm_Request = Request_Withdrawal,b_FailPINAttempt = 0,c_Card_m1 = Inserted,
c_PIN = b_AccountPIN,c_WithdrawRequest = 1,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
W_4
BC = TRUE,W_flow = W_1,atm_Dispense_m1 = 0,
atm_Request = Request_PIN,b_FailPINAttempt = 1,c_Card_m1 = Inserted,
c_PIN = PIN2,c_WithdrawRequest = 0,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
BlockCard_FALSE
BC = TRUE,W_flow = W_6,atm_Dispense_m1 = 0,
atm_Request = Request_Withdrawal,b_FailPINAttempt = 0,c_Card_m1 = Returned,
c_PIN = b_AccountPIN,c_WithdrawRequest = 1,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
W_5
BC = TRUE,W_flow = W_2,atm_Dispense_m1 = 0,
atm_Request = Request_PIN,b_FailPINAttempt = 1,c_Card_m1 = Inserted,
c_PIN = PIN2,c_WithdrawRequest = 0,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
W_1
BC = TRUE,W_flow = W_Final,atm_Dispense_m1 = 1,
atm_Request = Request_Withdrawal,b_FailPINAttempt = 0,c_Card_m1 = Returned,
c_PIN = b_AccountPIN,c_WithdrawRequest = 1,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
W_6
BC = TRUE,W_flow = W_3,atm_Dispense_m1 = 0,
atm_Request = Request_PIN,b_FailPINAttempt = 1,c_Card_m1 = Inserted,
c_PIN = b_AccountPIN,c_WithdrawRequest = 0,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
W_2
BC = TRUE,W_flow = W_A_2,atm_Dispense_m1 = 0,
atm_Request = Request_PIN,b_FailPINAttempt = 1,c_Card_m1 = Inserted,
c_PIN = PIN2,c_WithdrawRequest = 0,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
W_A_1
BC = TRUE,W_flow = W_Final,atm_Dispense_m1 = 1,
atm_Request = Request_Withdrawal,b_FailPINAttempt = 0,c_Card_m1 = Returned,
c_PIN = b_AccountPIN,c_WithdrawRequest = 1,W = TRUE,
atm_Dispense = 1,c_Card = Returned
Withdraw_Final
BC = TRUE,W_flow = W_4,atm_Dispense_m1 = 0,
atm_Request = Request_Withdrawal,b_FailPINAttempt = 1,c_Card_m1 = Inserted,
c_PIN = b_AccountPIN,c_WithdrawRequest = 0,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
W_3
BC = FALSE,W_flow = W_1,atm_Dispense_m1 = 0,
atm_Request = Request_PIN,b_FailPINAttempt = 2,c_Card_m1 = Inserted,
c_PIN = PIN2,c_WithdrawRequest = 0,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
W_A_2
BC = TRUE,W_flow = W_5,atm_Dispense_m1 = 0,
atm_Request = Request_Withdrawal,b_FailPINAttempt = 1,c_Card_m1 = Inserted,
c_PIN = b_AccountPIN,c_WithdrawRequest = 1,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
W_4
BC = TRUE,W_flow = W_1,atm_Dispense_m1 = 0,
atm_Request = Request_PIN,b_FailPINAttempt = 2,c_Card_m1 = Inserted,
c_PIN = PIN2,c_WithdrawRequest = 0,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
BlockCard_FALSE
BC = TRUE,W_flow = W_2,atm_Dispense_m1 = 0,
atm_Request = Request_PIN,b_FailPINAttempt = 2,c_Card_m1 = Inserted,
c_PIN = PIN2,c_WithdrawRequest = 0,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
W_1
BC = TRUE,W_flow = W_3,atm_Dispense_m1 = 0,
atm_Request = Request_PIN,b_FailPINAttempt = 2,c_Card_m1 = Inserted,
c_PIN = b_AccountPIN,c_WithdrawRequest = 0,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
W_2
BC = TRUE,W_flow = W_A_2,atm_Dispense_m1 = 0,
atm_Request = Request_PIN,b_FailPINAttempt = 2,c_Card_m1 = Inserted,
c_PIN = PIN2,c_WithdrawRequest = 0,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
W_A_1
BC = TRUE,W_flow = W_4,atm_Dispense_m1 = 0,
atm_Request = Request_Withdrawal,b_FailPINAttempt = 2,c_Card_m1 = Inserted,
c_PIN = b_AccountPIN,c_WithdrawRequest = 0,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
W_3
BC = FALSE,W_flow = W_1,atm_Dispense_m1 = 0,
atm_Request = Request_PIN,b_FailPINAttempt = 3,c_Card_m1 = Inserted,
c_PIN = PIN2,c_WithdrawRequest = 0,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
W_A_2
BC = TRUE,W_flow = W_6,atm_Dispense_m1 = 0,
atm_Request = Request_Withdrawal,b_FailPINAttempt = 1,c_Card_m1 = Returned,
c_PIN = b_AccountPIN,c_WithdrawRequest = 1,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
W_5
BC = TRUE,W_flow = W_5,atm_Dispense_m1 = 0,
atm_Request = Request_Withdrawal,b_FailPINAttempt = 2,c_Card_m1 = Inserted,
c_PIN = b_AccountPIN,c_WithdrawRequest = 1,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
W_4
BC = TRUE,W_flow = W_Final,atm_Dispense_m1 = 0,
atm_Request = Request_PIN,b_FailPINAttempt = 3,c_Card_m1 = Withheld,
c_PIN = PIN2,c_WithdrawRequest = 0,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
BlockCard
BC = TRUE,W_flow = W_Final,atm_Dispense_m1 = 1,
atm_Request = Request_Withdrawal,b_FailPINAttempt = 1,c_Card_m1 = Returned,
c_PIN = b_AccountPIN,c_WithdrawRequest = 1,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
W_6
BC = TRUE,W_flow = W_6,atm_Dispense_m1 = 0,
atm_Request = Request_Withdrawal,b_FailPINAttempt = 2,c_Card_m1 = Returned,
c_PIN = b_AccountPIN,c_WithdrawRequest = 1,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
W_5
BC = TRUE,W_flow = W_Final,atm_Dispense_m1 = 0,
atm_Request = Request_PIN,b_FailPINAttempt = 3,c_Card_m1 = Withheld,
c_PIN = PIN2,c_WithdrawRequest = 0,W = TRUE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Withheld
Withdraw_Final
BC = TRUE,W_flow = W_Final,atm_Dispense_m1 = 1,
atm_Request = Request_Withdrawal,b_FailPINAttempt = 1,c_Card_m1 = Returned,
c_PIN = b_AccountPIN,c_WithdrawRequest = 1,W = TRUE,
atm_Dispense = 1,c_Card = Returned
Withdraw_Final
BC = TRUE,W_flow = W_Final,atm_Dispense_m1 = 1,
atm_Request = Request_Withdrawal,b_FailPINAttempt = 2,c_Card_m1 = Returned,
c_PIN = b_AccountPIN,c_WithdrawRequest = 1,W = FALSE,
atm_Dispense = 0,c_Card = Inserted
W_6
BC = TRUE,W_flow = W_Final,atm_Dispense_m1 = 1,
atm_Request = Request_Withdrawal,b_FailPINAttempt = 2,c_Card_m1 = Returned,
c_PIN = b_AccountPIN,c_WithdrawRequest = 1,W = TRUE,
atm_Dispense = 1,c_Card = Returned
Withdraw_Final
Figure C.6: State chart for Withdraw use case with extesnion BlockCard.| |
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C.4 UC4: Sense and Avoid
| |
root
CA = FALSE,SS_flow = SS_Initial,ca_breach = FALSE,
intruder_m1 = TRUE,mission = On_Route,ss_breach = FALSE,
ss_plan = FALSE,ss_response = Idle,ss_risk = FALSE,
SS = FALSE,intruder = TRUE,separation = TRUE
INITIALISATION(FALSE,SS_Initial,FALSE,TRUE,On_Rout
e,FALSE,FALSE,Idle,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,TRUE)
CA = FALSE,SS_flow = SS_Trigger,ca_breach = FALSE,
intruder_m1 = TRUE,mission = On_Route,ss_breach = FALSE,
ss_plan = FALSE,ss_response = Idle,ss_risk = FALSE,
SS = FALSE,intruder = TRUE,separation = TRUE
SafeSeparation_Initial
CA = FALSE,SS_flow = SS_1,ca_breach = FALSE,
intruder_m1 = TRUE,mission = On_Route,ss_breach = FALSE,
ss_plan = FALSE,ss_response = Idle,ss_risk = FALSE,
SS = FALSE,intruder = TRUE,separation = TRUE
SafeSeparation_Trigger
CA = FALSE,SS_flow = SS_2,ca_breach = FALSE,
intruder_m1 = TRUE,mission = On_Route,ss_breach = FALSE,
ss_plan = FALSE,ss_response = Idle,ss_risk = TRUE,
SS = FALSE,intruder = TRUE,separation = TRUE
SS_1
CA = FALSE,SS_flow = SS_3,ca_breach = FALSE,
intruder_m1 = TRUE,mission = On_Route,ss_breach = FALSE,
ss_plan = TRUE,ss_response = Idle,ss_risk = TRUE,
SS = FALSE,intruder = TRUE,separation = TRUE
SS_2
CA = FALSE,SS_flow = F_1,ca_breach = FALSE,
intruder_m1 = TRUE,mission = On_Route,ss_breach = FALSE,
ss_plan = FALSE,ss_response = Idle,ss_risk = TRUE,
SS = FALSE,intruder = TRUE,separation = TRUE
SafeSeperationFailure_Trigger
CA = FALSE,SS_flow = SS_4,ca_breach = FALSE,
intruder_m1 = TRUE,mission = On_Route,ss_breach = FALSE,
ss_plan = TRUE,ss_response = Accept,ss_risk = TRUE,
SS = FALSE,intruder = TRUE,separation = TRUE
SS_3
CA = FALSE,SS_flow = F_2,ca_breach = FALSE,
intruder_m1 = TRUE,mission = On_Route,ss_breach = FALSE,
ss_plan = FALSE,ss_response = Idle,ss_risk = TRUE,
SS = FALSE,intruder = TRUE,separation = TRUE
F_1
CA = FALSE,SS_flow = SS_5,ca_breach = FALSE,
intruder_m1 = TRUE,mission = SS_Plan,ss_breach = FALSE,
ss_plan = TRUE,ss_response = Accept,ss_risk = TRUE,
SS = FALSE,intruder = TRUE,separation = TRUE
SS_4
CA = FALSE,SS_flow = F_3,ca_breach = FALSE,
intruder_m1 = TRUE,mission = On_Route,ss_breach = FALSE,
ss_plan = FALSE,ss_response = Idle,ss_risk = TRUE,
SS = FALSE,intruder = TRUE,separation = TRUE
F_2
CA = FALSE,SS_flow = F_4,ca_breach = FALSE,
intruder_m1 = TRUE,mission = On_Route,ss_breach = TRUE,
ss_plan = FALSE,ss_response = Idle,ss_risk = TRUE,
SS = FALSE,intruder = TRUE,separation = TRUE
F_3
CA = FALSE,SS_flow = SS_Final,ca_breach = FALSE,
intruder_m1 = FALSE,mission = SS_Plan,ss_breach = FALSE,
ss_plan = TRUE,ss_response = Accept,ss_risk = TRUE,
SS = FALSE,intruder = TRUE,separation = TRUE
SS_5
CA = FALSE,SS_flow = SS_Final,ca_breach = TRUE,
intruder_m1 = TRUE,mission = On_Route,ss_breach = TRUE,
ss_plan = FALSE,ss_response = Idle,ss_risk = TRUE,
SS = FALSE,intruder = TRUE,separation = TRUE
F_4
CA = FALSE,SS_flow = SS_Final,ca_breach = FALSE,
intruder_m1 = FALSE,mission = SS_Plan,ss_breach = FALSE,
ss_plan = TRUE,ss_response = Accept,ss_risk = TRUE,
SS = TRUE,intruder = FALSE,separation = TRUE
SafeSeparation_Final
Figure C.7: SafeSeparation with deviation from accident case CollisionWithIntruderAircraft.| |
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| |
root
CA = FALSE,SS_flow = SS_Initial,ca_breach = FALSE,
intruder_m1 = TRUE,mission = On_Route,ss_breach = FALSE,
ss_plan = FALSE,ss_response = Idle,ss_risk = FALSE,
SS = FALSE,intruder = TRUE,separation = TRUE
INITIALISATION(FALSE,SS_Initial,FALSE,TRUE,On_Rout
e,FALSE,FALSE,Idle,FALSE,FALSE,TRUE,TRUE)
CA = FALSE,SS_flow = SS_Trigger,ca_breach = FALSE,
intruder_m1 = TRUE,mission = On_Route,ss_breach = FALSE,
ss_plan = FALSE,ss_response = Idle,ss_risk = FALSE,
SS = FALSE,intruder = TRUE,separation = TRUE
SafeSeparation_Initial
CA = FALSE,SS_flow = SS_1,ca_breach = FALSE,
intruder_m1 = TRUE,mission = On_Route,ss_breach = FALSE,
ss_plan = FALSE,ss_response = Idle,ss_risk = FALSE,
SS = FALSE,intruder = TRUE,separation = TRUE
SafeSeparation_Trigger
CA = FALSE,SS_flow = SS_2,ca_breach = FALSE,
intruder_m1 = TRUE,mission = On_Route,ss_breach = FALSE,
ss_plan = FALSE,ss_response = Idle,ss_risk = TRUE,
SS = FALSE,intruder = TRUE,separation = TRUE
SS_1
CA = FALSE,SS_flow = SS_3,ca_breach = FALSE,
intruder_m1 = TRUE,mission = On_Route,ss_breach = FALSE,
ss_plan = TRUE,ss_response = Idle,ss_risk = TRUE,
SS = FALSE,intruder = TRUE,separation = TRUE
SS_2
CA = FALSE,SS_flow = F_1,ca_breach = FALSE,
intruder_m1 = TRUE,mission = On_Route,ss_breach = FALSE,
ss_plan = FALSE,ss_response = Idle,ss_risk = TRUE,
SS = FALSE,intruder = TRUE,separation = TRUE
SafeSeperationFailure_Trigger
CA = FALSE,SS_flow = SS_4,ca_breach = FALSE,
intruder_m1 = TRUE,mission = On_Route,ss_breach = FALSE,
ss_plan = TRUE,ss_response = Accept,ss_risk = TRUE,
SS = FALSE,intruder = TRUE,separation = TRUE
SS_3
CA = FALSE,SS_flow = F_2,ca_breach = FALSE,
intruder_m1 = TRUE,mission = On_Route,ss_breach = FALSE,
ss_plan = FALSE,ss_response = Idle,ss_risk = TRUE,
SS = FALSE,intruder = TRUE,separation = TRUE
F_1
CA = FALSE,SS_flow = SS_5,ca_breach = FALSE,
intruder_m1 = TRUE,mission = SS_Plan,ss_breach = FALSE,
ss_plan = TRUE,ss_response = Accept,ss_risk = TRUE,
SS = FALSE,intruder = TRUE,separation = TRUE
SS_4
CA = FALSE,SS_flow = F_3,ca_breach = FALSE,
intruder_m1 = TRUE,mission = On_Route,ss_breach = FALSE,
ss_plan = FALSE,ss_response = Idle,ss_risk = TRUE,
SS = FALSE,intruder = TRUE,separation = TRUE
F_2
CA = FALSE,SS_flow = F_4,ca_breach = FALSE,
intruder_m1 = TRUE,mission = On_Route,ss_breach = TRUE,
ss_plan = FALSE,ss_response = Idle,ss_risk = TRUE,
SS = FALSE,intruder = TRUE,separation = TRUE
F_3
CA = FALSE,SS_flow = SS_Final,ca_breach = FALSE,
intruder_m1 = FALSE,mission = SS_Plan,ss_breach = FALSE,
ss_plan = TRUE,ss_response = Accept,ss_risk = TRUE,
SS = FALSE,intruder = TRUE,separation = TRUE
SS_5
CA = TRUE,SS_flow = SS_Final,ca_breach = FALSE,
intruder_m1 = FALSE,mission = CA_Plan,ss_breach = TRUE,
ss_plan = FALSE,ss_response = Idle,ss_risk = TRUE,
SS = FALSE,intruder = TRUE,separation = TRUE
CollisionAvoidance
CA = TRUE,SS_flow = SS_Final,ca_breach = FALSE,
intruder_m1 = FALSE,mission = On_Route,ss_breach = TRUE,
ss_plan = FALSE,ss_response = Idle,ss_risk = TRUE,
SS = FALSE,intruder = TRUE,separation = TRUE
CollisionAvoidance
CA = FALSE,SS_flow = SS_Final,ca_breach = FALSE,
intruder_m1 = FALSE,mission = SS_Plan,ss_breach = FALSE,
ss_plan = TRUE,ss_response = Accept,ss_risk = TRUE,
SS = TRUE,intruder = FALSE,separation = TRUE
SafeSeparation_Final
CA = TRUE,SS_flow = SS_Final,ca_breach = FALSE,
intruder_m1 = FALSE,mission = CA_Plan,ss_breach = TRUE,
ss_plan = FALSE,ss_response = Idle,ss_risk = TRUE,
SS = TRUE,intruder = FALSE,separation = TRUE
SafeSeparation_Final
CA = TRUE,SS_flow = SS_Final,ca_breach = FALSE,
intruder_m1 = FALSE,mission = On_Route,ss_breach = TRUE,
ss_plan = FALSE,ss_response = Idle,ss_risk = TRUE,
SS = TRUE,intruder = FALSE,separation = TRUE
SafeSeparation_Final
Figure C.8: SafeSeparation with deviation from accident case CollisionWithIntruderAircraft
and prevention from extension use case CollisionAvoidance.| |
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